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Ph.D.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

is

defined here as the view that the needless killing or eating of animals

A number of environmental

vegetarianism in particular.

Many

oppose animal liberation

ethicists

in general

is

and

of their arguments are motivated by a concern that the

principles of animal liberation imply negative evaluations of

life

processes intimately associated

with the natural world, particularly pain, death, and predation. Environmentalists also charge that
animal liberation entails a distancing of humanity from nature in a manner that
to the extent that

it is

attempted, spiritually

if

is

untenable and,

not physically unhealthy.

Likewise, animal liberationists attack the philosophical foundations of environmentalism.

They argue

that non-sentient

liberationists fear that a

and any natural event
foothold.

Human

life

can have neither

realm of values which

is

intrinsic value

too broad

—would prevent the animal

activities

nor moral

—including

liberation

rights.

Animal

plants, rivers, ecosystems,

agenda from gaining a moral

such as hunting and eating animals can easily be swallowed up in

natural categories, the environmentalists' gateway to positive evaluation.
In the midst of the ongoing dispute

dissertation

comes

between vegetarianism and environmentalism,

to the defense of each against the other.

makes the philosophical mistake of clinging
and environmentalism are interwoven

as

I

argue that each side in the dispute

to a monistic axiology.

programs

this

I

argue also that vegetarianism

for practical change.

done a
Neither mainstream animal liberationism nor mainstream environmentalism has
very good job of addressing the impact of

its

agenda on

v

issues of

interhuman justice.

I

examine

radical environmentalisms

which have done exactly

this.

Two

of these left-wing

environmentalisms, deep and social ecology, have failed both the animals and themselves by not
addressing animal welfare directly.
of articulating a coherent position

A third,

ecofeminism, will be shown to have done the best job

which addresses

all

three concerns: environmentalism,

vegetarianism, and social justice.

I

conclude by discussing previous visions of a humane,

just,

society.

Most lack nothing

apart.

argue that a successful program will reject that separation.

I

in

recommendations

for

vi

ways

in

and environmentally sound

which humans and animals might

live

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
jv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ABSTRACT
LIST

v

OF TABLES

x

Chapter
1.

DISCORD
1.1

1

Assumptions

1

1.1.1

Anti- Animal Liberationists Believe in the

1.1.2

Anti-Animal Liberationists Are on a Desperate Defensive
1.1. 2.1
1.

1.1.4

2.

3

Incommensurability

4
6

Fudging on 'Necessary Suffering’

7

The Arguments for Animal Rights Have Already Been Given
A Thousand Words: The Limitations of Argument for the Assumption...

1.2

The

1.3

A Note on Method and

Baird Callicott on

The Main Reasons

17
for Formulating

2.1

J.

2.2

Arguments against the Liberation of Domestic Animals

an Interspecies Ethic

Five Arguments from 'Practical Impossibility

2.3

Arguments against the Liberation of Wild Animals

2.4

Rolston:

2.5

Arguments from Axiology

The Argument from the

1

...

17
18
18

The Argument from Incoherency

ORIGINS AND INDIANS:

9

16

a Definition

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL LIBERATION

2.2.2

8

13

Dissertation

2.2.1

3.

2

1.2.2 Skepticism

1.1. 2. 3

1.1.3

Assumption

1

Definition of Hights'

20
26
32

35

MORE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL LIBERATION

3.1

Rolston and Hettinger: The Argument from the Past

3.2

Callicott:

3.3

Native American Linguistics and Narratives

3.4

The Rest

The Argument from the

'Savage'

43
43

47
53

57

of the Story

vii

3.5

4.

3.4.1

Oj ib wa Pers ons

3.4.2

Lakota Families

Some Concluding Remarks

THE WORTH OF NON-SENTIENT
4.1

Plant Life:

LIFE,

NATURAL OBJECTS, AND ECOSYSTEMS

against Vegetarianism

Responses to the Slide Argument

4.3

Challenging the Consciousness Criterion

4.3.2
4.3.3

Arguments
Arguments
Arguments

The Value of Plants

4.5.3

73

for the Consciousness Criterion:

4.5

The
The

as Part of a Valuable

Members Constitute the Summum Bonum
Members Contribute Causally to the Realization
Summum Bonum
More Difficulties for the Leopold/Callicott Theory
Individual

A

4.8

An

4.9

The Problem of Evil and the Problem

.

1

88

Individual

4.7

The

92
93

100

The Problem of the

Biological Individual

103

of Junk

105

UTOPIA

IN

90
of the

94

Multitude of Tele
Alternative Path:

73
82
83

85

Environment

Telos and The Intrinsic Value of Organisms

5

Deontology

—Three Arguments

4.6

ANIMALS

65

for the Consciousness Criterion: Preference Utilitarianism...
for the Consciousness Criterion: Hedonistic Utilitarianism...

Consciousness Does Not Exhaust Value

4.5.1

65

7q

4.4

4.5.2

.

An Argument

^

4.2

4.3.1

5

60
62

115

Crisis Mentality

115

5.2

Deep Ecology

117

5.3

Social Ecology

120

5.4

Sodal Ecology versus Deep Ecology

122

5.5

Vegetarian Critique of the

Deep Ecology

The Vegetarian
The Vegetarian

5.5.3

Past Connections

5.5.4

The Present Obstacles between Vegetarianism and

Ecofeminism:

A

126

Ecologies

5.5.2

5.5.1

5.6

Two

Critique of

126
131

Critique of Social Ecology

Radical Response to the Critique

viii

the

Two

134
Ecologies.. 138
140

5.6.1

5.6.2

The Margins around Ecofeminism
The Ecofeminist Critique of Deep Ecology
5.6.2.

5.6.3

5.7

6.

A

5. 6. 2. 2

Critique of the totalizing 'Self
Critique of the Diagnosis of 'Anthropocentricism

5. 6. 2. 3

Critique of

1

Ecofeminism

as a

Deep Ecology Culture

Vegetarianism

Feminist Argument against Vegetarianism

CLOSING RANKS
6.1

6.2

142
145

1

145
146
149

150
151

163

Animals in Utopia, Part

II

1

on Midgley

63

6.1.1

Callicott

6.1.2

Taylor

lyi

6.1.3

Ahimsa, Jainism, and Veganism

I77

I64

Conclusion

lg 4

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1

IX

ot

LIST

OF TABLES

Table
1

.

Page
Prices of

some

groceries (July 30, 1995)

x

..162

CHAPTER

1

DISCORD

1.1

Assumptions

The bulk of this

dissertation

is

devoted to defending the proposition that vegetarianism,

environmentalism, and social justice are, despite mutual antagonisms,
compatible.
three starting assumptions,

two of which

Dictionary s definition of oppress.
thereof,

is

engaged

in

an unjustly harsh

segments of humanity are engaged
(3) that the

environment

assumptions,

little

I

mean

They

that

is

I

in

are formulated with the help of the
are (1) that humanity, or

Random House

an unjustly harsh

not going to spend

exercise of power over other

When

much time

I

say that these are

way business

I

we

crisis.

One might

assumption to be that humanity, or some segment thereof,
exercise of power' over the environment. This

it is

will

do

is

done on

this planet at this

at

the most

done; nor should any rational person need convincing that

are in the midst of a global environmental

unexamined; while

I

attempt to argue directly

time in history or that these injustices can and should be mitigated by changing
is

my starting

rights, intrinsic value, inherent

worth, or are otherwise deserving of moral consideration; nor will
either that social injustices are an integral part of the

some

segments; and

arguing directly for them.

by way of trying to convince the reader that animals have

fundamental level the way business

segment

significant

exercise of power over the other animals;
(2) that

going to hell in a handbasket.

am

some

begin with

I

I

is

expect

engaged

my environmental

in

an 'unjustly harsh

believe to be too controversial to be

easy to see that the environment

is

left

being systematically disappeared,

it is

not widely accepted that one can be unjust to an ecosystem or to a tree or river.

The three major assumptions
which

is

that are

about the philosophical and practical

liberationists, the environmentalists,

believes that animals

fall

and

all

made

are justified in the context of this dissertation,

conflicts

between the agendas of the animal

those concerned with social justice. Obviously,

beyond the pale of moral concern, or

if

one believes that there

is

if

no

one

accordingly simpler, and the topic of this dissertation
loses at least
simplification

is

least a practical

who do

available to those

problem.

my belief,

It is

some

of

its

interest.

Further

not think that environmental destruction presents
at

though, that

we have

entered a period of history where

most Westerners (my primary audience) are concerned
about the environment, believe
is

social injustice

which should be

and believe that one should

rectified,

that there

treat animals in a

manner

that can be called ethical.

While

do think

will not

argue directly for the three main assumptions on which

proper to consider

it is

of animals

I

a fair one. After

is

view. In what follows,

those

who

those

who do

why

all,

feel confident that the

I

this dissertation has

when speak
I

this

paper

rests,

I

assumption regarding the oppression

been written from the vegetarian point of

of 'anti-animal liberationists’

should be taken as referring to

I

argue directly and conservatively against animals' having moral considerability—
i.e.,
not appeal to environmentalist principles or principles of social justice and

who have

otherwise not expressed any particular commitments to such principles.

1-1-1 Anti-Animal Liberationists Believe in the

When
against those

reminded of
suffer

is

to

I

Assumption

think about the task that an animal liberationist

who

confronted with

when

arguing

staunchly defend the old view that animals are not morally considerable,

Plato's Gorgias.

wrong than

is

to

In that dialogue, Socrates

do wrong. While sometimes

change Polus' mind,

at others Socrates

is

it is

is

out to convince Polus that

it is

1

I

am

better to

evident that Socrates believes that his task

of the seemingly extraordinary opinion that

everyone really does believe as he, Socrates, does

—only they do not

realize

it.

Polus'

own

point of

view mirrors that of Socrates [474b 1]:
Polus.

1

How

seems
least

[...]

old this view
likely that

is,

Would you

or even whether

most people,

some concern

rather suffer

at

it

wrong than do wrong?

merits being referred to as the 'standard' view,

most times,

for the welfare of animals

in

most places

The

—even

—

these facts and

more

and concern for animal suffering
has never been greater

in

the animal liberation

doubt on the idea that indifference to animal suffering is the 'old' way
new It is no doubt true, though, that the extent of concern for animals

cast

is

It

at

disgust people evinced at the animal-torturings of

Cartesian disciples, the fact that the age of vivisection simultaneously heralded

movement

debatable.

—have had

is

post-Cartesian Europe

in the post-industrial

revolution west than

it

is

now

2

Socrates. Yes,
Polus.

On

and so would you and so would everybody.
the contrary, neither you nor I nor
anybody

would make

Socrates and Polus are each convinced
that the other person

dissonance, or

is

willfully disbelieving

same problem plaguing anti-animal
themselves from the view that
following remarks,

all

what he

'really'

liberationists.

it is all

The

believes.

They have

is

that choice.

suffering

from cognitive

attentive reader will find the

a collective habit of distancing

right to inflict unnecessary cruelty

on animals. Consider the

of which appear in anti-animal liberationist
literature:

In considering the

claim that scientific research violates
animal rights, it is
important to distinguish between the truism that
needless suffering should be
discouraged and the entirely different across-the-board
claim that

animals in research (or food)

is

wrong.

all

use of

1

do not believe it betrays undue sensitivity to find
certain practices employed on
factory farms profoundly disturbing. To put
no finer point on the matter, there
are practices afoot on them, pre-eminently in
the cases of laying hens and veal
calves, of which we cannot be proud. 4
l

Until something like a consensus emerges, amongst
philosophers and
psychologists concerning the nature of consciousness, and
amongst ethologists
over the cognitive powers of animals, it may be wiser to
continue to respond to

animals as

if

As soon as

it is

admission that

is

their

mental

states

were conscious ones. 5

admitted that one should not unnecessarily harm an animal, which

which the above philosophers

fail

where the arguments against animal

rights

5

Gorgias p 62
,

Levin, 'Animal Rights Evaluated,' p 12.
Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering, p 22
Carruthers, p 192f

is

a

fair

one

is

that

we have

entered a period

have taken on a desperately defensive tone. They tend

to be rehashed versions of old arguments, or based

4

degree of legitimacy

on a Desperate Defensive

Another reason for thinking the assumption

Plato,

affairs gains a

to appreciate.

1-1.2 Anti-Animal Liberationists Are

2

an

either implicit or explicit in the writings of these three anti-animal
liberationists,

then the animal liberationist critique of the current state of

3

is

on wildly implausible assumptions, or just

4

to

be rehashed versions of old arguments, or based on
wildly implausible assumptions, or just

plain thoughtless.

Here

present three relatively (for philosophy) recent
arguments (or recent

I

appearances of old arguments) against various aspects of
animal

1. 1.2.1

rights.

Incommensurability

The

argument was brought

first

to

my attention in

years ago but has recently resurfaced. In that
If

first article,

an

article

published some eighteen

Michael Levin wrote:

animals are to be given consideration equal to that
man and a wolf trapped on a mountaintop.

case of a

we
It

give to

man, consider the

would, then, be wrong to

make

a greater effort to rescue the man... Well, suppose we say that
we owe some
consideration to animals, although not consideration equal to that we owe
our
fellowman. Suppose the obligation is, say, one-one-hundredth as strong.
Then if
a man and a pack of one hundred wolves were trapped on a mountaintop,
it

would be wrong
This, of course,

represented as a

(1)

modus
If

to

is

a greater effort to rescue the man. 6

make

supposed to be a reductio of the animal

tollens

can be

argument:

humans'

rights.

(2)

Those

rights are not equal to

(3)

Those

rights are not

.'.

It

animals have rights, then either those rights are equal to or some

fraction of

(4)

rights position.

some

Animals do not have

human

fraction of

rights.

human

rights.

rights.

Lines (2) and (3) are supposedly justified in the stories of the mountaintop. But Levin
over-interprets the import of his

man and

own

a wolf, but two people, one of which

OK for you to

rescue your family

person's rights are not equal?

member

you honor

familial ties.

member. This

is

is

The same

is

actually be

true in the case of a

15.

member

on the mountaintop
of yours.

'yes,'

but

it is

From the
it

number

number

not a

is

fact that

it is

follow that the other

not a very shocking

to lack a certain right with respect to you,

not to deny that a sufficient

Levin, 'Animal Rights Evaluated,' p

a family

is

instead of the other person, does

The answer might

The non-family member just happens

6

Imagine that what

stories.

namely a

'yes.'

right that

of strangers versus one family

of strangers presents one with a genuine

5

moral dilemma (and the same might be true of a
of certain kinds);

it is

only to say that the conflict

resolution does not indicate that the
with.

that particular situation

8
.

rights, or

rights the recognition of

He

essentially the

is

if

same

There
speaks of

is

9

forgets,

me he

goes the extra step by

call into

Question the view that, where the choice
'the best thing to

'value'

of

'lives.'

of Levin's, published sixteen years after the

Where Levin speaks
This difference

first,

in

is

of

is

do would be to save

Hence, he formulates a flawed reductio similar to

and the

occurs in the context of his arguing that

effectively

is

have no

any human

if,

'rights' in his article

Carruthers

perhaps bridged by another

rights (no value) at

no question of weighing up animal

all.

which he implies that the two are

is

incommensurably

7

This

is

why

human

beings

10
.'

This

have

greater, then animals

Levin would agree with Carruthers' protest that 'there

lives against

the lives of

humans

intuitively abhorrent that the lives or sufferings of animals should be

sufferings of

article

as Fulda claims in his defense of animals, animals

right (or value)

as

Levin's.

interchangeable; he writes of 'the rights of the crocodiles, or their value as sentient beings

rights (or value) but

in

however, that considerations of family and friends (or

a slight difference, though.

'suffering’

be bothered

which would have saved them

story, but like

between some number of human persons and another,
lives as possible .'

rights too small to

the choice were not between persons and animals but between

shipmates or fellow platoon members)

many

had

.

comparing what one should do
persons and persons

of animals, especially animals

7

what

tells

number

not one of rights simpliciter, and so the

is

had no

'losers'

They just did not have the kind of

Carruthers

sufficient

'

11

and that 'we

find

weighed against the

it

lives or

12
.'

the classic dog-in-a-lifeboat problem

is

more complicated than people sometimes

notice, each

person has different rights with respect to different boatmates. Until something about the passengers and the
dog and the relationship of each to the others are all known, the puzzle is too vague to be useful For

one of the passengers a heinous war criminal 9 (No dearth of those at this point in history.) Then
On the other hand, the dog might just be
I believe many would rather throw him overboard than the dog
benefiting accidentally from what should be done with that particular passenger regardless.
example,

8

9

is

Carruthers, p
Carruthers, p.

10
1

12

9.
9.

Levin, 'Reply to Fulda on Animal Rights,' p

Carruthers, p 9
Carruthers, p 195.

112.

6

I

way

beg to exclude myself from Carruther's

'we'

and

offer this little bit of science fiction

by

of explanation: Imagine an astronaut hopelessly
adrift in space, as almost happened to the

Apollo 13 astronauts. Nearby there

is

a planet teeming with

There are no humans on the planet, nor anything

Now,

if

a

comet

be better: that

it

else that

life,

very diverse and beautiful.

would usually be regarded

as a person.

heading in the general direction of the astronaut and the
planet, which would

is

destroy the

life-filled planet,

or that

it

destroy the astronaut? Value-wise

surely better that an astronaut with but a few days oxygen
should die a

little

it is

earlier than that

an

entire biosphere should vanish.

But such arguments from
interactions cannot be

crises

have their

subsumed under the

humans and

1.1. 2. 2

entire range of

is

human- animal

your dog or your daughter'

not informative about the proper relations

animals. This should not be surprising, since the

convicted felon or your daughter.' There
laboratory.

The

vivisectionists' favorite

problem. The preference for one's daughter
generally between

limits.

is

same goes

for

'a

hardly a case there for the use of convicts in the

1

Skepticism

The ghost of Descartes

still

haunts the animal rights debate. Somehow, Descartes'

conception of animals as mere machines which only appear to be terrorized, in pain, elated,
hungry,

etc. still exercises a grip

tried to

revamp Descartes

on the minds of philosophers. Among philosophers who have

in the light of another three

hundred and

fifty

years of science and

philosophy are Peter Carruthers and David Hilbert. While the normative inference from 'no minds'
to 'no rights' has a

good deal of plausibility (but see chapter

that animals have

no minds

picture of

how

is

3), establishing the empirical claim

another thing altogether. Cartesians tend to

settle for a speculative

animal physiology might work in the absence of an animal psychology. Hilbert and

13

It might also be worth remembering that the government and medical establishment have often enough
opted for the 'your daughter and your dog' approach, as in involuntary radiation and syphilis experiments.
The radiation experiments in the western part of the US have become a focus of the media For a brief but
informative discussion and disturbing photographs of the forty-year syphilis experiment on blacks in

Alabama see

Spiegel,

pp 63-66.

7

Carruthers both appeal to the
object

phenomenon

of blindsight. People with blindsight can

in their visual field without experiencing

is

that animal

minds might work

is

parked cars or doing the dishes while absorbed

we do them more

or less 'automatically.'

The problems with these views

more

familiar,

in a piece of

behavior

is

is

to apparently

such as steering around double-

music

—

activities that are so routine

14

are, first, the

extreme nature of the skepticism and,

second, the speculative nature of the theories that follow
existence of animal minds

Cartesians begin by noticing that the

it.

not logically entailed by either their behavior or by the fact that their

is

remarkably similar to our own, certainly conscious, behavior. However,

observation not only

fails

that an

Hilbert and Carruthers both suggest

visually.

Another appeal, made by Carruthers,

like this.

non-conscious but goal-oriented behavior that

that

it

know

to prove that animals

do not have minds;

it

this

also fails to give us a reason

to seriously doubt that they do. Cartesian theories of animal psychology are themselves too

speculative to either prove their case or cause us to doubt that animals have minds.

1.1. 2. 3

Fudging on 'Necessary Suffering'

The

Many

last

of the desperate defenses

people think that eating meat

hundreds of thousands of
But there has also been

arguments

for

living

less

is

I

will look at

necessary for

is

the defense from necessary suffering.

human

health, although there are literally

counterexamples (not to mention

all

the vegetarians in history).

naive fudging with the concept of 'necessary,' and William Paton's

animal experimentation are a gold mine. His unflinching description and defense of

the use of the Draize test (wherein a

cosmetics to the eyes of a

number

of

human
bound

applies

what

is

usually a

compound

for toiletries or

rabbits) ends with the following:

The first is that we have enough
cosmetics and toiletries anyway, and do not need anymore: and looking round a
chemist's shop, that seems convincing. But it is worth recalling that that could
have been said about soap in the 1930's, when cracked hands and washerwoman's
dermatitis were familiar sights. It was only by being able to take advantage of

Two comments

14

The

fact that the

are often

in this context.

examples are of 'routines' might

rather than giving us insight into

character of routine behavior

another task

made

is

how

affect the force

of Carruthers' argument

It

may be

animals might function without consciousness, the non-conscious

a concomitant of complex consciousness that frees up the mind for yet

that,

8

chemical advances that today's detergents are possible, along with
improvements in means of care for sensitive or blemished skin. 15

Some

the other

concrete examples would have been helped Paton's case here. As

sentence completely mystifying, as

I

need dripping into

rabbit's eyes

and

—simple plant and mineral

(2) the pursuit of

what Paton

been fueled by the desire to make a cheaper, not a more

bom

it is,

oils

—are not the

sort that

healthful, detergent.

Both of these

out by the existence of more expensive, all-natural products, including the

necessity of the Draize test.

More importantly,

for

Paton to deem

this

lie

is

now

to the

use of animals ’needed’

effectively contradicts his periodic lip-service to the concerns of animal liberationists

The

find the last

’chemical advances' has

calls

ninety-nine cent bar of glycerin hand soap (see Figure 4.1). Such products give the

that said lip-service

I

have gotten the impression over the years that (1) the kind of

substances that are beneficial to the skin

suspicions are

all

and indicates

required by the liberal climate.

state of the anti-animal liberation right

condition of the pro-slavery right in the post-Civil

and

War

its

era.

arguments

The

is

reminiscent of the

loss of the

inspired such ridiculous and obviously defensive writings as 'The Negro

moral ’high ground’

A Beast

(1900), a racist

theological tract, [in which] author Chas. Carroll wrote, "All Scientific Investigation of the Subject

Proves the Negro to Be

An

16

Ape."’

I

believe that the anti-animal liberationists have also lost the

high ground and that the arguments above represent a similar kind of straw-grasping.

1.1.3

The Arguments

for

Animal Rights Have Already Been Given

Another reason for leaving
that can be

off the

done has been. Whether

Humeanism, or what have you,

it

it is

l?

16

Paton, p

143.

Spiegel, p 32.

some

all

is

that

all

the direct arguing

the classic analytic theories have been brought to

less success.

particular line of

for animal rights

Singer's utilitarianism, Regan's deontology, Midgley's

seems that

bear on the animals issue, with more or
criticisms against

argument

Indeed, even those

who have

argument sometimes acknowledge

its

general

power

in the

9

animals' case (e.g., Benton

on Regan, Adams on

ethics has the result of excluding animals

or

Habermasian communicative

Singer). Furthermore,

from the moral universe,

ethics, this

is

now

when

as in

widely taken to be a

a general theory of

Rawlsian contractualism
fault of the

theory (as the

authors themselves admit).
This

is

not to say that any one from the

sufficient in addressing the concerns of

any better with the animals
present author has no
that dramatic

new

theory, nor a

will not

group of theories

I

mentioned has proven

animal rights or welfare; they cannot be expected to do

issue than they

improvements

first

have done

in

interhuman

new improvement on an

The point

ethics.

is

that the

old theory, to offer, and believes

be forthcoming anytime soon. Such are the

limits of the

power

of analytic ethics to describe, let alone revise, our beliefs about the
proper treatment of each

other,

whether human or animal.

1-1-4

A Thousand
One

final

Words: The Limitations of Argument for the Assumption
reason for declining to argue the case for animals from scratch

argument might not be the
is

familiar land with propositions, valid inferences,

the method used throughout this dissertation. However, to

develop a concern for animals, probably requires,
particular facts about

what

is

happening

right

in

now:

most cases

facts

on board'

'get

at least,

is

that the best

and conclusion. This
in the first place, to

being confronted with the

about animals themselves and

how

they

naturally behave, facts about intensive rearing, facts about animal experiments, etc.

Furthermore, these

facts are not fully accessible

through the written word. While Singer's

report in Animal Liberation on the horrible abuses of animals

was

a bombshell in American

consciousness, the fact remains that such horrors can be explained
to confront them.

The more

limited the information, the easier

that Thatcher learned from the

American experience

in

away when people do not have

it is

to accept. This

Vietnam and applied

to the

was the lesson

war

in the

Falklands. As long as television cameras have immediate access to the battlefield so that citizens

are confronted with the ultimately indescribable reality of young Americans (and foreign soldiers

10

and

civilians)

window,

it is

and kept a
and

having their limbs blown off right in front of them, just on the
other side of the

TV

questionable whether any war will enjoy popular support. Thatcher
used this lesson

tight reign

on media coverage. Reagan followed

suit in

Grenada; Bush

ditto in

Panama

Iraq.

On

the other hand,

some good has come

of this visual-visceral connection, too.

doubtful that the national interest in the famine in Ethiopia would have taken
off

if

It is

the media had

given the story in just words instead of showing us what was happening.
It

seems to

me

that filtering out the visuals in favour of abstract argument imposes

—unnatural because our values

unnatural limits on the animals' case, too

some on naked emotional

are dependent to at least

response. Unfortunately, Singer and Regan, as the

made

liberation philosophers, have

it

two leading animal

understood that the animal liberation rationale

is

divorced

from emotional appeals:
have argued for it, appealing to reason rather than to emotion or sentiment. I
have chosen this path, not because I am unaware of the importance of kind
feelings and sentiments of respect toward other creatures, but because reason is
more universal and more compelling in its appeal. ..I do not think that an appeal
to sympathy and good-heartedness alone will convince most people of the
17
wrongness of speciesism
I

.

(the more emotionally charged) we are, the more likely we are to
reach a mistaken moral conclusion, while the cooler (the calmer) we are, the

The hotter

greater the chances that

While
argument,

I

I

do not want

to

we

will avoid

making mistakes

deny the relevance of impartiality and

believe that Singer and

giving the emotions their due, have

Regan have taken a dangerously

made

it

seem

as

taken exception to the Singer/Regan
it is

line

'coolness' to

moral

abstract road and,

by not

though our emotional responses to animals

are themselves irrelevant to the project of liberation.

Certainly

18
.

on emotions

I

agree with those ecofeminists

who have

in ethics:

may be morally
on reason alone may be

possible that a decision based on emotion alone

indefensible, but

it is

also possible that a decision based

objectionable. Furthermore, the beings we are considering are not just animals;
they are Lassie the dog and the family's companion cat, bald eagles and bunnies,
snakes and skunks. Similarly, humans are not just humans; they are friends and
lovers, family and foe. The emotional force of kinship or closeness to another is a
17

Animal Liberation, p 243
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights p
Singer,

lx

,

129.

11

element in thinking about moral deliberations. To
ignore the reality of this
influence in favor of some abstraction such as
absolute equality may be not only
impossible, but undesirable 19
crucial

.

Singer himself offers examples of what
call

a 'decision based on reason alone' that

is

I

Gruen (and many of

believe

'objectionable

us,

I

am

sure)

would

1

:

If Fenelon s future writings really will bring
wisdom and joy to thousands,
whereas my father's life is of no significance to anyone except
him and me, I
ought to save Fenelon.. .If people in Chad and Cambodia are
suffering from famine
and my money can help, I ought to give and go on giving until
the sacrifices that I
and my family are making begin to match the benefits the recipients
obtain from

my

gifts.

Presumably Singer s family
of the virtue of impartiality.
truth but

would

also be rid of

Those who wish

doing well and he

some measure

who

is

not acting in accordance with his theory

he were to give up that theory he would not only be closer to the
of false guilt.

to bring the emotions to bear

butting heads with those

which

If

is

on questions of

advocate pure impartiality. The former,

reflects the kind of character

we

like to

encourage

in

ethics are not simply

it

seems

we

children exhibit appreciation for animals' welfare not simply because this virtue

for animals

whatever

species.

I

and

raising a child

who

On the

other hand,

p 79

In the

same

Theory,'

useful to the

virtue), but

because

we

between

ethics

between

all

individuals of

and emotional response to a

in

Gaard, pp

Singer, The

believe there

is little

to be gained by further direct

An Analysis of the Connection Between Women and Animals,' in Gaard,
Donovan connects the Singer/Regan view with a kind of 'coldly rational'
way for oppressions generally See Donovan, 'Animal Rights and Feminist

167-194

Expanding Circle p 153
,

I

do believe that much more can be done by way of the

collection

thinking that has helped ease the
20

I

Gruen, 'Dismantling Oppression:
,

is

our

believe that the direct analytic case for animal rights has done as good a job as can be

argument.

ed

exhibits a dull impartiality

this discussion of the relationship

expected from the abstract, written word.

19

on

like to see

itself

sympathy

head:

(the hedonistic utilitarian line

like to

—else we should be indifferent between raising a child who has positive

value that virtue in

To bring

me, have a view

our children. Most of us

nurture our children's affinity for animals and discourage cruelty. Moreover,

improvement of the general happiness

to

12

presentation of the situation
is

itself.

A good example

of the kind of presentation

I

am

talking about

a booklet called The Story of Animal Cruelties Told by
Photographs, which was put together by

the

New

England Anti-Vivisection Society way back

suffering of research

wildlife as a

and agribusiness animals

is

in 1938.

Callicott's

not greater than that endured by free-living

consequence of predation, disease, starvation, and

offensive ring after

we have been

claim that 'the pain and

21

cold’

begins to have an almost

confronted with evidence such as the photograph bearing the

following caption:

LIVING DOG SPLIT IN THREE PARTS. With its spinal cord cut in two places, just
below the neck and about four inches above the tail, this dog is about to receive
an electric shock. His hindquarters and tail may be seen in the device, with the
vivisector holding the switch.

Said the Washington Star of December 29, 1937,
"The dog could see, hear, smell and taste with its head, but it couldn't control the
movement of one of its paws from the brain." 22

Other books featuring photographs of animal experiments, intensive rearing, and sports
include Monica Hutchings and Mavis Caver's Man's Dominion: Our Violation of the Animal World

(London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1970) and Marjorie Spiegel's The Dreaded Comparison:

Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror, 1989). As an example of how such images cut
offer the following

comments by an anonymous

participant at a conference

Human and

to the chase

on the overpopulation

of dogs and cats:
I'm not an animal control or humane professional. I'm a laborer, and I'm here
because I love animals. I've learned a lot. When you showed that poster before,

of the puppy in front of the pile of euthanized animals,

I could hear a wave of
shock go through the room. I think that's a good poster. People in the public, like
me you have to deal with this problem every working day people like me can
drive by the shelters where this is all going on and never go into a place in our
lives. The members of the public need to see that. People may say it's shocking.
23
There are some fairly shocking pictures of AIDS patients.

—

21

22
23

Defense p 35.
England Anti-Vivisection Society, p 5

Callicott, In

New

—

Anchel, p 56.

,

I
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1.2

The

Dissertation

Exposure to stomach-turning descriptions and imagery can awaken

in us a

sympathy

for

animals, a longing for the mitigation of their condition, or even
motivation to get directly involved
in

movements

However, that

for change.

only a

is

We

first step.

must then

how

figure out just

to

respond.

If

I

am

to

is

be believed,

between three areas of concern: animal

conflicts

justice.

the literature on the subject

believe that most people have at least

I

interested in

all

three. Because

I

rights,

some

be practical or philosophical:

when

there are

beef cattle in

light of the

How

natural lives?

How

can

hungry

we

for

can

How

can

to feed?

we

is

three

is

areas.

important,

also

I

important too, whether those

afford to maintain a natural environment

How can we

liberate millions

upon

millions of

decry

human

predation and yet strive to protect Sumatran tigers?

How

shall

we

value our

when human

own

selves

if

beings

we

all

over the world are

value the natural beauty of

cannot help but transform? These questions and more are raised and,

I

hope,

in this dissertation.

In a nutshell, the

answer

environmentalists have spent

lies in

worth noting

in this dispute.

making

allies

of enemies. Animal liberationists and

much time and many pages

that this almost exclusively antagonistic

First,

criticizing

each other's agenda.

I

believe

engagement has been a mistake. There are three things

animal liberationists and environmentalists have mutually

compatible main agendas. Second, they have
(e.g.,

we

three

all

all

one of these three

impact they would have on the environment in the pursuit of their

bread and justice?

we

environmental degradation, and social

interest in at least

give the animals even a moment's concern

a world which

answered

more and more people

are immediately faced with serious

think that finding solutions to

think that resolving the apparent conflicts between
conflicts

we

at least

some mutually supportive minor agendas

preservation of the environment on which wild animals depend), and this makes them

natural political allies (would they but notice this and act accordingly). Third, and this

fallout

from the

first

point, their

is

just the

arguments against each others views tend to be either merely

14

tangential to their

own

respective agendas or based on the most problematic
aspects of

believe are the philosophical grounds of their

Chapters

and 4 reveal

2, 3,

own

what they

view.

this third point.

In Chapters 2

the arguments of environmentalists against animal liberation.

and 3

Many

I

examine and

criticize

of the arguments are

motivated by a concern that the principles of animal liberation
imply negative evaluations of

life

processes intimately associated with the natural world, particularly
pain, death, and predation.
the fears of the environmentalists are justified,

it

seems that the animal liberation ethic

entails a

preference for a predator-free world and an impossibly death-free world.
Philosophically,
turn implies (on the face of

it,

If

this in

anyway) the devaluation of predatory animals. The

environmentalists fear that the ultimate practical implication of animal liberation

we

that

is

should

eliminate predatory animals. At least one vegetarian philosopher would seem to confirm these
fears:

Steve Sapontzis

made

his notoriety

by condoning the rescue of rabbits from

foxes.

There

is

the additional suspicion that animal liberation entails a distancing of humanity from nature in a

manner

that

is

untenable and, to the extent that

unhealthy. These are
In Chapter 4

all

I

legitimate concerns;

examine and

criticize

I

it is

hope

attempted, spiritually
to

with a skepticism with regard to non-sentient

have answered them.

is

Peter Singer,

life's

whose

utilitarianism inspires

having any intrinsic value or

the fact that non-sentient beings have neither pleasures nor preferences

is

motivation behind the animal liberationist case against environmentalists

is

too broad

—including

not physically

the arguments of animal liberationists against

environmentalism. The main complainant here

of values which

if

plants, rivers, ecosystems,

rights.

decisive.

is

For Singer,

The

the fear that a realm

and any natural event

prevent the animal liberation agenda from gaining a moral foothold.

him

Human

activities

—would

such as

hunting and eating animals can easily be swallowed up in natural categories, the
environmentalists' gateway to positive evaluation. With this concern in

to a

number

mind I turn

a critical eye

of theories justifying nature's being a bearer of intrinsic value and explaining the basis

15

for that claim. At the

down the

other,

end of the three chapters we

which

is

what one might expect

of

will

have found that each side

two

positions so intertwined.

fails

to argue

Neither mainstream animal liberationism nor mainstream
environmentalism has done a

very good job of addressing the impact of
I

examine

radical environmentalisms

its

agenda on

issues of

which have done exactly

interhuman justice. In Chapter 5

this.

1

will

show

that

two

of these

left-wing environmentalisms, deep and social ecology, have
failed both the animals and

themselves by not addressing animal welfare

done the best job of

directly.

A third,

articulating a coherent critical position

ecofeminism, will be shown to have

which addresses

all

three concerns:

environmentalism, vegetarianism, and social justice. Furthermore, in embracing
causes, ecofeminism

shows how each can derive strength from the other two.

all

It is

three of these

a powerful

combination.

The bulk
well.

There

1

of the dissertation

discuss visions of a

attempt to assimilate Midgleys

is critical,

humane,

Humean

and that

just,

is

under

and environmentally sound

fate.

rejected as a universal prescription for

critical scrutiny

recommendations
threefold agenda

for

and

ways

demands

is

society.

Callicott's

analyzed and found wanting. Taylor's Kantian

system of environmental ethics suffers a similar
is

tone creeps into the conclusion as

analysis of animal rights into a unified

environmentalist/animal liberationist ethic

Jainism

critical

The

principle of ahimsa

human-animal

is

examined, and

Veganism comes

interaction.

tentatively rejected. While these last three views lack nothing in

in

which humans and animals might

that

we

live apart,

of the animal and environmental

left

I

conclude that our

give

more

attention to the

question of how humans and animals can live together, with humans flourishing in their peculiar
role as the animal that loves the other animals.
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1*3

A Note on Method and

a Definition

Sometimes an argument
it is

mixed

is

embedded

in rhetoric

and redundant phraseology. Sometimes

in with other arguments. This can create
confusion for the reader

product of the writer's

own

and sometimes

the

is

confusion.

In order to avoid error

and to reveal

assumptions that go into the arguments

I

as quickly

will

and elegantly

be examining,

interpretations of those arguments. For example,

if

I

and

often present semi-formal

someone argues

because the Bible grants humankind mastery over the world,

as possible the rationale

we

that vegetarianism

is

wrong

can represent the argument as

follows:

(1)

The

(2)

If (1),

(3)

.'.

Bible grants

then

It is

humankind mastery over the world.

(3).

morally permissible to

These semi-formal interpretations
true,

will

kill

and eat animals.

always be formally valid.

If

the above premises are

then by the force of logic the conclusion must be true as well. There are a number of such

arguments in each chapter. In order to avoid confusion, the reader should keep

mention of

'line

one,'

'premise

(2),'

'the

third premise,' etc.

mind

in

that any

always refers to the argument

immediately preceding the discussion.

One
sense:

final note.

In this dissertation, the

word

'vegetarianism'

is

used in

vegetarianism = ethical vegetarianism = the view that the needless

animals by humans
'unnecessary,' etc.

is

wrong.

killing

There are problems associated with words

Those problems are discussed

the feminist argument against vegetarianism.

in

its

normative

or eating of

like

'needless,'

Chapter 5 in the sections on deep ecology and

CHAPTER

2

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL LIBERATION
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—

Barrd Callicott on

The Mai n R easons

Baird Callicott has

J.

made some

the literature of environmental ethics.

for

Formulating an Inrerspecies

of the

Among

F.thir’

most important and substantive contributions

philosophers he

is

undoubtedly and

justifiably

of the most famous spokespersons for environmentalism.
However, those environmentalists
are also concerned with animal rights might be
disappointed with

Ever since the publication of 'Animal Liberation:

some

A Triangular Affair'

(

to

one

who

parts of Callicott’s oeuvre.

Environmental Ethics,

vol. 1

[1979], pp. 71-81) Callicott has either ignored or been concerned to refute
animal liberationism.
This trend continues in his most recently published book. Earth's
Insights:
Ethics

from

A

Survey of Ecological

the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback (Berkeley:
University of California

Press, 1994), in

which

Callicott criticizes

aboriginal ethics and then goes

on

David H. Bennett’s animal

liberationist take

to say that ’one reason for formulating

be to abate practices that Westerners

like

Bennett consider cruel, but that

on Australian

an interspecies ethic may
certainly not

is

one of

the main reasons for doing so. The main reasons for formulating an interspedes ethic are to

preserve spedes, which the world

is

losing at an abnormal rate,

and more generally to abate

practices destructive of other aspects of the environment (p. 182f).
1

reasons for formulating an environmental ethic are

is

bound

A

debate about what the main

to be fruitless; after

all,

Callicott

can

hardly argue that the concern for animal suffering would not be one of Bennett's main reasons.

The most
for

Callicott

can do

an environmental

which

is

ethic.

argue that Bennett's concern should not be one of the chief motivators

What most caught my

Callicott succeeds in distancing himself

cruelty. This, together with

attention in this passage

from Westerners

is

like Bennett'

what immediately follows the passage,

on the

Callicott's

comparison of aboriginal ethics with Aldo Leopold's pro-hunting land

ethic,

the subtle

manner

issue of

approving

convinced

me

that

it

in

18

might be worthwhile to go back to
critique the

arguments

this

Callicott's earlier writings

and systematically

lay out

and

eminent environmentalist musters against
animal liberationism.

2-2 Arguments a gain st the Liberation
of Domestic Animalc
Callicott argues against the liberation
of domestic animals in his essay
'Animal Liberation:

A Triangular

Affair.'

In that essay he

is

chiefly concerned with refuting Peter
Singer, a utilitarian

and perhaps the best-known proponent of animal
welfare.

I

will

show

that the bulk of Callicott’s

objections are easily translated into the language
of hedonistic utilitarianism, the theory
which

characterized Singer’s position at that time (having
since been replaced by a preferencesatisfaction theory).

If Callicott's

objections are good, then the utilitarian animal
argument for

animal liberation—which pretends to maximize
happiness—is plagued with a serious
contradiction. Oddly, Callicott never quite

makes

this latter point,

although

it is

self-

entailed in

some

of his arguments. Never mind: Callicott's utilitarian
objections to utilitarian animal liberationism

depend on

2.2.1

false suppositions

about the goals and consequences of the

latter.

The Argument from Incoherence
Callicott's first

argument does not involve hedonistic considerations.

alleged conceptual error on Singer's part. Here
literally

(1)

It is

(2)

If (1),

(3)

.•.

It is

According to

then

cramped

a brief formalization of the argument.

(3).

Callicott,

cages, feeding

based on an

meaningless to suggest that domestic animals be liberated.

not the case that

of natural behaviors which

is

It is

liberate domestic animals.

domestic animals are not by nature

humans

them

we must

are frustrating by,

via conveyor belt,

among

free.

They have no

repertoire

other things, keeping them in

and hooking them up to milking machines.

Domestic animals are creations of man. They are living artifacts, but artifacts
nevertheless. ...It would make as much sense to speak of the natural behavior of
tables and chairs.
1

1

Callicott, In

Defense of the Land Ethic (New York: SUNY Press, 1989), p 30. All further citations of
which includes reprints of his articles on Singer and Regan

Callicott in this dissertation refer to this volume,
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Callicott contrasts the situation of
cows, pigs, etc. with that of

caged wild animals. He

claims that the situation of the latter
parallels that of black slaves in America.
Both are/were

metaphysically autonomous...
by nature if not by convention free beings capable of
ving on their own... [retainable] only by
a continuous counterforce, and only
temporarily. But this is not true of [domestic
animals]. They have been bred to
docility, tractability, stupidity,

and dependency

2

.

In other words, the apparent external
subjection of domestic animals merely mirrors

has been internalized by them through breeding.
There
internal state (a

which they

To paraphrase

Callicott,

incapable of living on their own. There

The second premise

is

is

we

state)

match between

their

and the external conditions

in

they are by both nature and convention unfree
beings
in a

barnyard pig nothing to set

based on the principle of 'ought implies

obligated to do the impossible (or the ’meaningless’).

We

in fact a perfect

human-enforced replacement of their natural

live.

animals, then

is

what

If it is

free.

can.’

We

are never

impossible to liberate domesticated

are not obligated to do so.

should be suspicious of

Callicott’s justification of the

treatment of domesticated

animals. Callicott’s reasoning implies that any immoral act of oppression
might be rendered moral

by sheer dint of being continued over a long enough

stretch of time,

due to certain

continuance of that action might have. The imprisonment of cheetahs

we keep them

liberating the cheetahs

tractability,

which was

its

outset morally reprehensible

Callicott’s reasoning.

I

do not mean

is

now

particular, the action at

2

Callicott, p

30

t+n

is

instead of

if

to suggest that a course of action

different

will find that a

morally acceptable

cannot be right at time t+n, due to changes in context.

cheetah case the action at t+n

wrong, but

captive and breed the species into docility, stupidity,

and dependence, then within a few dozen generations we

at

is

effects the

It

from the action

seems
at

t

—that

which

is

is, if

we

wrong

likely that in the

program
accept

at a

time

t

imaginary

for important intrinsic reasons. In

involves not the continued captivity of wild cheetahs but of
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domesticated cheetahs. The goal of the
breeeding program
redundant. Does that redundancy render
the
Internalized, unfelt control

permanently brainwashed
not follow that
Also,

they

my continued

even

if I

by another can be

captivity

cannot be

is

'cured,'

unjust.

Were

I

to be imprisoned

docility, tractability,

it

does not follow that

does not follow that they do not have wants,

instincts,

we may

in unstimulating

is

it

does

fairly obvious.

my 'keepers’ may do with me

docile, tractable,

as

and dependent,

it

and experience of the fundamental

pleasures and pains that are the lot of sentient beings.
Therefore, until

out of them

1

and

and dependence,

not unjust. Indeed, the contrary

Given that many domesticated animals are stupid,

will.

immediate ’counterforce

product morally acceptable?

final

time t+n into stupidity,

at

to render

is

we

breed consciousness

cause them to feel disaffected by beating them, confining
them, putting them

environments,

3

etc.

Therefore,

all is

not 'by definition' well with domesticated

animals.

This indicates that Callicott’s reading of 'liberation'

lend the
latter

word the same meaning

should be free in the most

But that hardly means that

we

is

too restricted. There

in the case of chickens as in the case of a

literal

is

no need

to

caged cheetah. The

sense; perhaps the former cannot be free in the

same way.

should not liberate chickens from the tiny wire cage, the sunless

warehouse, the conveyor belt feeding routine, the assembly
domesticated animals can be liberated, and so the

first

line slaughter.

premise of

Callicott's

In at least this sense

argument

is

certainly

false.

2.2.2 Five

Arguments from

1

'Practical Impossibility

After Callicott argues that the goal of animal liberation

’practical impossibility.'

4

He

offers five scenarios to

show

Even

if

we were

to breed consciousness out of them,

treatment would be acceptable.
that consciousness
4

Callicott, p

30

it

I

is

would

would not follow

Singer would take exception to

does not exhaust moral value

incoherent he claims that

that this

the start that not one of these scenarios entails anything that

3

is

See Chapter 4

this,

but

I

the case.

call

that

I

it is

a

will point out at

a practical impossibility.

any and

all

subsequent

agree with Callicott and others
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Rather, they are descriptions of the
disastrous consequences that would
arise were animal
liberation to be carried out

on a global

relevant to the debate, the liberation
I

will

compress these

five

scale.

Obviously,

these animal armageddons are to be

if

upon which they depend must be

arguments into one, with the

first

practicable.

premise of the argument

(pages 30-35) giving us what Callicott believes
are the five possible outcomes attendant
upon the
successful liberation of domestic animals, any
one of which
(1)

If

is

supposed to be unacceptable.

domestic animals are liberated, then either
they will suffer and become extinct, or

(i)

their feral descendants will

(ii)

wildlife for food

and

compete with humans and indigenous

living space, or

(iii)

their care will require clearing

(iv)

they will cease to be bred and raised and will be rendered

(v)

the

more land and bringing it into
agricultural production with further loss of wildlife
habitat and
ecological destruction, or
deliberately extinct, or

human

population will explode, causing ecological

catastrophe.

(2)

If (1),

(3)

I

.-.

will

then

(3).

Domesticated animals should not be liberated.

summarize the reasoning behind each

unable to take care of themselves.

If

they were

scenario,

all set

free

(i)

Domesticated animals are

one day, then they would have trouble

finding food (especially during the winter) and taking care of their young.

deal of misery (hunger) and finally extinction (starvation),

they give

descendants

rise to feral

relation to indigenous

life.

They

like the

will disturb native wildlife

so that they must fend for themselves.

We

might take

tremendous increase

we might be

if

it

if

we just

let

in the rate of forest devastation

a great

that

’exotics’ in

pests,

(iii)

domesticated animals loose

upon ourselves

Rhode

is

enough do survive so

and become agricultural

amount of agricultural production required

rapidly growing populations of heifers, longhorns,
in a

Or,

result

mustangs, then such creatures will be

But of course, these scenarios are what will happen only

case the tremendous

(ii)

The

to care for them. In that

to maintain feed stocks for

Island Reds, etc., will necessarily result

and extinction of wild

species,

(iv)

Or

the care-takers of domestic species while at the same time ceasing to breed them.
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This

way we

varieties,

avoid ecological devastation, but
at the cost of eventually
killing off the domestic

(v)

And no matter what

we

policy

pursue with respect to disposing of
the domesticated

animals, the vegetarian diet prescribed
by animal liberationism would yield
'an increase in the
efficiency of the conversion of
solar energy

devastating increase in the

number

from plant to human biomass,' 5
which would permit a

humans and the burden

of

that they represent

on natural

resources.

We
not,

is

must ask whether

Callicotfs scenarios exhaust the
possibilities of

there an acceptable alternative which
does not entail the conclusion?

exhaust the possibilities for

human

And

if

action.

If

the scenarios

action, does Callicott paint a realistic
picture of the

consequences of those actions? Finally,
truly unacceptable?

human

if

he does succeed

Do they really prove

in so doing, are these

consequences

to us that liberating domestic animals

would be a

mistake?
Scenario

adapt to

new

(i) is

probably too pessimistic regarding the

environments.

Many such

animals

ability of

domesticated animals to

know enough about what

to eat to survive.

Grazing animals, for example, hardly need to be taught to
eat grass. Furthermore, for a
these creatures reproduction and the care of young are
pretty

much

instinctual affairs.

lot

Nor

of

is

there any reason to propose that such animals be set free in
their current location, which might be

too cold during the winter were
this scenario

it

not for the rancher's

and move on to scenario

(ii),

which

is

bam

or henhouse. So,

I

propose

we

reject

similar but takes into account these

considerations.

Scenario

(ii)

seems to

me

to

be a

domesticated animals of the world were

which case scenario
speculate.

(i)

would

retain

its

No doubt many populations

fair prediction of

literally set free.

what would happen

True,

relevancy), but this

is

some

the

species might not survive (in

a matter

of formerly domestic animals

if all

on which

would give

it is

difficult to

rise to feral

descendants, and these would of course bring tremendous change to their environments.

?

Callicott,

p 34
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But a viable and responsible alternative
to simply opening up
readily available.

The extent of environmental change can
be

all

the cages and

bams

is

controlled by releasing the animals

onto restricted areas— in particular, onto
reclaimed areas. The combination of
limited food
resources and an introduction of
(endangered, indigenous)

nonhuman

predators would keep this

kind of animal liberation from being
ecologically catastrophic. By pointing
out

have shown
scenario

(in

what

alternatives there

is

at least

we must

Of course,
(iii).

hope

is

more than just

a trivial way) three things: that

that Callicott's scenarios do not exhaust
the possibilities,

(ii),

suggest that

I

one which does not

(iii)

follows

(if

and hence does not

is

correct)

and feed

can reject scenario

(iii)

in scenario

from human

as before their former

they had rendered genetically unfit to care for themselves ).’6

have already questioned the suggestion that these animals

we

reject

approach described

animal liberation

duties 'accumulated over thousands of years, to continue
to house

obtain. So

can

and that of the possible

entail ecological disaster

this alternative begins to look like the
caretaker

(whom

we

I

animal liberation.

reject

Callicott suggests that scenario

animal slaves

this alternative

really are so unfit, this

But since

we

duty does not

as well.

This brings us to the strategy of simply ceasing to breed and raise these
animals. This
differs

from the alternative

I

presented to scenario

extinction of domesticated animals.

would have

(ii)

in that the intended result

More would be required than just

to achieve negative population growth,

sexes must be separated or at least one of

them

presumably

sterilized.

as

Persons

who

setting the animals free;

This strategy

to

6

produce animal feed

Callicott, p 31

is

hardly 'practically

program would be

way

as to achieve extinction

In Callicott's sense of ’practically impossible,' this strategy obviously has

On

we

raise these animals already exercise control over their

reproduction; exercising that control in such a

devastating consequences.

the eventual

soon as possible. So the two

impossible,' in the usual sense of that expression. Carrying out such a
relatively simple.

is

is

no ecologically

the contrary, given the fact that deforestation

this strategy is

hardly unimaginable.

eminently ecologically responsible.

is

largely carried out

Finally,

it

entails very
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little

suffering

on the pan of the animals themselves

the lack of opponunity to raise
young and, for the

(the only negatives for their
welfare being

last

few animals, a lack of companionship).

Callicott calls this policy 'ironic'
in that 'the beneficiaries of
a

destroyed in the process of being
saved

the Pekinese. There

is

an oddness

need not be the continuance of outlandish,

in the expression, but

future animals a favor by preventing
their existence. Even

compassion by being destroyed-as

in the case of those

Ironic? Perhaps. But that tells us nothing
about

or not. Irony

is

extension of conscience are

7
.'

Yet, the goal of animal liberation
like

humane

not a measure of injustice.

I

we would

whether Kevorkian's practice

is

all

sickly

benefit from

seek the services of Dr. Kevorkian.

conclude that scenario

destructive nor otherwise morally objectionable,

indeed be doing

humans sometimes

who

sickly forms

a viable policy.

(iv),

Its

morally justified

is

being neither ecologically

possibility renders

argument suspect.

Callicott's

However, even
involve a gross

if

there are available to us

two animal

liberation strategies

which do not

amount of environmental damage being done by the animals
themselves or on

their behalf (e.g, clear-cutting for the production
of feed crops), there

scenario (v). Scenario (v)

is

not an alternative to

integral part of the animal liberation program.

universal adoption of a

human

diet

would

matter, environmentally, which strategy

(i)

through

If Callicott is

(iv)

is still

the question of

but rather attaches to each as an

correct

when he

argues that the

itself result in ecological devastation,

we

then

it

does not

adopt with respect to disposing of domestic animals

themselves. Environmental ruin will surely be visited upon a vegetarian humanity.
Callicott

s

vision of an exploding population of vegetarians depends

cogs in a vast biomass-conversion machine. The situation

no matter what the

First of all,

directly translate into

humans
in the

is

is

much more complicated than

diet of a given culture, the potential afforded

human biomass

on viewing humans

as

this.

by the earth does not

because the distribution of non-human biomass as food for

governed by complex economic relationships. Some people (the homeless) are starving

middle of the

7

Callicott, p

31.

com

belt

and some (government

officials

and owners of capital) are thriving
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in the

Horn of Africa. The

human biomass because
considered a truism

potential afforded by the earth also does
not directly translate into

patterns of reproduction vary with economic
and social conditions.

at this

point that reproductive rates in societies
where

women

It is

are able to take

advantage of educational and vocational
opportunities tend to be lower than the same
rates
societies in

which

women

are barred from education and careers.
Indeed,

implausible to suppose that
in the

my

world were vegetarian.

I

and Family Planning

children

clinics are

come

he have

I

bleak outlook?

all

way food

is

if

to the

believe

same conclusion about

it is

because

we

among young

Callicott could convince

own

his

friends.

me
I

in

everyone

especially effective population controls.

at their eradication.

combining animal

I

does

families live,

people, etc.

that the dedication of arable land to

would

fail

to

why that
all

practice should be

proving to be

hardly expect to hear that Callicott has been lobbying to

Also, nothing prevents animal liberationists

rights

I

Why then

which actual

continued. War, heart disease, cancer, AIDS, and automobile accidents are

holistic strategy

if

tend to buy into stereotypes about third-

beef-destined grain was an effective population control,

end attempts

rather

evidence that they are not unusual in so doing.

procured, the mortality rate

Furthermore, even

it

have had (on average) more children

world reproductive patterns without thinking about the conditions
the

find

have witnessed the deliberative nature of their approach
to having

suspect that Callicott would
this

would

friends

I

in

with the kind of traditional

socialist

from adopting a

program which,

providing the same kind of education and career opportunities for everyone that Callicott and

have enjoyed,

will

prove a

much more

in

I

effective population control than the current sacrifice of

grain to beef cattle.

I

conclude that premise 2

is

false.

Interestingly, although Callicott couches his criticisms

of animal liberation and vegetarianism in ecological terms
really

do value the environment, and

animal welfare in the

its

utilitarian calculus

traditional utilitarian terms.

destruction

is

— presumably to persuade us that we

an unacceptable consequence of including

—he could easily have framed those

He might have argued

criticisms in

as follows: Utilitarian animal liberation has as
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its

theoretical goal the maximization of

human and animal

happiness.

inevitably frustrate that goal (because
ecological devastation

humans). Therefore, animal liberation

is

is

Its

practical

program would

painful for both animals and

hopelessly self-contradictory.

I

have already given

reasons to reject the second premise of even
this argument. However, with a

little

work

it

might

yet be a strategy worthy of an environmentalist's
attention.
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Arguments against the Liberation of Wild Animals
As Callicott points out in

his

'Review of Tom Regan, The Case for Animal

Singers chief internecine rival in the field of animal
welfare
interest for

two reasons.

First, it gives

him a chance

animal liberation, an appeal to rights rather than to
of Singer, Callicott here concentrates

on animal

Rights,'

Regan

is

8

ethics.'

Callicott's

review

is

of

to address Regan's deontological approach to
utility.

Also,

liberation as

it

and

in contrast to his criticisms

applies to wild, rather than

domestic, animals.
Callicott begins

with a brief summary of Regan's view.

According to Regan..., only those animals who have ’inherent value' have rights.
And only those who meet the 'subject-of-a-life criterion' have inherent value. To
be a subject-of-a-life involves, among other things, being self-conscious and
having the capacity to believe, desire, conceive the future, entertain goals, and act
deliberately.

9

Callicott believes that wild animals

(pp.

44 through 46)

to

(1)

We

(2)

If (1),

make

do not have

his case against

ought to protect humans'
and animal predators.

(3)

.'.

We

then

rights.

He employs

the following reductio

Regan.
rights not to

be preyed on by both

human

(3).

ought to protect animals' rights not to be preyed on by both human

and animal predators.

The

first

premise

is

supposed to not be very controversial and not particularly tied to

Regan's philosophy. Measures should certainly be taken to prevent humans from being food for

8

Callicott, p

39.

Callicott, p

39f.

9
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sharks, bacteria, etc. Premise 2,

on the other hand,

Regan s expansionist

a human's right to be protected from predators

fact that

right.

strategy.

if it is

appropriate for us to protect the human's right,

protect the animal

s

right also.

conclusion seems ridiculous

and keeping cougars,
Sapontzis has

that

supposed to reveal an

first

when we

grizzlies,

come out

premise

is

The animal

is

no

envision

it

it is

in practice:

in favor of

such practices).

If

committed to

it.

view does not

could try to

will

second premise. Second,

settles for scoring a point

a

'nations.'

would claim

we

we

could try to

show

show

that the

that the rights-

first

premise

is

obligation to defend

its

unusual circumstances (and there

species).

(to

citizens but

in unusual circumstances

Callicott offers

no

direct challenge to this strategy (instead

with respect to Regan’s ironical use of Henry Beston's phraseology).

not-uncommonly held view

endangered

absurd,

to extricate himself out of premise 2 by advocating a policy of self-

determination for the animal

It is

false; yet Callicott

is

only

do both.

Regan attempts

he

woods

Therefore, the rights-view must be wrong.
First,

entail the

(as Callicott notes,

the conclusion of the argument

common-sensical, then premise 2 must be
is

incumbent upon us to

forest rangers policing the

There are two ways to get Regan out of this muddle.

I

based on the

is

different in the relevant respect. But that

and wolves from feeding themselves

anyone with the rights-view

false.

'Achilles heel’ in

she has inherent value,' then any being with inherent value
must be granted that same

And

and the

If

is

is

pursue the

none

'nations'

analogy) that the United States has an

to protect the citizens of other countries

1

except in

certainly nothing implausible about supposing that

we

might

have an obligation to protect a prey-animal, for example a member of an

Similarly,

we each have

a prima facie obligation to protect our families from

harm, and a weaker obligation to protect the families of others. However, the weaker obligation
to protect other nations

So there seems

to

and

families does not

come with

a greater license to do unnecessary harm.

be nothing implausible about self-determination

respects the rights of predator and prey animals alike. This policy

view, so the rights view does not entail premise

1

This

is

not to say that this view

is

correct

2.

for animals, a policy

is

which

compatible with the rights
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Furthermore,

I

would argue that the

first

premise

is

false.

Certainly

we fellow-humans

ought to protect each other from being preyed
on, but that can be true without our
having a
not to be preyed on.
to

Humans have

non-human predators we have

nght

is

a right not to be preyed

it

on by other humans, and with respect

a right to our fellow humans’ protection.
However, this latter

not grounded in a right to not be preyed
upon by those same non-human predators.

reason for rejecting the existence of such a right
has

has with respect to some being

interests with at least as

much

right

is

simple.

Y (X and Y may be

regard as

I

I

My

believe that any right that a being

identical, for

I

X

have a right to consider

consider the interests of others). Furthermore,

my

Y must

be possessed of a degree of moral responsibility— a degree
that most animals do not possess.
Therefore, most animals are not beings with respect to
which

I

have a right not to be

killed

and

eaten.

Callicott explicitly rejects this view:

From

the subject-of-a-life’s point of view his or her rights are equally and
upon being killed and eaten whether 'those' who do so are
human hunters or wolves. Regan's answer is that animals are not moral agents
indifferently violated

and so can have none of the same duties moral agents have, including the duties
to respect the rights of other animals. The wolves who eat the caribou do
no
moral wrong, though the harm they cause is real enough’ (p. 357). This answer is
not adequate. A wolf is an agent, not a natural force like a tidal wave or an
earthquake, since, as a mammal, it has all the capacities Regan claims for subjectsof-a-life, though perhaps it is not a moral agent. An agent's moral competency is a
relevant consideration in redressing his or her offense, but
consideration in protecting a patient's rights....

it is

not a relevant

Imagine the authorities explaining to the parents of a small child
tortured and killed by a certifiably brain-damaged sadist that, even though he had
a history of this sort of thing he is not properly a moral agent and so can violate

no one's

rights,

and therefore has

course of action to which he

I

am somewhat

tidal

wave.

why

not a non-agent?

If

is

to be allowed to remain at large pursuing a
11
impelled by drives he cannot control.

mystified by Callicott's motives in pointing out that the wolf

is

not like a

a non-moral agent can violate one's rights 'from the subject-of-a-life's point of view,'

It is

incumbent upon

conception of moral agency
agents, and every agent

1

Callicott, p 44f.

is

is

bipartite

(at least

Callicott to

answer

this question.

The usual

and exhaustive: there are moral agents and nonmoral

with respect to a given act) either one or the other. Most adult
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1

humans
tidal

are moral agents; most animals
are not; no tidal

wave

effect'

is

an agent

('one

wave

is

a moral agent, although every

who, or that which, exerts power upon
something and produces an

).

Callicott introduces a tripartite
distinction:

moral agents, nonmoral but rights-violating

agents, and nonmoral, non-rights-violating,
nonagent, natural forces.

from the

class of agents,

subject-of-a-life

to

what

(something

like a person).

subject -of-a-life's rights have been violated

it is

excludes the

tidal

wave

and grants the wolf rights-violating agency
by virtue of its being a

However,

fail

I

Callicott asserts in the first sentence.
If Callicott

of-view,' then

He

itrelevant

is

one that

whether the violator

is

is

is

to see

right,

settled

how

this distinction

is

relevant

and the issue of whether a

by consulting that

subject's 'point-

a moral agent, a nonmoral rights-violating

agent, or a non-rights-violating, nonagent,
natural force. Callicott does not explain

how

information about the violator would change what
happened from the subject-of-a-life's point of
view. Without that explanation (and

I

cannot think of a plausible one myself), he cannot object
to

premise one of the following argument, which

I

believe refutes his view regarding the rights-

violating abilities of wolves:

(1)

If

(la) a wolf can violate the rights of a subject-of-a-life from the
subjectpoint of view, then (lb) a tidal wave can violate the rights of a

of-a-life's

subject-of-a-life

from the

— (lb).

(2)

~(la).

(3)

Callicott

s

mistake rests on a confusion over the dual uses of the term

philosophy.

Sometimes

(person, ego)

who

is

it

has the use described above; sometimes, though,

capable of deliberate action.'"

the second sense, a tidal

wave

the second definition, like the

is

not an agent.

first,

1

Angeles, p 5.
Angeles, p 5

A

In the first sense, a tidal

wolf

is

is

also a

it

wave

'agent'

means
is

'a

in

self

an agent;

in

an agent in both senses of the term, but

does not imply anything about moral agency.

agent in both senses of the term, and

2

subject-of-a-life's point of view.

moral agent.

A human

is

an

30

Callicott also oversimplifies the role
of

government

in protecting

its

Here

citizens.

is

a

formalization of the argument implied in the
second paragraph.
(

insane killers do not violate their victims'
rights, then they should not
be locked up.

If

1)

Insane

(2)

killers

Insane

(3)

Callicott fails to

should be locked up

killers

do

violate their victims' rights.

persuade us that

that

is

should be locked up.

'if

fine

one

is

true.

He

claims that the reason insane killers

they remained free in society and continued to
behave as before,

they would certainly violate the rights of other people.' 14
This merely assumes what

Not every danger that the government proteas us from
justification for locking

up an insane

killer

The justification

different than that for eradicating smallpox or relocating

wanders

into a suburb.

The

citizens at risk

take care of this danger to their

lives,

1 is false.

but this right

Insane

for locking

any

is

in

To paraphrase

Callicott, the

up an insane

a danger
killer

killers

is

large, wild predator that

not grounded in

some other

common enough

right

occurrence in

will

anyone has

my

should be locked up not for the reason that they

violate their viaims' rights, but for the simple reason that they do

again.

is

have a right to expea that administrative bodies

against the smallpox virus or a wandering alligator (a

hometown). Premise

at issue.

a threat to our rights, and the

need not go any deeper than that he or she

to other citizens—not to those citizens' rights.
little

is

is

kill

moral competency of the agent

is

their

viaims and may do so

not a relevant consideration

proteaing the patient.
Callicott believes that Regan's deontological

would prove

approach to the liberation of wild animals

in praaice as ecologically disastrous as Singer's utilitarian

of domestic animals. Also similar to Callicott's attack on Singer

from self-contradiction:
will

if

we

Callicott, p

45

the availability of an argument

attempt to respea the rights of individuals, disastrous consequences

ensue involving the ultimate violation of those very

14

is

approach to the liberation

rights.

Again, though, the argument goes

31

unnoticed by Callicott. And again

it is

just as well:

we

shall see that his

arguments from

supposedly disastrous consequences are as unsound
here as before.
In response to Regan's suggestion that
environmentalists adopt his approach in order to

argue for the rights of the inanimate members of the
biotic community Callicott argues the
following (p. 43).

(1)

Respecting the rights of the individuals that make up the
biotic
community would not preserve the community.

(2)

If (1),

We

(3)

biotic

then

should not respect the rights of the individuals that

make up

the

community.

Callicott offers the following

If

(3).

by way of an explanation of

(1):

the right of individual whitetail deer to live unmolested were respected, the
communities which they help to make up would not be preserved. On the

biotic

contrary, without

some provision

for 'thinning the

herd’—a euphemism

for killing

—plant members of some communities would be seriously damaged, some

deer

beyond

recovery... Perhaps [Regan] means that if the rights of each individual of
every species were simultaneously respected, then the community would be
preserved. But to attempt to safeguard the rights of each and every individual

member

of an ecosystem

would be

processes beyond photosynthesis

to attempt to stop practically

all

trophic

—and even then we would somehow have

attempt to deal ethically with the individual life-threatening and hence
15
violating competition among plants for sunlight.
I

have already

laid

down

the groundwork for

whitetail deer have a right to live unmolested,

nonhuman

the presence of

it is

my objection to

If

predators in their community would be both an ecologically and

even such things

important to see, again, that

human

premise.

Callicott's first

a right they hold against moral agents only. So

morally acceptable solution to the problem of overgrazing.
'individuals' includes

to

rights-

if

as plants

is

a bit

16

Construing premise

1

where

more complicated. However,

plants have rights, those rights cannot be violated

animals, which are typically not moral agents. And, of course, there

is

it is

by most non-

a life-threatening

15

Callicott, p. 43.
16

Seeing as

their habitat

eaten)?

I

how

it

is

a right they hold against us, are

we

(which would be a human action resulting

obligated to not introduce
deliberately,

no

less!

—

nonhuman predators

in their

—

effects

past

predators themselves have rights against us which are similar to those of the white-tailed deer

bad

state

is

a also traceable back to

human

activity

into

being killed and

Not re-introducing predators would have bad effects for the deer
human activity (predator extermination, land development, etc ) in the

think not

traceable back to

—

which are

Also, the

Their current
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but no rights-violating competition

among

plants.

Nor do wild animals and

plants have a right to

our protection from other wild animals and plants.
So, from a rights point of view, our obligation
to respect the rights of each individual

member

of the biotic

community does not suggest

of protecting those individuals from each other.
Hence, line one seems to be
Callicott has failed to

make

examine

more

his positive

theory of environmental ethics.

It is

possible that, in

radical approach to environmental ethics, he can sell us

humans and non-humans, one

in

on a

more arguments

2.4 Rolston:

We must

making the case

different

scheme

still

for a

for evaluating

let

us turn to another Leopoldian

against animal liberation.

The Argument from the

Holmes Rolston

he

which hunting and meat-eating are

acceptable. But that will be examined in Chapter 4. For now,
still

it

offers utilitarian objections

arguments and deontological objections to deontological arguments.

the relationship between

with

false.

the case against animal liberation. However, in attacking

never challenges the most fundamental terms of the debate.
At best he
to utilitarian

a policy

III is

Definition of 'Rights'

another prominent environmentalist opposed to animal liberation.

His articles have appeared in a

number of anthologies, and he

is

the associate editor of

Environmental Ethics, the world's leading journal on the subject. Rolston devotes the second
chapter of his book Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values

Temple University

Press,

1988) to arguments against animal

in the

Natural World (Philadelphia:

liberation.

Some

of these arguments

are similar to those of Callicott. Both authors follow in the footsteps of Leopold and have
essentially the

same program: a defense of the environment

Rolston's arguments can be broken

arguments from
This

down

into

linked to a defense of hunting.

arguments from the definition of

'rights'

naturalistic axiology.

first

argument from the definition of

(1)

Animals do not have

(2)

If (1),

(3)

/.

then

'rights' is

rights.

(3).

Animals should not be liberated.

derived from page 5 1

and

33

Rolston

explains

first

what

rights animals

do have

if

they have any rights

at all:

A

citizen has a legal right to vote, assigned in
laws. But we also think that natural
rights exist, regardless of law. Innocent persons
have a natural right not to be

no matter whether they have court access. Good laws
should recognize
Few legal rights have been assigned to animals (though there are

killed,

natural rights.

laws about animal welfare), so animal rights would
seem to be natural rights...
When we say that persons have natural rights, we mean that there are
certain values in personality (characteristics in the
nature of personhood) that
warrant protection with rights and that laws in culture ought
to reflect these... But
if we take persons off the scene entirely,
in the wilderness the mountain lion is
not violating the rights of the deer he slays. Animal rights
are not natural in the
sense that they exist in spontaneous nature. Rights go with
legitimate
claims and

entitlements, but there are no

wilderness

titles

17

and no laws that can be transgressed

In the latter part of this passage Rolston

After

all,

the issue in natural rights

there should be such

titles

Still,

as

I

is

and laws

that can be transgressed in nature
in nature.

in the

.

indicated in

is

my

seems to confuse natural

not whether there are 'no

(legal rights).

So the

titles

I

with legal

rights.

and no laws’ but whether

fact that there are

irrelevant to the question of

criticisms of Callicott,

rights

no

titles

and no laws

whether there are natural

rights

agree with Rolston that animals in the

wild do not (usually) violate each other's rights (exceptions might be found in other intelligent

and highly socialized

species). This does not rule out the possibility that animals have rights

against humans. Rolston recognizes this but

is

not willing to grant that these would be natural

rights.

Any such

rights emerge only with actual intervening in ecosystems. Such an
interruption-generated right would be artifactual, stronger than a legal right,

binding independently of law, but not natural
Unfortunately, Rolston
right natural.

is

rather unclear about just what

Elsewhere he seems to say that even natural

cultural discovery, really a convention, that

culture, [but]

are

17
1X
19

meant

is

p. 50.

what he

is

it is

that does

make

a natural

rights are not really natural, being

'a

works well to protect values associated with persons

not translating well to duties in an ecosystem

to illuminate

Rolston, p 47f.
Rolston, p 49

Rolston,

18
.

getting at:

19
.'

Perhaps the following remarks

in

34

does seem odd to say that the [beached]
whales had a right to [euthanized]
killing or that the [beached] dolphins
had a right to be nursed back to
health and then released, or that the seals
and porpoises had a right to be
rescued. Ducks, dolphins, whales—we seem
to be treating animals differently
from persons. We would at once say that persons
had a right not to be shot at all
[the reference is to the banning of lead
pellets for duck hunting; the lead can
poison a merely wounded duck]; a right to be warned
of an impending flood; a
nght to be rescued, medically treated, and released;
perhaps even, if doomed to
It

mercy

die, a right to a painless death. 211

The reason

it

treatment mentioned
issue of

what

seems odd to say that the
is

that

sorts of rights

it is

odd to say that even

and porpoises had a
a

and duties attach to charity

have such

rights, those rights are held

respect to

all

place. Right

seals

human
is

right to the beneficent

has a right to such treatment. The

notoriously

difficult.

Where people do

with respect to other persons, and not necessarily with

persons. Rights might also have to be indexed with other factors,
such as time and

now am
I

typing at

while the people living in

my

desk in

my building

my apartment:

have a right to

There

nothing odd in asserting that

is

my assistance

in the event of a fire breaking

out two minutes from now, the people living in a similarly hazardous building in the
next town do
not.

And while

right to

it

might be a matter of some controversy whether a beached

be rescued by beachcombers,

I

think

it

should be

pilot

whale has a

less controversial to assert that

have a right not to be taunted and climbed on and treated

like a tourist sight.

We

it

does

should not

let

the problems of the rights of charity worry us out of a belief in animal rights.

Of course, not everything
discusses (p.

that looks

550 a controversy regarding

on the surface

'If

are causing the deaths, that does

that

it

human
seem

we

intervention,

to

an act of charity really

a migrating antelope herd

have been reduced by human development. Should
food supply? Rolston writes:

like

make

or should

is

Rolston

whose winter range may

we

not supplement the available

and not just the

forces of natural selection,

a difference in the welfare claim.' But

changes the very nature of the claim, which

is.

I

would say

not in the former case a welfare claim but a

claim of rectificatory justice.

I

can only say that

insistence,

20

Rolston,

on

p.

I

see no substantial argument, only suggestive remarks and repeated

Rolston's part for the claim that animals have

50

no natural

rights.

And because

he,

35

like Callicott,

does not consider that rights might have a
fundamentally indexical character he

overstates the practical implications of our
recognizing such rights inhering in
all

suffering introduces rights or welfare
claims

when moral

agents

come on

consistent animal ethics will dislike predation
and seek to eliminate
dislike

is,

eliminate

perhaps, predation generally, but especially
is

human

on the scene are

predation; and this

rights

is

human

21
it.'

predation;

because the rights introduced

nonhuman

lives:

'If

the scene, a really

What such an
what

it

will seek to

when moral

with respect to those moral agents. Predatory animals

ethic will

agents

will share in

come
such

rights.

2.5

Arguments from Axiology

A more

interesting argument,

and one which

theory of environmental ethics, takes as
that animals

kill

its

is

tied

more

intimately to Rolston’s general

starting point the rather startling claim that

it is

good

and eat each other.

(1)

Non-human predation

(2)

If (1),

(3)

If

then (2b)

is

human

good.
predation

is

good.

(2b), then (4).

Animals should not be liberated.

(4)

As usual, one must search carefully through Rolston's platitudes to find a coherent
rationale for his premises. Rolston's most explicit justification for line one seems to be on p. 57:

Our

attitude

toward predation is not just that it is practically difficult to remove,
it is an impossible ideal. We [for 'we' read 'I, Rolston'] would

or that removing

not want to take predation out of the system

humans out of the predation

if

we

could (although

we

take

system), because pain and pleasure are not the only

not even the principal ones... In the trophic pyramid the
omnivores and carnivores regularly and necessarily capture values by imposing
pain on others.
Meanwhile, predation does not all that obviously increase suffering. Slow
death by starvation or disease is not more pleasant than nearly instantaneous
death by tooth and claw. Predation prevents overpopulation from the surplus of
young and culls the aged and diseased.
criteria of value,

21

Rolston,

p.

56

36

That
in dispute.

killing

has instrumental value for both the predators
and the prey populations

But the question

intrinsically good?’

not

'is

As an answer to

not do; even murder has

he does have a

distinct,

is

its

predation instrumentally good?', but

'is

is

not

predation

question the immediate material benefits of hunting
will

this

rewards. Although Rolston has trouble keeping these
two questions

naturalistic axiological principle that

he thinks supports

one

line

(p. 58):

In the struggle for life, for adaptive fit, many
individuals will be losers; their
welfare must be sacrificed to predators or competitors.
That is not satisfactory to
these individuals; their preferences are not satisfied. But
we humans who observe
this system find such a system, where many natural
kinds are interwoven into a
web of life, satisfactory [good?] not just in the sense that we tolerate it but
that
we see how it yields a flourishing of species, manifest in individuals.

—

It may seem unsatisfactory that innocent life
has to suffer, and we may at
wish for an ethical principle that protects innocent life...Ought suffering to
continue when humans do or can intervene in nature? That it ought not to
continue is a tender sentiment but so remote from the way the world is that
we
must ask whether this is the way the world ought to be in a tougher, realistic
environmental ethic. A morally satisfactory fit must be a biologically satisfactory

first

fit.

What ought

Rolston’s

macho

predation happens.

It is

governed by biological
naturalistic ethics.

earmark

it

I

to be is

derived from what

posturing aside, predation

is.

is

good, he seems to be claiming, because

a biological reality, and in the realm of nature moral principles are

facts.

happens,

If it

will save

debate on

it is

good. This

this principle for

is

the upshot of Rolston's nakedly

Chapter

4; for

now would just
I

and move on to the second premise.

That the goodness of nonhuman predation provides a justification

seems to be implied

in the Rolston's

themselves in the suffering that
world. The real issue, though,
satisfactory fitness.’

Human

is

is

remarks above to the

First

we must

the relationship between

human

humans ought

human hunting and

hunting behaviors are a morally satisfactory

fit.

Is

fit,

hunting

to implicate

Or

is it

'biologically

according to Rolston,

that plausible?

ask what makes a behavior a biologically satisfactory

contributes to the survival of the species?

Some

effect that

for

found in the day-to-day operations of the nonhuman natural

because they are a biologically satisfactory

species?

like to

that

it

fit?

Is it

that

it

does not contribute to the decline of the

behaviors have nothing to do with species survival. Others have nothing to do

37

with species survival now, or perhaps

may even be somewhat

deleterious, but

may be

species-

savers in the event of a sudden change in environment (geological
cataclysm, introduction of

predators, etc.)- Likewise, behaviors that are advantageous

As

I

will

show

in the next chapter, time will prove to

Suppose we grant that a
the welfare of the species.

biologically satisfactory

itself

if

we have

fit

is

Because Rolston has overlooked

(or,

is

falters.

the most healthful.

this aspect

—the

Some nonhuman

It

One

for having asserted that cruelty to animals

later.

a behavior that contributes to

we have

already accepted

it

then follows that
is

every indication

would indeed seem odd

for a naturalistic

effect of

predation

not as good as vegetarianism) for humans.

famous

is

accepted Rolston's ethics,

ethic like Rolston's to endorse behaviors that contribute to

—premise 2

just

bear the naturalistic stamp of approval, since there

that a balanced vegetarian diet

hunter

disadvantageous

trouble for naturalistic ethics.

nothing follows ethically unless

Still

Rolston's naturalism. Surprisingly,

vegetarianism should

make

now may be

new

is

human

heart disease and cancer.

hunting on the welfare of the

good

for

some nonhumans;

not good

it is

could also appeal to issues of character. Kant

is

wrong because of the bad

effects

it

has on

the character of the people involved. Regan makes a similar argument for the case against eating

what he would say are non-sentient animals. While these concerns may not make an
for vegetarianism, they raise issues that are peculiar to

claim that

human

if

nonhuman predation

predation

is

is

good, then that

humans and

is all

in so doing cast

we need to know to

good.

peculiar to his theory than

my

is

his general

'is

formalized version of his argument

to ought' approach.

It is

The eating of animals by humans does not destroy

(2)

If (1),

.'.

then

(3).

Animals should not be liberated.

is

probably more

hinted at in the

(p. 81f).

(1)

(3)

doubt on the

conclude that

Another argument of Rolston's appeals to an axiological principle which

of

airtight case

values.

first

premise

38

The acceptance
though

it

does destroy values, reallocates such values

the sacrifice of animal
nature.

of premise one depends on Rolston’s claim
that 'the eating of animals,

He views

22

lives.'

when humans

This follows from Rolston's general picture of the
axiology of

the food chain as a ’trophic pyramid'

the top not only in terms of diet but in terms of value.

system, Rolston

tells us, is

lower values of caribou

(p.

82 and elsewhere) with carnivores

Humans

What happens when

’anthroapicaT).

life

gain nutrition and pleasure at

of course are at the very top (the
a wolf eats a caribou

are transformed into the higher values of wolf

In nature, the pain-pleasure axis

not the highest value in either

is

or

nonhuman

is

that the

life.

not the only spectrum of value; indeed,

human

at

it is

might be said, for
instance, that knowing the meaning of life is more important for
humans than
leading a painless life, that a life with courage and sacrificial charity in
it, which
requires the presence of some pain, is a richer life than one without it.
Similarly,
life.

It

the evolution of a world with carnivorous mammals, primates, humans, and
culture is a richer world than one without them, and the presence of pain seems
to have been necessary for such evolution. In that sense, advanced values
are
frequently built on suffering.

The reason such

a world

is

22

richer

is

that 'lower organisms

potential in the ecosystem as fully as do higher ones.' 24

do not express the richness

The point here seems

in

to be that, while

organisms such as plants have value, organisms such as cheetahs have more value because they

have a wider behavioral repertoire: they locomote and perceive

as well as eat

and grow. But the

higher value which attaches to the lives of more complex organisms depends on the lower value of
less

complex organisms.

We

cannot admire ecosystems until we see them as places of value capture. ..One
can admire a peregrine falcon's flight or the gait of a cheetah, but locomotion

—several trophic
—on plants (99.9 percent of the biomass) that soak up

takes high energy funding. Muscles, nerves, and brains depend

rungs

down

the sunlight.

the pyramid
25

A human who
an

22
23

24
25

26

can eat and take an education has more interest in eating than does

elk, since all

the ’upstairs’ values depend on the ’downstairs’ value.

Rolston, p 82
Rolston, p 83 (my emphasis).
Rolston,

p.

68

Rolston,

p.

175.

Rolston, p 74

26

39

Thus, Rolston views predation as a simple
transformation of the value attached to the prey
arnrnal

mto the higher values associated with the predator
animal. While

metaphysically

difficult,

I

would

like to set aside those

this

notion might be

problems and instead address a

mathematical problem and a problem with Rolston's view
of the food chain.
true that the value associated with an eaten
Thompson's gazelle

First, if it is

destroyed but rather

who

ate

it,

is

is

not

transferred and transformed into a higher value attached
to the cheetah

then a cheetah

is

a remarkably valuable creature indeed. Adult cheetahs
are solitary

hunters. Suppose that a cheetah eats six gazelles each year.
Suppose that the average cheetah
lives to

be fifteen years

eighty times

old.

If

you do not

more valuable than

find

it

problematic to conclude that a cheetah

is

nearly

a gazelle, then consider the case of the great white shark.

typical great white, besides eating voracious

dolphins. Are the values adhering to

its

amounts of fish,

will eat a

number

A

of seals and

penniped and cetacean victims transferred and

transformed into higher values associated with the great white shark?
This seems unlikely, and the case of the great white reveals the fundamental problem in
Rolston's picture of

what we might

call axiological

transformation in nature: the theory seems to

have been based on a profoundly questionable hierarchical picture of the food 'pyramid.' As any
grade-schooler knows, the 'highest' forms are almost invariably eaten by some of the 'lowest'

not always after they have died of 'natural' causes.
capture,'

what are we

would not

be, to

borrow Rolston's own phraseology, a

vessels of value (a grizzly’s killing
27
).

This view

is

just a trade-off of the value of the

Rolston, p 57

Rolston's theory of ’value

'tough' or 'realistic' view.

because Rolston views animals (including humans) as mere

and eating a fawn should be

'seen simply as a value capture

reminiscent of Singer's picture of animals as vessels of pain,

pleasure, and preference (see Chapter 4).

27

we buy into

to say about such incidents? Perhaps they are tragic exceptions. Yet that

All of these difficulties arise

within the wilds’

If

—and

life

What happens when an animal

of the prey for the value of the

life

is

killed

is

more than

of the predator.

An

40

been erased from existence. And when a human
being unnecessarily

individual has

kills

and eats

another animal, the minuses of greed, callousness,
and gluttony must be factored into the

To

equation.

see

how

explanation of what

is

Rolston overlooks the significance of individual

lives

one need only read

his

wrong with cannibalism:

Humans do

not eat other humans because such events interrupt
culture; they
destroy those superior ways in which humans live in
the world. The eating of
other humans, even if this were shown to be an event

in nature, would be
Cannibalism destroys interpersonal
28
relations. But in nature no such relations obtain,
or can obtain.

overridden by

cultural destructiveness.

its

These remarks point out another weakness

and

I

eaten

seem

to share a

lower

is

common

view: predation

is

in Rolston's

scheme

more acceptable

to elevate hunting.

as the value of the creature

in proportion to the value of the creature doing the eating

a chicken than a

human;

it is

He

(it is

better for a shark to eat a tuna than a dolphin).

better for

On the

me

to eat

basis of this

underlying principle, Rolston should embrace vegetarianism as the most efficient transformation
of

lower values to higher values that humans can

Imbedded within

Rolston's remarks

effect.

on page 83

is

a

somewhat

different

argument against

animal liberation:
(1)

A world

(2)

If (1),

(3)

First,

than one with
'eliminate'

.’.

it

with carnivorous

then

mammals

better than one without.

(3).

Animals should not be liberated.

must be noted that premise 2

less,

is

is

true only

for the goal of animal liberation

one species of carnivore,

Homo

is

if

a world with more carnivores

not to eliminate

sapiens (by changing

Second, premise one has two readings, but

I

shall

its

all

is

better

carnivores but to

diet).

argue that neither will save

it

from

falsehood.

It

world

28

in

might be read to mean something

which some of the animals

Rolston, p 81.

like

the following: All other things being equal, a

(in particular,

some mammals)

eat other animals

is

better

41

than a world in which none of the animals eat
each other. Unless
value of predation,
is

it

depends on the claim that predation

a difficult case to make.

And

1

do not

is

this

the case for the intrinsic

is

indeed intrinsically valuable. But that

feel inclined to believe that a

comparison of two such

worlds yields a judgment in favor of the world in
which animals are run
in front of their fellow animals' eyes; a
in the other; a

world

world

in

which prey animals know

which the only pleasures

in

down and tom

differing

to pieces

fears that are not

known

from those in the other are the

pleasures of the hunt and the pleasures of the escape... Is the
world without predators lacking?

Rolston himself refers to predation as a 'sad good,’ a 'painful
good.' Aren't happy goods and
pleasurable goods better?
a predator-free world

is

If

Rolston

teach them

is

right,

how

then the best thing

to hunt,

we

could do for the inhabitants of

and eat each other. But enough of this

kill,

absurdity.

A more

reasonable reading of premise one goes something like

equal, a world with complex, intelligent, social animals

is

this:

All other things

better than one without,

and

being

as a matter

of biological necessity complex, intelligent, social animals are carnivores. Therefore, a world with

carnivores

false.

is

better than one without. That reading of line one

is

more reasonable, but

it is

also

Elephants, gorillas, and vegetarians are complex, intelligent, social animals, and they are

not carnivores.
Finally,

we come

to the following argument,

For humans to

(1)

the world

If (1),

(2)

will not dwell

on the

our inclinations (the way
against the

the rest of the world

on the

we

way the world

fact that

is

is

at all

is

in utter

disharmony with the way

(3).

The animals should not be

(3)

I

no animals

hinted at on p. 91:

is

made.

is

then

kill

which

liberated.

are 'made') to needlessly

made,

made.

some animals

world

fact that vegetarians, too, are part of the

Still,

kill

too.

kill

If it

goes against

and eat other animals then

Rolston doubtlessly means that

he gives no argument for

line one.

other animals for food. However,

if

it

it

goes

goes against the

He,

like Callicott,

humans'

is

way
fixated

failure to kill

and
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eat other animals

is

in utter

disharmony with the world

is

made, then so are the eating habits of

elephants and gorillas.

two depends on the supposition

Line
the world

does

it

is

made. With that

mean? Perhaps

natural activity

we

inclined to admire

1

we

that

see around us. There

many

are obligated to act in

have no quarrel, but admittedly

means

it

we

that

a rather vague claim.

are obligated to act in such a
is

some

plausibility in this

way

What

as to mirror all the

inasmuch

as

people are

kinds of animal behavior: the fidelity of the swan, the
community of the

elephant, the merciful hunting methods of the tiger. At
to support the idea that

it is

harmony with the way

we

first

glance this interpretation would seem

should be omnivores, incorporating every kind of diet into ours
and

hence maximally imitating the world around

us.

But this interpretation

is

untenable, for

it

saddles

us with the obligation to mirror every other kind of behavior as well, not
just those associated with
eating.

It is

impossible for

humans

to

behave

in every

way

every other animal, one paradox

like

being that eating everything that other animals eat would result in imitating no animal extant.
So
this interpretation of acting in

harmony with the way the world

is

made' must be rejected.

believe that to act in

harmony with the way the world

is

made

I

that

is

is

simply to act in a

way

compatible with a healthy and beautiful world. This interpretation has the virtue of not

saddling us with the obligation of imitation for imitation's sake. Also,
a priori claim that animals themselves act in this

environmentally destructive)
the world

is

made,’ line two

animal liberation

is

.

is

way

(it

it

does not commit us to an

must be admitted that animals can be

In the light of this interpretation of ’acting in

false.

I

have already pointed out in

harmony with the way

my comments on

indeed compatible with a healthy and beautiful world.

Callicott that

CHAPTER 3
ORIGINS

AND

MORE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL LIBERATION

INDIANS:

31 R o lston and H ettinger: The Argument
.

In this chapter
lifestyles as

I

am

going to

from the Past

criticize

evidence for the moral permissibility (or
even the moral necessity) of hunting.

with an argument that appears in Hettinger's
Ethics:

arguments which appeal to indigenous or
ancestral

article

I

begin

Valuing Predation in Rolston's Environmental

Bambi Lovers versus Tree Huggers' ( Environmental

Ethics 16: 3-20, Spring 1994).

Hettinger subscribes to Rolston's views on
environmental ethics. Rolston has written that
'the
rules for [eating animals]

come from the ecosystems

straightforward argument from a Rolstonian view
of

Hettinger

(it

seems

to

in

which humans evolved,’

human

origins occurs

be derived from a combination of claims

in Rolston's

1

but the most

on pp. 13-14

book and

in

in his private

correspondence with Hettinger):
According to Rolston,

we would not have evolved into human beings without the
human mind and hand to hunt; if our ancestors had remained
herbivores, he suggests, there would have been no human
culture. Thus, Rolston
holds, hunting and eating meat affirms human nature by
participating in a process
that made us what we are. To reject our predatory history
and still try to value
the human being isolates a product from its essential historical
genesis. Rolston
evolution of the

repeatedly
in

such a

insists that

way

that

it is

the products and process of natural history are interrelated
inappropriate to value the former and not the latter.

Furthermore, he argues, when the process that produces a product is essential to
the understanding of what that product is, one cannot consistently affirm the
value of the product while denying the value of the process that created it. One

might as well try to value the culture of Native American plains
rejecting their tradition of killing buffalo for food, clothing, and

Here

is

a line-by-line presentation of what
If

(2)

If (1),

(3)

If

Rolston, p 8

take to be the argument:

.

then (2b)hunting animals and eating meat affirms

human

nature.

(2b), then (4).

.Vegetarianism

is

morally wrong (hunting animals and eating meat are

morally obligatory).

1

shelter.

humans' ancestors had not hunted animals and eaten meat, humans
would not have evolved.

(1)

(4)

I

tribes while
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Premise

1

looks like a straightforward empirical
claim needing no further explication

except for the word 'ancestors.' Does
the term 'ancestors' refer to

humanity? Certainly not-there was no meat

how

human hand and mind

the

relatively recent

direct

way to

in

all

biological ancestors of

the primordial sludge. Given Rolston’s
views on

developed, 'ancestors' should probably
refer here to some

group whose hunting behavior can be credited
with contributing

the flexibility of the

human hand and

that there might have existed such a group,
there

must be resolved, and of which Hettinger

is

is

the honing of the

in a relatively

human mind. Even

given

another issue-a non-empirical issue-which

aware:

One can imagine

beings very much like us who came into existence
without a
predatory past. However, if we assume that the
basic features of a species'
evolutionary history are essential to what that species
is, then these beings would
not be human. Viewed as responses to openings in
ecological resource
relationships (’niche fillers’), species (including
to their evolutionary history. 2
In other words,

humans

Homo

sapiens ) are essentially tied

are by definition descendants of hunters and meat eaters,
and

descendants of hunters and meat eaters would not have evolved
eaters

had not existed

What does

affirm

mean

It

inasmuch

as Hettinger

transmogrifies

human

and meat

in

seems to mean either

relevant.

eating

(as hunters

premise 2? Nothing in

'indicates approval

The idea seems

was an evolutionary precondition

participate

'in

a process that

made

us

for

those prior hunters and meat

eaters).

to

be that vegetarianism

are.'

seems to be

rejects or

to be that since our ancestors' hunting

humans

what we

my dictionary or thesaurus

of or 'perpetuates.' This makes sense

and Rolston's complaint seems
nature.

if

as

and meat-

they exist today, to hunt and eat meat

This participation

is

at the

is

to

same time a

perpetuation of that process. Furthermore, participation in and perpetuation of that process serve
as indicators that

one approves of the product

(in this case,

human

beings) of that process.

Premise 3 condemns the hypocrisy of vegetarianism. Assuming that vegetarians value

human

2

life,

they act hypocritically by refusing to perform the actions which are dictated by a

Hettinger, pp

13-1

4n
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positive evaluation of humanity,
participate in

it is

incumbent on anyone

and perpetuate the process which
made

Hettinger claims that the
condemnation of
suggests a hatred of nature;'

humanity and

human

who

all this

claims to value humanity that
she

(herself especially) possible.

participation in predation

by animal

argument here indicates that

his

suggests as well a hatred of

it

self.

Now to the

objections. First, Rolston's views

on the relevance of hunting behaviors

development of the human hand and mind
are suspect, and Hettinger would
do well
the matter on his

the subject

is

activists

3

to the

to investigate

5

own He depends on

Rolston for his information, and

all

Rolston has to say on

4
'hunter-gatherer cultures are the earliest
known.’ As of this writing,

paleoanthropologists tend to believe that both
of these adaptations have a close
link to defensive

mechanisms, but nowhere have
If

I

read that hunting behaviors were also
important in

Rolston's theory held any water,

one would expect

for hunting behaviors to

this regard.

dominate among

other intelligent, opposable-thumbed
animals— i.e., the rest of the primate family—yet they
do
not.

Furthermore, a species genetically, phenotypically,
and behaviorally identical to

Homo

sapiens could certainly have evolved without
a predatory history. Hettinger's denial that they

would have been humans on purely

show

that the expressions ’essential'

the concept of

The

definitional

and

grounds

is

unconvincing-at

'essentially are doing

some

least, until

work

real

he can

in his explication of

'species.'

plausibility of the

second premise depends on (a)there being some one agreed-upon

thing (perhaps a collection of properties) called 'human nature’
and on (b)an equivocation

between human nature and human

humans
nature

ancestors' nature.'

did might 'affirm' those ancestors' nature, but

—unless our nature were already

like theirs

I

I

can see

how

do not see

doing what the ancestors of

how

would

it

affirm

human

with respect to the activity in question.

If

the

1

Hettinger, p 3
4

Rolston, p 80
I must take exception to Hettinger's explication

—I

do not understand what

it

means

to say that a species

both temporarily and genetically distant (its evolutionary history), nor do
that conception is supported by the notion that species are 'responses to openings in

'essentially tied to' past events

understand

how

ecological resource relationships.'

What does

'essentially'

mean

in this context"7

What does

'tied to'

I

mean"7

is
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activity in question

were hunting, and we

hunters like them),

we would

really

were

like then, in that respect
(that

not be having this argument.

I

do no, know

agreement between myself and Hettinger
regarding what human nature'
have to explain
part of

how the

that there

property of 'Wiling other animals
needlessly and eating their

any

is

flesh' is a

it.

and meat-eating affirm human nature, then

is

that, if

hunting

refraining from these activities
rejects

human

nature.

This assumption depends further on an
especially narrow understanding of

which includes

strict

The idea
beginning.

product

is

If

human

we

nature, one

adherence to past policy.

that the past

is

somehow

morally privileged dooms this argument
from the

Hettinger and Rolston are right in believing
that 'when the process that produces a

essential to the understanding of

what that product

is,

one cannot consistently affirm

the value of the product while denying the
value of the process that created

friends

were we

and Hettinger would

is,

Premise 3 runs into that human nature
problem again. The assumption

since

is,

value Elie Wiesel

who grew up

in the

we

should value the holocaust. Or, since

former

DDR

I

I

value

then

it,'

it

my young

seems that
socialist

should value World

War

would have

two more absurd consequences.

II

and the Honecker regime.

That would be ridiculous.

The moral
First,

it

privileging of the past

would allow past generations

any given way of

life

at least

to dictate the duties of future generations.

(including, please note, vegetarianism) could,

Our adoption

by virtue of that way of life

being the process that creates and molds future generations, have the effect
of making

incumbent upon those future generations to do

as

for ethics, the resulting stagnation (assuming that

unfortunate for
before,

it

human development.

we

it

do. Besides being an absurd consequence

most people do

their duty)

would

also be

Second, by making our duties dependent on what was done

leaves philosophers like Rolston and Hettinger in the unfortunate position of having

their ethical views be refutable

of

by new information about the

updated edition of Rolston's Environmental

Ethics in

past.

Hence,

which he argues

we

can imagine an

that, since

(we are
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supposing)

new

paleoanthropological finds indicate that the

we must do

nuts and berries,

first

humans

subsisted on a diet of

the same. (A similar problem haunts Callicott's argument,
as

we

will

see.)

3.2 Callicott:

The Argument from the

Callicott argues that

tame, and confined

'Savage'

we must

follow Leopold's prescription to reevaluate 'things unnatural,

terms of things natural, wild, and

in

6

free,’

and that

this

means, among other things, the reappraisal of the comparatively recent values
and concerns of "civilized" Homo sapiens in terms of those of our "savage"
ancestors.... Savage people seem to have had, if the attitudes and values
of
surviving tribal cultures are representative, something like an intuitive grasp of
ecological relationships and certainly a morally charged appreciation of eating

[my emphasis]. 7
Calhcott concludes that this reappraisal will reveal that the most morally responsible diet

—

the traditional food of hunter- gatherer societies. 8

consists of wild animals

and wild plants

Achieving that diet and

lifestyle requires 'a shrinkage... of the

i.e.,

wilderness and a renaissance of tribal cultural experience.' 9
Callicott's

domestic sphere;. ..a recrudescence of

Here

is

a semiformal interpretation of

argument:

We

(1)

should reevaluate things unnatural, tame, and confined in terms of

things natural, wild, and free.

If (1),

(2)

then (2b)

'civilized'

human

human

we

should reevaluate the values and concerns of

society in terms of the values and concerns of 'savage'

society.

(3)

If

(2b), then (4).

(4)

.‘.

We should eat

nothing but wild animals and wild plants.

consider each premise in turn. In line one (and thereafter) Callicott

Let's

suggesting, by the expression 'reevaluate in terms

of which

6

we measure

Callicott, p.
8

9

34

Callicott, p

36

Callicott, p.

34

that natural things

the value of unnatural things. After

Quoted from Leopold, p 9

7

of,'

all,

is

not simply

become the

whether you evaluate,

units in terms

in the closing

48

days of 1994, the American dollar
in terms of the Mexican
peso (6) or the peso in terms of the
dollar (1/6),

you

still

get the result that a dollar

Calhcott means, of course,

thing

better than a

is

'more valuable’

I

tame

mean

(as

more

is

thing,

I

six

x

more valuable than an unnatural thing y-

that a natural thing

is

perhaps to the degree that x

was

am

and a

free thing

intrinsic value

is

We

is

is

By

’better’

we

or

greater intrinsic

'of

not determined by usefulness). So,

when

get the result that wolves are of greater

better than tameness, freedom

better than unnaturalness.

operating assumption implicit in the premise
speak.

better than a confined thing.

wolves and poodles,

than poodles because wildness

confinement, and naturalness

is

sure Callicott does) 'intrinsically
better' or

intrinsic values of

What

natural thany. Continuing in this
train of thought, a wild

value' (intrinsic value being the kind
of value that

comparing the

is

times as valuable as a peso.

We should

is

better than

probably note that an

that our evaluations have been upside-down,
so to

is

have been assuming not only that poodles are better than
wolves, but that tameness

is

better than wildness, confinement better than
freedom, and unnaturalness better than naturalness.

The reevaluation

Callicott

The assumption

is

in the

kinds, ’civilized' and 'savage.'

that the values

values

calling for requires a transposition of those evaluative
assumptions.

second premise

Making

and concerns of

qualities)

which

am

I

not at

tricky.

society can be divided into

On

civilized society are unnatural,

all

sure.

natural, wild,

and

the face of

that, since

savage society

might be

civilized.

Since

any given

society, the last

it

society values and

is

fair to

say that what

two proposed

is

more

free.

Now, what

the premise implies

is

it

would mean

values and

is

and confined(-ness).
its

values

should be emulated by the

concerned with defines, in

interpretations might be practically equivalent:

concerned with things that are unnatural, tame, and confined;

concerned with things that are natural, wild, and

free.

for a

that the things (and

natural than civilized society,

be— are better and
it

it,

two

tame, and confined, whereas the

Perhaps what Calhcott means

and concerns—whatever they might turn out to

is

is

human

civilized society values are unnatural(-ness), tame(-ness),

Or perhaps he means

values and

that

this division

and concerns of savage society are

value to be natural

is

part,

'civilized'

'savage' society

The assumption

in the third

premise

that

is

whether a human society values and

concerned with things that are natural, wild,
and free
wild animals and wild plants are eaten
by

which values and
wild,

and more

is

members

likely,

A

of that society.

hunting-gathering culture

Callicott refers translates, in the case of

the three words

is

more

natural,

an agricultural, vegetarian culture (a culture
that values and

with eating domesticated plants) and therefore

which

a function (in pan) of the extent to
which

is

concerned with eating wild animals and wild
plants

free than

’wild,’ ’natural,’

and

is

better.

I

am

is

more
concerned

not sure whether the 'freedom' to

humans, to anything

’free’

is

like political

freedom. More

are simply evocative expressions referring
to a

single property.

I

have already discussed,

in

Chapter

2,

some

naturalistic axiology appealed to in the first premise.

raised by premises

and

two and

three.

of the problems associated with the sort of
In this chapter

Assuming that there

is

I

concentrate on questions

a tenable distinction between

'civilized'

'savage' societies, does the Leopoldian preference for the
'natural' over the 'unnatural' translate

into a prescription to adopt the diet of the so-called 'savage?'

There does seem
'values

wild,

to

and concerns.' After

and

free

and confined.
sacrifice

them

inasmuch

be a problem with drawing the distinction in terms of each
all, 'civilized'

as these are the

'Civilized' society

in order to

society

must be concerned with and value things

raw materials

might even

society's

for

intrinsically

natural,

manufacturing things unnatural, tame,

value things natural, wild, and free but

manufacture things of greater instrumental value.

It

might be more to

the point to drop the comparison of 'values and concerns' and instead simply compare the people
or groups of people or cultures themselves. This alters the argument somewhat, but

change which

Callicott

would not consider

unfair, for

I

believe

he also writes:

Leopold's prescription... does not stop... with a reappraisal of nonhuman domestic
animals in terms of their wild (or willed) counterparts; the human ones should be
similarly reappraised.

"'Callicott, p. 34.

10

it is

a

50

Callicott suggests not only that

we

should become more wild than

we

we

axe, but that

once were more wild and some of
us are more wild than others.
These wilder people serve as
models which the res, of us should
emulate. So who were/are these
’wild counterparts' in

terms

of which 'we'

human domestic

Remarks of

Callicott's

Ethics’) of In Defense of the

animals should be reappraised?

such as the following in Part IV
(’American Indian Environmental

Land Ethic indicate

that he

cultures as examples of the kind of
’savage' societies

is

we

ready to offer up Native American
should emulate:

thus represent a romantic point of view;
I argue that the
North American
savages were indeed more noble than
’civilized’ Europeans, at least
in their
outlook toward nature.
I

Callicott regards Native Americans,

'surviving tribal cultures’), as natural, wild,

and indigenous peoples generally (what
he

and

free

phenomena

of the

son

calls

that Leopold approves.

Their environmental practices exhibit 'traditional
patterns of human-nature interaction.' 12 With

we

mind,

this in

can reformulate (2b) to read:

’...we

should reevaluate Euro-American culture in

terms of Native American cultures’ (although any
indigenous group
I

argue that Callicott cannot successfully appeal to Native
American culture as evidence of

a blanket moral justification for hunting.
criticisms of his

think

argument

the deeper and

is

will do).

1 '1
.

The next

I

will offer

two rather simple and even uninteresting

section of this chapter begins with an analysis of

more troubling problem with

his

argument:

his

what

I

conception of Native

Americans.
First,

Callicott

’classical,

is,

our revision of (2b) entails at least one important and questionable assumption:

in effect, asking us to

buy

into assumptions reminiscent of the Tylor-Redfield

unilinear evolutionary paradigm of culture’:

Two

relevant corollaries of this theoretical posture are,

nonliterate

nonWestem

first,

that

contemporary

societies are ’primitive’ in the literal sense that their

cultures closely resemble the cultures directly ancestral to contemporary
11

Callicott, p. 177.
12

Callicott, p. 94.
13
1

will

for so

forego the point that

many

centuries that

would no doubt argue
do not

its

many indigenous

cultures practice agriculture (com, for example, has been bred

origins in the wild are a matter of some dispute

that indigenous cultures

among

botanists).

Callicott

which practice agriculture are not as natural as those which
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civilizations and, second, that there
exist universal features that
characterize
cultures at a given stage of development. 14

Calhcott and coauthor Overholt do not

m

CaSe Callicott

seem

s

proper ecological niche a
first,

it

clear

what they think of this paradigm 15

.

'

’

being the

make

all

specific

the original,

kind of

demand

to

human

human culture-at

culture

that

we

consider as our model of humans'

which cannot,

I

argue, claim the

not without evidence which

least,

I

title

of

do not think

is

forthcoming anytime soon. Were the original
humans omnivores? Three problems here are the
sparseness of the

and the

fossil record,

the difficulty of deciding

difficulty of figuring out

who

which patterns of behavior

will

count as that

first

human

(so far as they can be determined

from the evidence) were natural and which were
unnatural innovations. The success of

argument depends not only on

human

activity as either

If

the original

this latter distinction

but also on our being able to classify any

actually herbivores, and meat-eating

we must drop

that

humans always

ate other animals.

On

is

no reason

or small.

social structures

humans,

like

kind of big

It is

fair to

ask

if

human

and/or tools (weapons).

first

14

else, if

we

down

’fact'

no good speculating that perhaps the
like ants; this supposition will

the

humans

ate ants

cultural innovation

original

not support the

may just be an

would not justify the eating of

take Callicott's naturalism seriously. These questions

humans, and was hunting a

it is

almost any sort of

that Callicott wants to defend, since the latter activity

unnatural augmenting of the former—the

anything

It is

to suppose that

hunting began with the development of certain

todays chimpanzees, ate easy prey

game hunting

as a

the contrary: throughout our

biosphere s history hommids have been notoriously ill-equipped to bring
arumal,

was introduced

the reference to Native Americans in the revised (2b), and

(3b) becomes: ’...we should eat nothing but wild plants.’ There

more probable

Callicott’s

one or the other.

humans were

cultural innovation, then

culture,

—who will count as the

—become even more problematic

in light of

Overholt and Callicott, p 5.
On p 9 they write: 'From the biological point of view there are no necessarily universal cultural

characteristics distributed species-wide, nor necessarily any distinctly primitive cultural universal as the

panprimitivists suppose.'

or that of Dobzhansky

The

context, though,

makes

it

unclear whether they are expressing their

own view
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Callicott's liberal

culture exists.

views (with which

agree) regarding where (i.e,

The following remarks, together with
the

problems faced

any attempt to specify the

in

more

In the

flexible,

information

may

1

take

is

more

inherited by

many different

first

human

facts of

among which

human

rapidly changing processes of
cultural evolution
means of social communication, which

human

past,

human
mche

we

grant Callicott the point that such a
culture can be identified

premise (3) of

his

argument

is still

in

concept

(I

do

particular place

all

the rest of

fill its

fictiony example:

even

if it

is

So, for example,

the morally responsible diet for

life

humans

and

all

times.

if

ecological

ate’?

if

we

we buy into

it

has none in that

at a given place

To use a

is

and

science-

to go five there.

take 'morally responsible

The answer

the

find that a giraffe by

on Mars, and people want

humans on Mars,

after Callicott, the diet that the first

we

human behaviors

at all places

abundant

An

eats but also the geographic

North America because

could survive here. Similarly,

Suppose that there

in the

diet’ to

not Martian animals, nor

Martian plants (perhaps the two categories would not even apply). Anything
humans do on

Mars

will of necessity

Maori to

sail to

New

be completely ecologically innovative— and the same was true of the

Zealand

would prove too much

ancestors, but

16

somewhere

better thought of as a many-dimensional

its activities.

’proper’ ecological niche in

time will not serve as a model for such practices

it

is

16

not have a model of proper

not, but Callicott must) of a ’proper’
ecological niche, then

definition cannot

is it

We would

which the dimensions describe not only what the
creature

and temporal locations of this and

mean,

weak.

not just a diet; a creature's ecological niche

is

is

’

primates.

ecological behavior outside of those areas
in which the species originated.

volume

What

among animals
veTofte^each
bod? language
§

forms. Predatory animals, for
example,

among

if

evolution, hint at the

culture:

their young to hunt by demonstrative
methods. Facial gestures,
and vocalization convey important
"cultural" information

Even

sorts of animals)

six

hundred years ago.

If Callicott's

argument were to succeed, then

—not only would we be morally obligated to

we would be

Overholt and Callicott, p 8

first

stick

with the diet of our

morally obligated not to emigrate. Hence, not only would the Maori
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have been wrong to hunt the Moa
to extinction,- but they would
also have been wrong to
eat
anything outside of their traditional
Eastern Polynesian
y do
Callicotfs

I

offer these simple criticisms
based

argument

on mere

cannot help bu, approach the Native
American as an almost
easily refuted naturalistic

to

have

left

home.

biological considerations? Because

burdened by two assumptions which
together make

is

which to construct an

and wrong even

diet,

it

strictly natural'

the case that he

phenomenon upon

argument against vegetarianism. He weds
the

Leopoldian formulation of the problem
of environmental ethics with the
assumption that

worthwhile study of Native American culture
in

this

regard

cultures conceptualize their immediate
experience with

33

exhausted by the study of

is

non-human

how

those

nature.

Native American Linguistics and Narratives

As noted above, Callicott believes that indigenous
peoples are possessed of a sort of
intuitive

grasp—versus

part of his

is

book

rational or scientific

to Native

indicated by the

title

knowledge-of their environment.

American thought, but what

is

Callicott devotes

the content of that thought? The answer

of one of his essays, ’American Indian

Land Wisdom' 18 (my emphasis).

Callicott invites us to consider certain
conceptualizations of nature as definitive of the indigenous

persons experience as indigenous person. Nowhere does he
make
suggestions for tackling what he

calls 'the uncertainties

the verification of the hypothesis that there existed
traditional

American

His

first

Indians'

suggestion

19

is

we

some

is

and

clear than in his

environmental wisdom among

past.

documents which

first

appearance

(2) Native encounters

lie

as close as

in written history). This

based on the two assumptions (1) that Native American wisdom

definitive conceptualizations of nature

now

sort of

investigate historical

possible to the 'documentary horizon' (Native Americans'

method

more

of the descriptive ethnological approach to

—emphasis (mine) on the

that

this

is

exhausted by certain

with nature are more limited

than they were in the past. These suggest the conclusion that Native wisdom

Assuming

that they did,

18

Callicott, pp.
19

Callicott, p.

203-219.

212

and that they did not have a good reason for doing

it.

is

trapped in

54

the past

hence CaWcott’s endorsement of
the

historical approach,

further assumption that readier
access to Native American

wisdom

an approach predicated on the
is

available through European

invaders of centuries ago (the
source of any documents at the
horizon) than through Native

Americans

living today.

Callicott’s

second suggestion

is

that

we

analyze Native American languages.
There

is

no

denying the immense value of
linguistic analysis to cross-cultural
philosophical enterprises, but
Calhcott, by narrowly focusing on
Native encounters with nature,
cheats himself out of the
potential that lies within this method.

Overholt and I undertook a reexamination
of HallowelTs analysis of Ojibwa
semantic categories with an eye to applying
them to the question of an Ojibwa
land wisdom. According to Hallowell,
the formal Ojibwa linguistic distinction
etween animate and inanimate (analogous to
gender distinctions in Romance
languages) does not cotrespond to
scientifically informed Western intuitions.
For
exmnple, some stones (flint), certain kinds
of shells (the megis shell of the
Midewiwm for instance), thunder, various winds, and so
on, as well as plants,
animals, and human beings fall into the
animate linguistic class. Further, the
category of person, according to Hallowell,
is not coextensive with the
category
human being in Ojibwa semantic distinctions as it is in
English and other modem
Western languages. Animals, plants, stones,
thunder, water, hills, and so on may
be persons in the Ojibwa linguistic organization
20
of
'

experience.

Callicott then goes

on

to claim that this

personhood of non-human

entities

is

naturally

attached to their being included in social relations
and hence being of ethical concern. However,
these considerations will not suffice for an understanding
of Native American environmentalist
ethics.

Nor

will

they go very far as an explanation of why those ecological
attitudes and practices

are so different from those of Euro-America.

personhood

is

no guarantee of my

Callicott

seems

treating

It is all

too evident that

my acknowledgment

you equitably nor even of my believing

to think otherwise, as

is

that

I

should.

again indicated in his comments on Lakota

culture:

To speculate

briefly on other Plains cultures, if the Lakota world view familiar to
everyone from Black Elk Speaks survives critical scrutiny, then the Sioux pictured
nature as more like a vast extended family than a congeries of societies. Such a
world view appears to be corroborated by the Lakota mythic materials collected in
the 1890s by James R. Walker. An environmental wisdom is certainly immediately

inferable from such a representation

20

Callicott,

p 214

[my emphasis] but

it

would not be very

of your
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r

et

e

hS

eSCribed

'Lh

familial

““
5

'

*^

relate^'

C

° ne S
“ me
'

'

Callicott’s characterization of
his

“ **"is to me, go beyond
3 f0m,ality ina
PP r0 P riate to intimate

familial duties '
'

remarks here as

'brief speculation' is

puzzling since

according to the method he employs
in explicating Ojibwa land
wisdom’ his work on Lakota

environmentalism

is

almost done,

if

we do

not need an account of Ojibwa
inter-human ethics in

order to understand Ojibwa environmentalism
(we need only
persons, too), then

we

know that non-humans can be

should not need an account of Lakota
family relationships in order to

understand Lakota environmentalism (we
need only know that non-humans can be
family

members,

too).

Callicott's descriptions of

Native 'land wisdom' suffer from a lack of
content, and

I

believe

that this lack arises in part from a failure
to appreciate fully the material (and
especially the
social) contexts in

sociologist, but

I

which Native environmentalist

suspect

would be a

it

and practices appear.

beliefs

I

am no

similarly hopeless task to understand western

environmentalist destruction without investigating
western interhuman relationships, including

economic relationships and
environmental destruction

their competitive structure.

in eastern

suspect that the

I

same holds

true for the

Europe; one must understand the dynamics of interpersonal

relationships (including economic relationships), concepts
of interpersonal rights and obligations,

the traditional Marxist attitude toward nature, and the
dynamics of bureaucracy.
exclusively on a culture

s

conceptualizations of nature, then

we

If

we

focus

can only pretend to understand

that culture's relationship with the environment.

If all

would deny

I

seem

this

to be doing

is

pointing out an oversight of Callicott's,

and deny that material considerations are

(although he does admit

now and

I

suspect that Callicott

essential in these kinds of investigations

then their usefulness). Callicott explicitly subscribes

Overholt and Callicott) to Stephen Tyler's conception of culture, given on

p.

3 of the

(p.

latter's

Cognitive Anthropology.

It is

assumed

for perceiving
21

Callicott, p

216.

[in cognitive

anthropology] that each people has a unique system

and organizing material phenomena

20

—things, events, behavior, and

in

56

^~

emotions (Goodenough, 1957). The
object of study is not these material
a lhe,n ' elve s.
the way they are organized in the
minds of men.
m
phen ° mena; ***
«*»“« organizations
material

All of

leave

it

up

«

phenomena!

of

the cognitive anthropologist's eggs
are in the taxonomical basket.

to the anthropologists to decide

what makes a

culture a culture, but

No doubt
I

I

should

cannot restrain a

naive urge to question the fruitfulness
of any project which aims to understand
a culture
exclusively through

what comes down

anthropologist does not

she claim to

know anything about

know when

she claims to

minds of the participants
Parenthetically,

Overholt and

Callicott’s

to (at least in Callicott’s case) linguistic
analysis.

the material experiences of a culture,

know how

those material

phenomena

If

the

how much

can

are organized in the

in that culture?

we

can see a similar problem haunting claims such
as the following in

book, Clothed-in-Fur and Other Tales:

An

Introduction to an Ojibwa World

View (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America,
1982):
[Ojibwa] narratives certainly reflect and affirm a
fundamentally economic
between human persons and animal, plant, and mineral persons.
Animals, plants, and minerals are not, however, rightless
resources, as is the case
relationship

Western economic assumptions. They are as it were trading partners
with
beings, and are pictured as profiting, from their own point
of view, from
exchange with human beings. 22
in

human

No one who

has read or heard these Ojibwa narratives will deny the contrast with

Western economic assumptions, but neither can we deny a similar contrast between some
traditional English

and German narratives

(just

break open your dusty copy of Grimm's) and

Western economic assumptions. The information about a culture available
narratives,

when

of that culture,

is

from some of our

in a culture's

not supplemented with knowledge about the material existence of the members
limited.

own

Speaking for myself,

in the

I

do not

find the

Ojibwa narratives so different

appearance of animal persons, the moral content, and the use of the

narratives in 'the child's enculturation by elders.'

23

This similarity accounts for the fact that an

audience of Ojibwa listeners reacted positively, rather than expressing puzzlement, when John

22
23

Overholt and Callicott, p 155
Mary B Black-Rogers, in Overholt and Callicott, p xv
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Rogers—Chief Snow Cloud— regaled them with
is

difficult for the

uninformed reader to know just

differ (in this case,

and German
reqmres

how

Furthermore,

it

the moral lessons within the tales might

with respect to ethics and the environment)
from the moral lessons in English

tales.

at least

the story of Red Riding Hood. 24

It

seems to

some idea

me

that

knowing the moral of a

one has never heard before

story

of the direction in which the storyteller

is

inclined to go.

It is

easy,

I

think, for a non-Indian to find morals in
Indian stories not very different from those told
in non-

Indian society. This should not be mistaken for a
claim that the Ojibwa regard their tales in the

same way Euro-Americans
Ojibwa

stories are

regard, say, the story of the Three Billy Goats
Gruff.

regarded as

to the listeners, are

fact or fiction,

and whether that

distinction

is

Whether the

of any consequence

examples of the kind of deep and interesting questions that remain.

I

only

suggest that the tales themselves are not terribly strong
evidence for the foreignness of Ojibwa
culture nor even for an Ojibwa environmental ethic— although

knows more about the

actual living conditions

I

do believe

that,

once someone

and material relationships of the Ojibwa, she

will

be convinced on both counts.

3.4

The Rest of the Storv
I

—when those

think that the fixation on Native American cultures' ecological activity

cultures are regarded at

—

all

is all

too

common in

are possessed of images of that activity: the
Plains cultures

is

'the first Thanksgiving,'

We

is

Wounded

—of these two

exhaust the non-Indian's conception of

Rogers, p 124f.

the 'weeping Indian' image of the 1970s

Knee, leaders like Chief Joseph and Sitting

even John Wayne movies. Such images

two-dimensional cartoon. What

of subsistence hunting of buffalo by

also have images of the Native relationship with white America:

the Little Big Horn,

mythological and even racist

24

phenomenon

widely known, and of course there

environmentalist campaign.

Bull, and, yes,

Euro-American culture. Typically, non-Indians

is

all

—whether veridical or dangerously

facets of the Native

that

is

Indian. For

missing, or at best

is

American experience almost

many

non-Indians the Indian

uncommon,

is

is

a

a third kind of image: that

58

of Native American relationships with
each other. While there are such icons as
the 'chief; the

squaw; the

'papoose,'

and the brave,' there

is

a paucity of images-real or imagined-of
activity

and attitudes within the community.
easy for a distortion

It is

A

the third.

classic case of this

Native American

man

of,

or over-emphasis on, the

was the 'weeping

in traditional dress surveys

cheek. The image should be ambiguous, but

it is

first

image to

Indian' television ads of

environmental havoc.
not.

It

moment

that he might be

weeping

in

memory

of

two decades ago: a

A tear

runs

down

his

should cause us to consider both the

destruction of his environment and the destruction of
his people, but
for a

arise in the absence of

all

it

does not.

We

should think

the cultural destruction that was

predicated on land theft and environmental recklessness—
the destruction of people and
interpersonal relationships, the disease, the genocide, the
boarding school terrorism, the theft of

language, alcoholism, unemployment,

etc.

—but we do not.

No,

we

see immediately that the

Indian weeps because white people don't pick up after themselves.
This advertisement
representative of the

way

in

is

which environmentalism has marginalized the Indian.

Hettinger's claim (already noted above) that vegetarians cannot 'value the
culture of

Native American plains tribes while rejecting their tradition of

and

shelter'

is

another example of

how

killing buffalo for food, clothing,

environmentalists over-emphasize the

ecological image) at the expense of the third (the social image). Hettinger

assumption that buffalo consumption

The

lack of a

more

is

is

first

image (the

relying

on the

the be-all and end-all of Plains cultures.

holistic appreciation of Native

American society endangers even the

kind of direct cross-cultural research which Richard Brandt engaged in for his book Hopi Ethics.

Brandt makes an error which complements
themselves

to

he goes

directly to the source

—the Hopi

—but with absolutely no appreciation of the general metaphysical and evaluative

principles underlying the ethical

what

Callicott's:

make

judgments of the Hopi he was studying. Hence he does not know

of Hopi (as well as Navajo) disregard for domesticated sheep and dogs

when Hopi

59

respect for animals and nature

contradiction

I

where there

is

was otherwise

none

evident. Consequently, he cannot help but see
a

25
.

do not mean to disparage the value of the

analysis of language

and

narratives.

It is,

example, interesting and probably instructive that Native creation
myths diverge from our
the

way they

do. In Indian creation myths

fundamentally different from that most
paternalistic gods of the Bible

we

for

own

see a characterization of the given world order

common

in the west; unlike the

and of Greek myth, the Indian world

is

product of egoistic and

often seen as the product of

a very positive, collaborative, creative effort:

As [Earthmaker and Coyote] floated along, they saw something like a bird's nest.
"Well, that is very small,” said Earthmaker. "It is small. If it were larger,
I could
fix it. But it is too small. I wonder how I can stretch it a little! What
is the best
way? How shall I make it larger?" So saying, he prepared it.
When all the ropes were stretched, he said, "Well, sing, you who were the
finder of this earth, this mud! ’In the long, long ago, Robin-Man made the world,
stuck earth together, making this world ." Then Robin sang and his world-making
1

song sounded sweet. After the ropes were all stretched, he kept singing; then,
after a time, he ceased.
Then Earthmaker spoke to Coyote also. "Do you sing too," he said...
Then Earthmaker sang..., until by and by he ceased. "Now," he said, "it
would be well if the world were a little larger. Let us stretch it!"-"Stop!" said
Coyote. "I speak wisely. This world ought to be painted with something, so that
it

may

look pretty.

Navajo myths
to

make

this

tell

What do you two

think ?"....

of the emergence of First

world a good one for the Navajo.

2
'

26

Man and

The Lakota

the councils of the elemental gods (Rock, Sky, and Earth
collaborate together on the

here
25

is

starkly different

make-up of the world

28
.

First

Woman from the

story of creation

is

concerned with

—Inyan, Skan, and Maka)

The

role

lower worlds

as they

and value of cooperative behavior

from that evident in the Theogony. There, cooperation merely serves

(is

Reichard attributes Hopi maltreatment of such animals to 'contempt for a non-contributing, hence

—

The vast majority of dogs in a Hopi or Navajo community are not
more respected because 'they furnish the daily meal' (ibid ). Sheep can
be contrasted with wild animals in that the former have very little power of their own, living entirely as they
do off the care of humans Therefore, we should not be too surprised to see them and other domesticated
despised, form of

life'

(Reichard, p

working dogs. Sheep are only a

143)

little

food animals, as well as dogs, presenting something of a challenge to Hopi values, which have their
foundations in an egalitarian view of the responsibilities that humans and animals share foundations to

—

which Brandt
26
27

28

is

oblivious.

Roland B Dixon, Maidu Texts (American Ethnological Society), IV,
Reichard, p 26.

Walker, Lakota Myth, p 194ff.

p.

4ff cited

in

Radin, p 239f
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subservient to, competition, as
in the 'pattnersWps' of
Gaia

md Kronos

(against Ouranos); Gaia,

Rheia and Zeus (against Kronos);
Zeus, Kottos, Briateos and
Gyes (against Kronos); Gaia and

Typhoeus (against Zeus); and of course
the whole Olympian pantheon

(against the Titans).

The

Hesiodic view of a malevolent
earth begins a tradition continuing
through Thucydides (see the

Melian Dialogue) and Plato (see
to

Callicles'

speech

in the Gorgias), further

Spencer and Nietzsche and beyond: the
propensity to see nature

in tooth

and claw’-i.e., a vicious competition.
This seems to be

still

as, in

through Hobbes, up

Tennyson’s phrase, ‘red

in contrast

with the

spirit

of

these Indian creation myths. Likewise
the Indian myths contrast with
the Biblical world of a God
jealous of his immortality and his
knowledge, and

humans who immediately

fall

into deceit

and

murder.

we need more

But

than

this.

Having

criticized Callicott for not exhibiting

of the material facts involved in Indian
environmental ethics,
give just a few examples of the kinds
of information which,

I

will

undertake in

wedded

to

an appreciation

this section to

what he says about Ojibwa

and Lakota language, give a better indication of
the nature of Indian environmental ethics-in
particular,

an indication of how

it is

part of an ethics which includes duties to
other

human

persons.

3.4.1

Ojibwa Persons

Even Hallowell, the source of much of Callicott's information
on Ojibwa

linguistics,

recognizes a gap between linguistic taxomonies and ethics:

The

entire psychological field in

which

[the Ojibwa] live

and

act

is

not only

unified through their conception of the nature and role of
'persons' in their
universe, but by the sanctioned moral values which guide the
relations of
9

’persons.'^

A concrete
grandfathers.

tell

us

Knowing

much about

2>

Hallowell,

p.

example of Hallowell’s

386.

holistic

that the Ojibwa regard

approach

is

his explication of the role of

some non-human

the Ojibwas relationship to those

non-human

entities as 'grandfathers’

entities until

we know

does not

something

61

about the role of grandfathers in Ojibwa society. As

it

turns out, grandfathers have a powerful and

positive role:

The kinship term

grandfather'... is not only applied to

human persons but to
are persons of a category other than human. In fact, when
the collective plural our grandfathers' is used, the reference
is primarily to
persons of this latter class. ...Furthermore, both sets of
grandfathers
spiritual beings

who

can be said to
be functionally as well as terminologically equivalent in certain
respects. The
other-than-human grandfathers are sources of power to human beings through
the 'blessings they bestow, i.e., a sharing of their power which
enhances the

power

of

human

A

beings.

terminological grandfather.
relative or not. This

reference to a

name

child
It is

is always given a name by an old man, i.e., a
a matter of indifference whether he is a blood

carries

with

it

a special blessing because

dream of the human grandfather

in

it

has

which he obtained power from

one or more of the other-than-human grandfathers. In other words, the relation
between a human child and a human grandfather is functionally patterned in the
same way as the relation between human beings and grandfathers of an other10
than-human class
.

Given

Callicott's

general point that

what other features of interhuman

for the

Ojibwa as persons,

relationships in Ojibwa culture might help us to get a grip on

Ojibwa environmentalism? For one
cultures an emphasis

some non-humans count

thing, the

on the value of sharing

Ojibwa seem

to share with other Native

American

—which seems to be more than just supererogatory:

When my friend

Chief Berens once fell ill he could not explain it. Then he
had overlooked one man when he had passed around a bottle of
whiskey. He believed this man was offended and had bewitched him. Since there
was no objective evidence of this, it illustrates the extreme sensitivity of an
recalled that he

individual to the principle of sharing, operating through feelings of guilt

There

is

also a

marked

identification of self with

31
.

community:

when

they met, always asked one another, 'Waenaesh k'dodaem?’
(What is your totem?); only afterwards did they ask, 'Waenaesh keen?' (Who are
you?) The question and answer reflected the nature and importance of the
Strangers,

and corporate sense of identity... When asked of their identity men and
might answer 'Zaugee,' or 'Zaugeewinini,' meaning i am of the People of
the River Mouth,' or 'Pottawotomi,' which means am of the People of the
32
Keepers of the Fire,' or 'Menominee I am of the People of the Wild Rice '...
individual

women

'I

—

That identification of
of the

self

with community

community take precedence over the

The

act of leading

is

30

32

Hallowell, p 360
Hallowell, p 385

Johnston, p 59f.

consistent with the

way in which the

leadership, rather than the other

way around.

without compulsion. The followers follow freely and are at
is chosen by consensus for his foresight to lead the

liberty to withdraw.. ..A leader

31

is

desires

62

way

In the exercise of leadership,
a leader did not act
rS

th™“f

that concerned the community,
he

upon his own initiative
was expected to seek and rely upon

COnSiStinS ° f ‘ he eading
'

commvX“

me "

and

WOme "

° f the

war leader had no control over the
outcome of a battle, neither had he
control or authority over his warriors.
By custom he asked and invited
warnors to join his expedition. The
warriors invited could either refuse
or accent
A sufficient number of warriors subscribing to
the war party to ensure success
was
a form of permission; too few
accepting was a form of denying
34
permission
Just as a

much

The

fact that the

Ojibwa regard some non-humans

as persons should not lead us
hastily to

conclude that the Ojibwa have an
environmentalist outlook.

have no case against the hypothesis that they
might yet be
Hobbesians

like

This would

seem not

is

Ayn Rand.

In that case the

to be the

not to find out that there

is

If

that

is all

we know,

then

we

as yet

laissez faire capitalists, dedicated

Ojibwa society would be an environmental
nightmare.

case-although the point of researching Ojibwa
inter-human

such a thing as Ojibwa environmentalism (there
are far

less

ethics

oblique

methods), but to understand Ojibwa attitudes toward
the environment (and maybe even our own)

much

better.

3.4.2 Lakota Families

Whether some person
any particularly remarkable

A's recognition that

effect

on

A's attitude

some other person B

toward B

is

is

related to her will have

an open question. Different cultures

place different amounts of significance on the various sorts of family
relations. So the fact that the

Lakota regard
attitudes

when

all living

things as related will not settle the question 'what

toward the environment?' However, that

fact

is

the nature of Lakota

might take on a much greater significance

put alongside information about what the Lakota regard as proper treatment of even the

most distant of

relatives.

I knew a well-educated Indian who had come back
to his reservation after
working for many years in a big city. With his life savings he opened a cafeteria
and gas station. All day long the cars lined up. “Hey, Uncle, fill her up. I can’t
pay, but you are rich; you let me have it free.” And the same thing over at the

33
14

Johnston, p 6 If.
Johnston, p 78
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cafeteria: “Say, Uncle, let

bother to wnte up a

bill

me

have one of them barbecued-beef
sandwiches

Don’t

for a relation of yours...”

He couldn’t say “no” to a poor relative, and
the whole reservation was
one big mass of poor relatives... We aren’t
divided up into separate, neat little
anuhes Pa Ma kids, and to hell with
everybody else. The whole damn tribe
is
one big family; that s our kind of reality 1

just

.'

once heard of an Indian who lost a leg in
an industrial accident. He got about
thousand dollars in insurance money. In no
time his place was overrun
with more than a hundred hungry relatives...
The fun lasted a few weeks then the
money was gone. That man had no regrets. He said
he wished he’d lose his other
leg so that he could start all over again 36
I

fifteen

.

Old Uncle would sometimes leave a heifer or steer
in front of a poor cousin’s
ouse. He used to tell me, ‘There’s more to
food than just passing through your
body. There are spints in the food, watching
over it. If you are stingy, that spirit
will go away thinking hhat bastard is so
tight, I’ll leave.’ But if you share
your
food with others, this good spirit will always stay
around.” I was brought up to
regard food as something sacred 37
.

Even now, among

traditionals, as long as

one person

eats, all other relatives eat
always some poor relative saying,
Kanji, I need five bucks for food and gas,” and he
will not be refused as long as
there is one single dollar left. Feeding every comer is
still a sacred duty.. .Fourth
and fifth cousins still claim relationship and the privileges that
go with it. Free
enterprise has no future on the res 38

too.

Nobody

saves up

money because

there

is

.

Hence,
...We are lousy

raw material from which

Non-humans-as-relatives
it

conveys. However, once

is

an intriguing notion but limited

we have an

give to their relatives;

has thus given

itself to

it is

this

39
.

in the

amount of information

idea of the communitarian sorts of social relations which

attach to being related in Dakota society,

Dakota environmentalism. Perhaps

to form a capitalist

we might have

is

a better idea of the underpinnings of

illustrated in the idea that animals, too, are believed to

believed that a successfully hunted animal allows

itself to

be

killed

and

the Dakota as food.

35

Fame Deer, p 34
Fame Deer, p. 34f
37
Lame Deer, p 36.
38
Crow Dog, p 12f.
39
Lame Deer, p. 35 Of course,
3h

recent successes of a

there

is

number of Native

the formidable task

last two
Foxwoods Casino

of squaring these

enterprises, including the

statements with the

64
3.5

Some Concluding Remarks
This might be an appropriate
point at which to return to Hettinger,

who

claimed that

vegetarians cannot Value the culture
of Native American plains tribes
while rejecting their
tradition of killing buffalo for food,
clothing, and shelter.' Perhaps one
of the lessons to be found
in material

such as was referred to in section 3.4

Plains cultures than just the killing
of buffalo.

is

that there has

been a

While there are points of

lot

more going on

friction

in

between some

animal liberationists and Native Americans
(particularly regarding the continuation
of traditional
hunting), there

is

much more

for

animal liberationists os animal liberationists
to value

in Native

cultures: a cooperative (or symbiotic)
rather than competitive conception of
nature, a cooperative

rather than competitive ethic, and an inclusion
of animals and other non-humans into the
realms
of personhood and morality.

The stake

in the adoption of a cooperative ethic

and especially non-animals

into the

is

that both animal liberationists

and environmentalists have

the subject of Chapter 5. The inclusion of non-humans

moral realm presents challenges for Westerners; these

challenges are examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

THE WORTH OF NON-SENTIENT

An Argument

4-1 Plant Life:

Not seeing the
does,

NATURAL OBJECTS, AND ECOSYSTEMS

against Vegetarianism

clear line

between sentient and non-sentient beings

Butler's

Erewhonians, to abstain from plant

doubt

if

becomes absurd.

life

anyone can be a practicing vegetarian

her bowl of salad

at

animals, are living things

make

it

in

America these days without hearing the

later, usually

coming from the other side of

mealtime: 'So you don't eat animals; but you do eat plants. Plants,

— how do you justify

The mock indignation and
question

me, as it led Samuel
as well, at which point the whole

1

following remarks (or something like them) sooner or
his or

that Singer

find the logic underlying vegetarianism leading

I

enterprise

I

LIFE,

killing

like

and eating them?'

air of self-congratulation

which invariably accompany

this

plain that the speaker does not expect the requested information but rather

believes that he or she has delivered an original and decisive argument against vegetarianism.

I

believe that the argument

is

supposed

to function as a sort of reductio,

and

I

suspect that

it is

driven by the assumption that the vegetarian's moral evaluation of plants reproduces in miniature
the meat-eater's evaluation of food animals (as well as plants). In this section

and refute
attitude

this

argument. However,

I

do not want a

I

result of that refutation to

will try to explain

be a vegetarian

toward plants which mirrors the meat-eater’s dismissive stance with respect

animals. As

we

will see in this chapter, that attitude

animal liberation and environmentalism. Therefore,
claim that the only beings

who

to food

would preclude a rapprochement between
I

will

examine arguments

matter in ethics are conscious beings

for

and against the

—namely, some animals.

The

ensuing discussion will focus on the merits of plants as morally considerable beings and then lead
us into a look at attempts to include other non-sentient entities such as mountains and entire

ecosystems in a moral calculus.

1

Rodman, p 107
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First let us

begin with the reductio.

One way

to express

it

more completely would be

as

follows:

(1)

[ex hypothesi ] Vegetarianism

(2)

If (1),

(3)

If

(4)

.-.

On

then (2b)

It is

wrong

be

false.

to

humans

to

kill

and eat non-human

life.

plants.

non-vegetarian

latter's attitude

is

simply demanding consistency of the

toward other forms of life. Since the non-vegetarian

unacceptable to the vegetarian, he thinks he has
shown the latter that (1) must

is

The non-vegetarian

hand and that of

and eat

kill

this interpretation, the

that (4)

for

true.

(2b), then (4).

vegetarian with respect to the

knows

wrong

it is

is

all

other

side of the line, then

it is

life

is

on the

wrong

non- vegetarian believes he
consequent, of course,

sees a clear line demarcating the value
of

is

other. If

to eat everything

the

first

wrong

it is

to bring to

ridiculous; therefore,

on

to eat

human

life

on the one

any particular thing on the other

that side of the line.

my attention the

(In

my experience,

fact that plants are alive.)

the

The

not wrong to eat any particular thing on that

it is

side of the line.

Line (2)
is

and

satirical,

is

its

false.

It is

based on an exaggerated interpretation of ethical vegetarianism.

presence in any argument pulls the rug out from under the project of a
reductio

showing any other premise

(here, the

first

premise) to be

false.

Better to stick to a

straightforward argument from the same assumptions about the relative value of
all

other

human

life

and

life:

(1)

If it is

(2)

It is

(3)

.-.

wrong

It is

it is

wrong

to eat plants.

not wrong to eat animals.

is

the only thing to contest here

—which lend

today

to eat animals, then

not wrong to eat plants.

Since the argument

alive

It

valid,

is

and

line (2)

is

the truth of (1). There have been traditions in

line (1) plausibility, so

—see below),
philosophy—

obviously true (or generally true!

it is

worth examining.

still
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The justification

humans on

for line

the one hand and

all

rests, again,

( 1 )

else

on the

on the

ability to parse the world,
value-wise, into

other. Kant does this explicitly
in the

Groundwork of

the Metaphysic of Morals.

Beings whose existence depends, not
on our
they are non-rational beings, only a

less, if

will,

but on nature, have none the

relative value as

means and are
Rational bcin * s
the other hand, are called persons
because their nature already marks them
out as ends in themselves. 2
qU

rr T
With
price,

ly Ca ltd th ngS

-

-

',

this distinction in

mind, Kant

is

able to contrast the sort of value

and hence exchangeability) from the kind of
value

non-exchangeability).

3

What determines the

'price'

rational beings

have

of a thing? Reference to

mere things have

(a

(dignify, indicating

human needs and

wants. Note the consistency between these
remarks and the following passage from the
Lectures

on Ethics:
animals have the faculty of using their powers
according to will. But this will
It is necessitated through the
incitement of stimuli, and the actions of
animals involve a bruta necessitas. If the will of all
beings were so bound to
sensuous impulse, the world would possess no value. 4
All
is

not free.

Of course,
and

'Duties

claims that

all this

supports Kant's famous passages 'Duties Towards Animals
and

Towards Inanimate
'all

Objects'

( Lectures

on

Ethics, pp.

239-241), in which he explicitly

duties towards animals, towards immaterial beings, and
towards inanimate objects

are aimed indirectly at our duties towards mankind'
(p. 241). These passages have been

noted by animal

liberationists.

humans and everything

else,

Here

I

merely wish to point out the clean

a line which leaves animals with exactly as

our diet as plants, and which would serve nicely as the justification for
justification

(value as

would go something

means

only),

if it is

like this:

wrong

to use

Since animals

one of these

other. In the Kantian system, animals have the

plants.

2

Kant, Groundwork p 96
Kant, Groundwork, p 102.
Kant, Lectures on Ethics p
,

1

4

Spirits'

,

121

same moral

it

Kant draws between

much moral

shelter from

line (1) above.

and plants have

as food, then

line

the

much

The

same kind of worth

must be wrong to use the

significance (or insignificance) as

5

No one

68

in the

anthropocentric

ethic presented

neither does the
to at least

effects

some

debate with which

this dissertation

by Kant

in the passages

more conservative non-vegetarian. The

is

concerned subscribes to the extreme

noted above, and,
latter

is

when

hard-pressed,

usually against needless cruelty

kinds of animals (and because of the
animal's pain, rather than because of the

on the character of the person, which was

Kant's only concern).

1

believe that most non-

vegetarians would consider this Kantian
justification of line (1) too extreme.

Another justification of
he endorses
otherwise

line (1),

and the one to which

Butler's anti-vegetarian satire in

known

as

Wang’s paradox.

Erewhon?

Dummet

is

I

suspect Callicott subscribes

when

based on a Sorites (or slide) argument.

gives a succinct description of these sorts of

arguments.

Consider the following inductive argument:
0 is small;
n

If

is

small, n +

1 is

Therefore, every
a paradox, since

small.

number

is

small.

we

can evidently find interpretations of 'small' under which
the conclusion is patently false and the premises apparently
true. It is, in fact, a
version of the ancient Greek paradox of the heap. If you
have a heap of sand, you
still have a heap of sand if you remove one
grain; it follows, by repeated
...It is

applications, that a single grain of sand makes a heap, and,
further, that, by
removing even that one grain, you will still have a heap. Wang's paradox
is
merely the contraposition of this, where 'n is small' is interpreted to mean 'n
grains of sand are too few to make a heap.' 7

In the case of line (1) the idea
that, at

some

point, the distinction

and non-heaps)

is

and

in

Or

'spirit-centric,' if

moral sphere
6

Callicott, p
7
*

17.

Dummett, p 303.
Sorabji, p. 102.

and plants share enough

between animals and

any case

foundation for the argument

(Kant's view, sketched above,

5

that animals

characteristics so

plants (like the distinction

between heaps

vague. While the Sorites argument against vegetarianism goes as far back,

reportedly, as Solon,

modem

is

we keep

in

far

is

back enough to be a topic of Porphyry's Abstinence, the

laid

down by

depends on the

mind

all

latter).

La Mettrie's attack on Descartes' dualism

La Mettrie saw humans as differing only

the sorts of beings (angels,

God) Kant would have

in

us include the

69
degree from animals, and both
of these groups as differing only
in degree from plants
(see

L Homme machine and

Homme plante).

L'

There are two traditional paths to
the view that the differences
between animals and
plants are only a matter of degree.

One

is

via the belief that

God has

filled

the world with every

possible kind of creature (the
rationale being that the world's
missing anything

accomodate would constitute an imperfection).
That

one

to

it

could

level of ontological saturation

suppose that every creature has a close
'neighbor'

in

terms of attributes

(e.g.,

might lead
people are

rather ape-like, apes are rather aye
aye-like, aye ayes are rather
possum-like, etc.), so that the
world's creatures would,
linear

if

you could

it

closely resembles but in different
respects). This

development of the theory of evolution.

It

throughout the eighteenth century,

’missing links’

did,

when

held something like
is

differs

this; that

is

scientists postulated a

is

we

plants (our nearest

common

We

world

is

probably what

Sontes argument:

The other path

is

to the

through some belief about evolution. La Mettrie

saturated with

fit

underlying the

it is

creatures.

modem

fit

survive.

accepted today, but

Something

like this or the

non-vegetarian's attempt at the

are related, by virtue of evolution, to animals and

all

animals are related to

relative lived about three billion years ago).

can then divide these various possible justifications of

justifications

9

nature creates every creature imaginable and only
the

in the idea that the

following consideration

world saturated with

species.

not so far from one or two of the basic tenets of
evolution as

mainly

view preceded the

however, continue to exert some influence on the

and predicted the existence of as-yet undiscovered

differences-are-only-a-matter-of-degree view

This

up, exhibit a kind of continuity
(not necessarily

one might imagine a many-dimensional
grid of resemblances such that each
being would

have a number of neighbors

latter

them

line

line (1) into

two main groups:

based on resemblance (the continuity view) and justifications based on relatedness

(the evolutionary view).

The power of the

of ethical vegetarianism's

commitment

Sorites objection

is

directly proportional to the

to either resemblance or relatedness as reasons for

’

See Stephen Jay Gould's essay 'Bathybius and Eozoon,'

in

Gould, pp 236-244

depth
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prohibiting the killing and eating
of other animals. However,

founded, then the import
too, are beings,'

is

more extreme than just the

if

the Sorites objection

is

well-

prohibition of plants in the diet.
Minerals,

and the Great Chain of Being includes
them on the

far end.

If

a prohibition on

animals slides into a prohibition on
plants, then a prohibition on
plants slides into a prohibition on
minerals, so that

we

are

left

with the diet of Abaris,

Pythagorean doctrine by refusing to eat any
food

4-2 Responses to the Slide

He appeals

'demonstrated the most extreme form of

10

at

all.'

Arwimpm

In deference to the ancient character
of the

responses.

who

argument,

to approximately seven characteristics

we

entails destruction; fruit does not.
Animals are not our property; plants are.
Meat is more difficult to obtain than is fruit.

(4)

(5)

Meat
Meat

(6)
(7)

Now, some

we sow and

entails luxurious destruction for the sake of
pleasure; fruit does not.
entails an injustice to a kindred creature; fruit
does not.

of these criteria do not appear to be

cultivate [plants],

as applicable to animals as

general justification, or
is

it

to those of us

it

who do

it is

to plants,

aimed

and Sorabji

tells

not feel that frugivorousness

it

is

The justification

11

it

to them,'

'should not be taken as a

The problem with

be dropped to the ground
tree.

for (4),

But

if it is

this distinction

is

and

(2)

not

worthless

morally obligatory. The truth of line (5)

is

a

changes from time to time, place to place, and individual to

Hughes, ’The Environmental Ethics of the Pythagoreans,'
103

us that

children.'

at fruit; the fruit will

individual (e.g., contrast the availability of vegetables in

Sorabji, p

that relevant.

does not entail the destruction of the

wholly empirical matter, and

1

all

and nourish them by other attentions which we pay

would sanction our eating our

that they are peculiarly

taken, and gathering

10

(pp. 71, 72, 127, 139):

Meat
Meat

(3)

(3)

look at Porphyry's

Animals have souls; plants do not.
entails theft; fruit does not.

(1)
(2)

is

first

which distinguish plant food from

meat and which justify drawing a moral boundary
between them

that

should

p.

my case

208

with the case of a Laplander; the

implications of this difference are
discussed in both the preceding and
following chapters).

wholly too flimsy a ground for making
the

seems

It

me

to

of most persons’ diets)

distinction.

that (1) (substitute 'minds' for
’souls’)

u

remain the cornerstones of

becoming more popular with the resurgence of
of

Mary Midgley

objection targets

But

we

differs

Chapter

in

6).

on

is

and

(meat

(6)

ethical vegetarianism,

interest in

Of course, justifications

the emphasis

if

Humean

is

like (7) are exactly

an axiological preference

it

what the

seems to be

animal

for

On this
life,

that there

is

latter

do

or eat the former. Rather,

and that

not what

is

reading, (7)

is

not just wrong

a kind of betrayal involved).

Regan or

utilitarians like

not believe that the fact that animals resemble us more
than plants do

quality,

in Porphyry).

not, but also because their having souls implies

Ethical vegetarians—whether they be Kantians
like

kill

Sorites

whereas (7)

points out the insensitivity to shared experience
(eating animals instead of plants

because the former have souls and the

like (7)

ethics (e.g., see the discussion

’kindredness’ simpliciter (which

(1) in that (1) implies only

an unnecessary part

with something

could instead put the emphasis on shared
capacity for consciousness.

from

It is

is

it is

wrong

to

kill

is

what makes

Singer—do
it

wrong

to

or eat animals because they possess a certain

consciousness. True, they resemble us in this respect, but this accidental
fact

relevant.

A conscious

cauliflower, even

if it

does not resemble us very

much

at

is

all,

should be spared the salad bowl.
Similarly, conscious life (as

is

non-conscious

decisive just

is

is

life,

life

it is

so happens here

on Earth)

is

not the closeness of the relation that

the simple fact that

wholly irrelevant

unrelated

but

it

some animals

Were we

in ethics).

more
is

are conscious (this

closely related to us than

decisive; rather,

is

what

not to say that relatedness

to discover a descendant of ancient ferns, or a wholly

form from another planet, which had the attribute of consciousness, the theories of

philosophers like Regan and Singer would have no trouble accommodating prohibitions on
or eating them. So line (1), on whichever justification,

12

is

•

But see the section

is

false.

*

in

Chapter

5

on ’A Feminist Argument Against Vegetarianism

1

killing

72

Finally,

we

can follow Judith Thompson and
question the form of the

slide

argument

itself.

We

are asked to notice that the
development of a
birth into childhood is continuous;

ough

then

choose a point

human

being from conception

a line
m this development and say 'before this point the draw
thing
not

person, after this point

said that to

it is

is

to

a

a person' is to make an arbitrary
choice a^hoice for
n§S n ° 8 ° 0d reaS ° n Can be given
h
'
is con duded that
the" fetus
k
th
We had better say k is a P erson from the moment
of
°J
mnr r
conception.
But this conclusion does not follow.
Similar things might be said
about the development of an acorn into
an oak tree, and it does nof follow that
acorns are oak trees, or that we had
13
better say that they
it is

hC natUrC ° f

-

i

f

’

are.

Similarly, while

(e.g.,

it

might be possible to lay out a

fairly rich scale of

people, dolphins, crocodiles, ants, oysters...),
most of the creatures that

(some forms of photosynthetic zooplankton might
challenge our
so) certainly have

only target those

no consciousness whatsoever, and the

who

elect to eat

some animals and not

subtle grades of consciousness. Unfortunately,
that
ethical vegetarianism, Singer

and Regan. They

eating oysters or even turkeys. This will cause

A
argument
that

we

response to the slide argument

final

is

valid at

all, it is

upon

is

all,

to

as nothing

wrong

to eat people, then

(3)

If it is

wrong

to eat animals, then

1

trouble, as

we

problem-^an

visible

more

proponents of
killing or

will see in this chapter.

remind the non- vegetarian that

to the resemblance

if

the slide

between animals and

to eat people.

If it is

Thompson, p

a

wrong with

like this:

(2)

It is

it is

would include the most

compared

It is

.'.

problem-if

others and base the distinction on

them some

(1)

(4)

categories, but not disastrously

find nothing intrinsically

is

call 'plants'

the resemblance between animals and plants that the

humans. The argument would go something

wrong

slide

we

valid in both directions, serving also in a reductio
against the claim

should not eat people. After

anti-vegetarian depends

13

degree of consciousness

wrong

to eat plants.

it is

wrong

it is

to eat animals.

wrong

to eat plants.

73

The argument

is

valid.

The conclusion

propped up by the same kind of
that kind of slide

is

that

43

we

argument

is

slide

is

false.

The second and

argument on which the anti-vegetarian reductio
depends;

sound, then line one must be

false.

Clearly,

it is

not.

if

Equally clear

should reject anti-vegetarian arguments
based on the suspect reasoning of the

slide.

Challenging the Consciousness Crirerinn
In

any

case, the animal liberationist's distinction

between what

treatment of plants and acceptable treatment of
animals

then

it

seems perfectly sensible

is

for the non-vegetarian to say, ’Okay,

important division between plants and animals. Even

among
seem

if

there

to treat

you

them

as

off the hook.

you

will?’

have to be taken up

see that the criterion of

enough and

a dense spectrum of consciousness

is

all

animals from your diet would

But why or how does plants' lack of consciousness give you
license

This question

may at

in the light of cases

In the 1880s a tunnel

I

constitutes a neat

it

animals, plants are certainly not conscious. So,
excluding

to get

constitutes acceptable

generally based on consciousness. But

conciousness saves you from the Sorites objection
inasmuch as

will

third premises are

was

first

seem too comical

such as the following:

cut through a giant sequoia in

National Park. Driving through the

to warrant attention. But

Wawona tree,

what

is

now Yosemite

formerly in horse and buggy

and later by car, amused and impressed millions. The tree was perhaps the most
photographed in the world. On holidays there was a waiting line. The giant blew
over in the snowstorms of 1968-69, weakened by the tunnel, although it had long
stood despite it. Some have proposed that the Park Service cut more drivethrough sequoias, but the rangers have refused, saying that one was enough and
that to do so is an indignity to a majestic sequoia ...Is it wrong (or just silly) to
.

mutilate a sequoia to excite tourists?

4.3.1

Arguments

14

[My emphasis.]

for the Consciousness Criterion: Preference Utilitarianism

As a sometimes hedonistic-, sometimes preference-utilitarian, Singer

view that non-sentient

where

14

it

life

of whatever species

is

committed to the

(of itself) ethically irrelevant (except, of course,

influences the happiness or preference-satisfaction of sentient

Rolston, p 95f.

is

life).

He

explicitly argues

it

74

against the non-considerability of
non-sentient

out what the right thing to do

hnagine that

in

is

any given

life.

The argument

is

tied to a

method

for figuring

situation.

have to decide whether to keep a dinner
appointment with three
my father, who has just phoned to say that he is
ill and must
stay
bed...I can arrive at an impartial
decision by imagining myself in the
position of my friends if I break the
appointment, and of my father, if I fail to visit
him. There are also my own preferences
to take
I

friends or to visit

m

into account.

By imagining
preferences,

ourselves in the position of others...and
taking on their tastes
can often arrive at a reasonably confident
verdict

we

action will satisfy
Let

me

matter to see
say, a tree

preferences.

must be taken

plants

and

about which

15

[My emphasis.]

this point

into account.

about to be cut down. Imagining what

one preference (the

least

more

pause here for a moment. At

how

[My emphasis.]

it is

we might

We just
like to

tree's) against cutting the tree

say, 'Well,

now,

it is

a simple

imagine ourselves in the position

be such a

tree,

I

find that there

is

of,

at

down. Right?’ Singer disagrees.

There is a genuine difficulty in understanding how
chopping down a tree can
matter to the tree if the tree can feel nothing. The same
is true of quarrying a
mountain. Certainly imagining myself in the position of the
tree or mountain will
not help me to see why their destruction is wrong;
for such imagining yields a
perfect blank.
[My emphases.]

An argument

here can be formalized as follows:

(1)

We

(2)

If (1),

(3)

•

•

cannot imagine ourselves in the position of a non-sentient being
then (3).

Nothing

The justification
and

if

there

is

nothing

we do

to non-sentient beings can be

for line (1)

it is

I

will

discussion of Taylor, below. For now,

premise would seem to be that

that there

(i)

Singer, The
Singer, Ihe

Expanding Circle p
Expanding Circle p
,

,

is

it is

I

would

like to focus

like to

in itself.

be a non-sentient being,

nothing to imagine
this line of

on

line (2).

when one

reasoning in

101
123.

in just are

(ii)

puts

my

The justification

only preferences count in moral calculation and

preferences to take into account.

1

nothing

have more to say about

beings whose positions we cannot imagine being

16

is

be a being, then there

like to

oneself in that being's position.

is

wrong

for this

the kind of

the kind of beings which have no

75

Ironically,

own

We

theory.

Graham

uses Singer's appeal to epistemic
difficulties in a challenge to
Singer's

cannot even

know what some

know what

it is

like to

be an animal, says Graham (we can
only

particular animal experiences are
like),

position of an animal. Furthermore,

Graham

some animals do not know what

like to

it is

and so we cannot put ourselves

into the

claims (based on research on vervet
monkeys) that

be themselves.

Suppose you try, Singerlike, to grasp what
it is like to be a vervet.
You say to
yourself, Despite the strain, I have a
pretty good idea what it is like to be
a
vervet. Do you?
can you? If Cheney and Seyfanh are
right, you cannot
grasp what it is like to be a vervet because
vervets

How

themselves

They dont /hmk of themselves
at there

t

be

If

successful,

vervets (assuming

same time beings

in his

what

is

that they

it is

itself can’t

like to

it

be them. And you can’t know what
17
it is like to be X.

it is

like to

Graham’s argument undermines Singer’s second
premise by defeating

whose

I

know what

know what

Cheney and Seyfarth
in

making a mistake.

know

anything

is

X when X

don’it

as being conscious; they fail to
recognize

position

we

are right) certainly have preferences, but
they are at the

cannot imagine being. However, here

think that monkeys do

know

that.

(ii);

know what

it is

like to

In his review of Graham's book,

I

think

Graham

is

be a monkey; what they don't

Matthews captures

this distinction

proposal for two senses of ’know,’ a strong sense and a
weak sense, in the context of ’know
it is

like to

be an

F.’

Perhaps a hen [or a vervet] could not, in the strong sense, know
what
be a hen unless the hen could have the thought, This is what it is like

And perhaps

own

the hen, having no concept of a hen and no
conscious experience, could not have that thought.
Still,

which

someone might want

—so long

as there

is

to say, there

such a thing as what

is

a

it is

way

like to

be a hen.'

of referring to

weak sense
like to

it is

to

its

of ’know’ in

be an F

—

F's are, in

general, in an ideal position to

know what it is like to be one.. .So, in the weak
sense of know, a hen would know what it is like to be a hen, and the application
of (K) [if an F does not know what it is like to be an F, then no one else can know
what it is like to be an F] to hens could not be used in a successful modus ponens
argument for the conclusion, 'No one else can know what it is like to be a hen.' 18
So, perhaps justification

(ii)

of line (2) remains intact. But

plausibility of the first premise.

17
18

Graham, p 193
Matthews, 'Mindedness

for Beginners,' p

77

we have

yet to challenge the

76

Paul Taylor argues for a 'respea
for nature; and in so doing
suggests that
to line (1

)

and

its

Scientists

many proponents,

who have made

we can,

take the point of view of
non-sentient forms of

contrary

life.

careful studies of particular

plants and animals
m the field or in laboratories, have often acquired

whether

a knowledge of their
de ntlfiable ‘"‘“"duals. Close
observation over
K
0
apprec,ati0 " of the “lique
'personalities' of their
subjects...As one becomes more
sublet
and more familiar with the organism
and its
havior, one becomes fully
sensitive to

Wh

Tl

S onX

“

the particular

116

vmh

fascinated

^

^

way

it is

living out

its life

even experience some involvement
with the occurrence of environmental

good and bad fortunes (that is,
conditions favorable or unfavorable
to the realization of its good).
The organism
comes to mean something to one as a
unique, irreplaceable individual
The final
S PTO eS iS the achievement
of a genuine understanding of its
'
Doim of view and,
a with
u that
u
point
understanding, an ability to 'take' that
point of view
onceiving of it as a center
of life, one is able to look at the world
it
its

from
J

perspective...

When

its

considered from an ethical point of view,
a teleological center of

life is

an

whose world can be viewed from the
perspective of its life. We can
conceive of a teleological center of life
as a being whose standpoint we
can take
making judgments about what events in the
world are good or evil, desirable or
undesirable... The entity itself need not
have any (conscious) interest in what is
happemng to it for such judgments to be meaningful
19
ntity

and

The place
chapter. Here

I

true.

of teleological processes in axiology
will be considered in later sections of
this

want to focus on

Taylor’s attempt to

open up the

actually realize) of taking the point of view
of a non-sentient

life

possibility

(which he thinks

What would

One way to
were

find

it

is

to consider counterfactuals like 'how

Or 'how would

nearest possible worlds in which
'inside'

a tree's

life.

Now,

respect like a tree, then

is

like to

if

we

I

/

like

am

being cut

a tree,

worlds in which
again

come up

be non-conscious. So perhaps

Taylor, 'The Ethics ofRepect for Nature,'

p.

I

I

down

if /

would

were a

I

tree?'

look at the world

might be able to get some idea of what

am

a tree are

all

worlds in which

should look to worlds in which

my treeish

2 Of
1

if

I

By imagining the

I

against Graham's principle that there

we

otherwise enough like a tree to appreciate

l;

We must

be like to 'look at the world’ from the ’perspective'
of a non-conscious object?'

an answer

[say] a tree?’

we

form.

As things stand, Taylor just seems to be butting
heads with Graham and Singer.
ask

in

I

am

am
is

it is

to be

in every

nothing that

it

conscious but

existence. But wait; there probably are

no

77

worlds

in

which

am

I

entitle us to assert a

in

a tree (unless

I

have been changed into one?).

correspondence between

me

In this

world and

It is

my

hard to say what would

supposed tree counterpan

the other. Let us settle for worlds
in which trees are conscious
enough so that

meaningfully say that there
actual world can imagine
like.

something

is

it is

like to

be such a

what some of the experiences of trees

But that was not the problem! What
about the trees in

world serve as 'diplomats; communicating
to us imperfectly
be a tree in

tree.

in (let us call

this

(as

Presumably,

it)

unconscious actual-world tree, since there

is

nothing that

it is

can

we humans

diplomats will) what

like to

in the

the tree world are

world? Can the trees

world? The conscious trees of the tree
world cannot know what

this

we

it is

in the tree

it is

like to

be an

like to

be an actual world

tree.

So

the diplomats will have no message to
deliver.

Perhaps another way to discover the tree
perspective

fewer of

my human

and animal

that this procedure might

buy

attributes, until all that

is

is left is

to imagine myself with fewer and

something

into the concept of a Great Chain of Being).

unable to move, unable to communicate, unable
to perceive, unable to
suggests,

would be

I

come

like to

to the point

be

This hurdle

reason non-sentient

imagine what

it

in a

is

I

draw a

much

a problem for Singer as

can be discounted morally

would be

like to

same reasoning, discount people

be a non-sentient
in

comas

person in a coma, temporary or not. But
people

20

who might

yet recover

20
;

The question of whether people

in

and

this

as well.

it

would seem

comatose

to discount people in

who have no

is

it is

I

imagine myself
But then, as Singer

think...

try to imagine

what

that

life

for the tree-sympathizer. For

we draw

form, then

such a blank

it

seems that

You cannot imagine what

it

when we

we

it is

could,

like to

the

try to

on the

be a

that our inability to imagine ourselves in others'

states count morally highlights the distinction

more

if

to discount such people, certainly

recent preference utilitarianism

permanent comas (which

here), the hedonistic theory has an easier time

comatose,

do when

I

would be wrong

means

Singer's former hedonistic utilitarianism and his

theories

blank, just as

I

vegetable (note

coma.

as

life

where

like a

accommodating our

preferences but might yet experience

some

I

think

is

between

Although both

wrong, but

will not

argue for

intuitions regarding the temporarily

pleasure.

78

positions

no reason to discount them.

is

justification

am

I

is

(ii) is

true,

and people

in

So, even

if

line (1)

perspective of non-conscious

on Taylor’s own

restrictions

when he

life.

1

true, line (2)

I

can only conclude

if

a, this point that

he

writes of our being able to
look at the world from the

base this judgment not only on
the

on what

must be false-^ven

comas do not have preferences.

sympathetic to Taylor's position.
However,

speaking somewhat loosely

is

this

difficulties

noted above but

means:

is to be noted that we
need not be falsely anthropomorphizing
when we
conceive of individual plants and
animals in this manner. Understanding
them as
teleological centers of life does not
necessitate 'reading into’ them

We

characteristics

need

huma!

not, for example, consider

them

to

consciousness.

There are other reasons

to read Taylor as writing loosely,

have

and

I

will get into these

on the

on teleology below.

section

At any rate,
a problem

more

we have come

to the

suited for a dissertation

end of what

that

we

is

a kind of other minds problem,

on the philosophy of mind. Perhaps we should
leave the

test of putting ourselves in other
species’ shoes.

demand

essentially

Let us turn next to an argument which
does not

enter the minds of other beings.

On page 124

of The Expanding Circle Singer presents an
argument which can be

formalized as follows:

(1)

Non-sentient beings have no preferences.

(2)

If (1),

(3)

If

(2b), then (3b)nothing

(4)

If

(3b), then nothing

(5)

.-.

then (2b)non-sentient beings have no

Nothing

Consider a rock.
Therefore,

it

way abuse

it,

we do

for

we do

matters to them.

to non-sentient beings can be

to non-sentient beings can

A rock has no

can have no interest

we do

be wrong in

wrong

in itself.

itself.

thoughts and therefore no desires with respect to

in that fate.

no action of mine can

interests.

If

that

is

so,

then

I

cannot offend the rock or in any

violate the rock's wishes. If

21

Taylor, 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature,' p 210

its fate.

it is

impossible for

me

to

do

79

anything to a rock which, from
the rock's 'point-of-view,'
the rock can be wrong in

itself (it

is

wrong, then no act of mine
involving

might yet be wrong with respect to
the consequences to beings

which do have preferences).

One

of the problems with Singer’s
presentations of his arguments

any other proponent of preference
substantive account of what

were no, the issue
share so

means

this distinction

to

life

I

between the preference

that neither

have been able to discover

have a preference. Perhaps

many characteristics. Although my main

considerability of plant
rocks,

it

utilitarianism so far as

is

'haves'

this

would not be

offers a

problem

a

and 'have-nots'-who otherwise

criticisms of Singer's position

do not depend on the controversial
assertion

have preferences, a case can be made that
the

he nor

possibility that

on the moral

that plants, let alone

some non-sentient

life

might

have preferences should not be dismissed
out of hand.

What does

it

mean

for a

person P to have a preference?

P has a propositional attitude, then not
only
also

any creature which cannot think

in

is it

it is

must agree that a preference

doubt preferences can be described
Perhaps a preference

But

this

is

if

is

in

is

I

sleep

on the

floor’

nor

’that

to allow that dogs

have

not a propositional attitude—although no

terms of propositional attitudes.

a disposition to

act.

It

would seem meaningless

to ascribe

they did not generally act or be disposed to act in accordance with
them.

where the prerequisite of sentience appears

earthworms are

least, that

a stretch to say that the dog’s acting out
his preference exhibits an attitude

So, Singer

preferences to people

very

terms of propositions. Consider a dog’s
preference for the

toward those abstract objects (the propositions 22
).
Singer wants
preferences.

at the

impossible for plants to have preferences, but

sofa over the floor. Since the dog cannot
grasp the proposition 'that

sleep on the sofa,'

means,

If it

sentient.

crawl to the surface. Does

But they certainly
it

seem

22

act.

suspect. Singer does not think that

After a heavy rain, earthworms are disposed to

farfetched to suggest that earthworms prefer to be on, rather

The expression ’propositional attitude’ ’suggests that knowing what someone believes, etc. is a matter of
identifying an abstract object of their thought, rather than understanding his or her orientation towards
more

worldly objects.’ Blackburn,

p.

307

I

80

than

soaked earth? Bu, perhaps what

in,

is

happening here

the sentience of earthworms.
Let us talk of plants.

How do know this?

Because

1

it

moves toward the

(sunflowers are an even more dramatic
example).
thus of plants,

1

am

anthropomorphizing. This

write in this way, and until Singer
or

preference

is, it is

difficult (for

me,

someone

at least) to

anthropomorphizing and what to make of
I

have said that what

Singer makes one attempt, but

move
facts,

a person prefers.' 23

my desk

on

is

drinking antifreeze

is

dog P refers what

is

Now,

may

i,

prefers the sunlight.

might be argued

is

in his

in his stead gives a meaningful
account of

know how to

line one.

a meaningful account of the
concept of preference.

many dogs

He

suggests that 'we

’a

make

The dog might be

take an interest in

(what

I

it

it:

and

all

the relevant

would be harmful

will call) desire-interest but not

kill

they want to drink

what

is

in his

We might wish to

But

it.

to his welfare.

(what

I

will

assert that,

if

the

him, then 'on balance and after reflection on the

certainly prefer not to drink the antifreeze. This

suicidal,

the plausible

person’s interests’? There are at least

dog’s interest, in the sense that

dog knew that drinking the antifreeze would

would

what a

evaluate the charge of

welfare-interest—my dog prefers to drink the anti-freeze.

relevant facts' he

I

perhaps brought out by considering a dog's
attraction to

sweet, and

my

when speak

that,

very well be true, but people do
read and

Now, what does Singer mean by

not in

mistaken about

sunlight even in the course of the
day

not very heartfelt.

it is

this expression,

antifreeze. Antifreeze

call)

is

plant

just that Singer

of taking a person's interests to be what,
on balance and after reflection on

two ways of taking

My

missing

is

The

is

after careful reflection decide that he

is

not necessarily true.

would rather

die.

Suicide

is

often in a person's desire- interest but usually not in a person's welfare-interest.

This distinction between kinds of interest

Goodpaster and marks the prima
If

facie distinction

a being has no preferences, then

it

Singer, Practical Ethics, p 94.

crucial

(it is

noted by Kantor and hinted

between welfare- and

certainly follows that she has

not follow that she has no welfare-interests.

23

is

One

case

is

no

at

by

hedonistic-utilitarianism).

desire-interests, but

that of a patient in a coma.

it

Such a

does

81

person has no preferences, and
hence no desire-interests, but
does have welfare-interests
things being equal, a cure
for her condition

preferences to interests in Singer's
line two

would be
is

move

a

her welfare-interest).

in

can say they have no interests;

move

we

will

then see

to welfare-interests (thus
protecting

is

One can

see the

move from

the

to desire-interests, then
the premise

very well be true, but in that
case coma patients must be
inc.uded

we

If

(all

how

comatose

they fare

among
at the

patients), the

same confusion between these two

those beings of

whom

argument's end.

premise

is

may

if

the

false.

kinds of interest in an argument
of

Rollin's:

Although plants, bacteria, viruses, and
cells in culture are alive
and may be said to
ls no reas °n to believe
that they have interests. That
is, there is
nnrtT^’
6 °
ence that these thin gs have any
awareness or consciousness
j
Matters’
matters to

matters to

it.

it

interests).

I

would

The same may be

then one

direction;

^^

that

^

than getting

a being has no desire-interests, then

If

interests,

^

the^V
them anymore

is

may be

may be

p.

safe

like (3b), (4),

123 of The Expanding

one has no welfare-

is

against one’s welfare-

(5) constitute a shortened

The

identical

—

Value for Nature

argument

-An Incoherent Basis for Environmental Concern'

is

of.

Here

form of the

given by Rollin

( Free

Inquiry,

25

we assume

is

false.

Some

actions

which

One example

will not disaffect

is

any

the case of the patient in a

that the patient has no family or friends and that the hospital
staff will not be

^Rollin, Animal Rights

’Humans

and

Circle.

conscious beings do strike us as morally problematic.

’

If

we do

no matter which kind of interests we are speaking

something

Line four of Singer's argument

If

these needs

conclude that nothing

that having one's reputation besmirched
after death

argument, appearing on

coma.

fair to

true of a being with no welfare-interests.

So premise three looks

Spring 1993).

it

^

thwartin §
matters to a car. 24

either dead or non-existent (the
entailment does not go in the other

like to point out that

in Intrinsic

oil

and Human Morality,

p 42.

we do matters to them this is also the case with animals
mattering gives sense to the notion of intrinsic or inherent value conscious beings can
(inherently) value or disvalue what happens to them, even if no one else does'
My criticisms of
(p. 20)
are morally considerable because what

And such

Singer's fourth premise are addressed to Rollin's argument as well

,

—
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saddened by
Note that

1

his death,

then line four

that

we must

done something which

will

real-life

I

his htture preferences
(as

conclude that Singer's argument

discount the preferences of
conscious beings

makes

vandalism

is

problem

I

wrong

in a

4 3 2 ft^uments
'

'

its

we were

wrongness even

sufficed to

to

if

we

dead whale's body

is

say that the only
that such

then a mere hardemng of the

make

and indeed

Some might

sensibilities of

the action permissible instead
of

it is

a suggestion which brings out a
general

for preference utilitarianism:
the theory cannot account for the
fact that

even

if

» tad

not sound.

retains

in the late eighties.

If this is true,

find this highly implausible,

A

Nothing about

might be the case

is

itself

the desecration of a beached
grey whale's body in

to carve obscene graftal
into a

community would have

preferences themselves.
fulfilled,

is

which occurred

offensive to other people.

the rest of the
forbidden.

it

California,

not wrong i n

in a •persistent
vegetative state.'

is

example of a moraUy wrong action
which

Humboldt County,

is

take the patient's possible
future recovery into
accotui,

go against

tattoo his forehead instead).

thing that

the conclusion that killing
him

have not stiptdated that the
patient

Ime four implies

A

(fields

preference for the vandalization of
graves

is

we

evaluate

one that should not be

world where most people have that
preference.

for the

Co nsci ousness

Criterion: Hedonistic Utilitarianism

Singer's conversion to preference
utilitarianism signified a change in his
axiology but not a
significant one.

The problems

that plague preference utilitarianism are
foreshadowed in Singer's

previous hedonistic utilitarianism. Consider a line
of reasoning which eventually

is

used to argue

against the moral considerability of plants in Animal
Liberation.

The capacity

for suffering

and enjoyment

is

a condition that must be satisfied before

all,

a prerequisite for having interests at

we can speak of interests in a
meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the
interests of a
stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does
not have interests
because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly
make any
27
^

difference to

26

27

See note 2
r
Singer,

its

welfare.

1

•

Animal Liberation, p

7f.
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If

a being

there

I

is

is not capable of
suffering, or of experiencing
enjoyment or happiness,
nothins
nothing to be
bp ttaken
atpn into
intn account. 28

believe that this hedonistic
argument can be formalized as
follows:
( 1 )

Non-sentient beings do not have
the capacity for suffering
and enjoyment.

(2)

If (1),

(3)

If

then (2b) non-sentient beings
have no

interests.

(2b), then (4).

Nothing

(4)

we do

to non-sentient beings can
be

wrong

in itself.

Line (2) exhibits a confusion between
pleasure and welfare, a confusion
reminiscent of the

problem

I

mentioned above about the

coma cannot
interests.

suffer, but that

So, line (2)

conscious suffering,
since plants (like

it

false.

4- 3

-

we do

in a

to her can disaffect her welfare

Furthermore, while plants

may not be

capable of

should strike us as unnatural to say
that their welfare cannot be
disaffected,
patients) can fare well or

for us to say of

an

because plants are living things, there

anthropomorphising

between the two kinds of interest.
A patient

not to say that nothing

seems to be

coma

would make no sense

is

distinction

in

'My car

is

ill,

live

office plant,

good reason

or die.

'It is

doing

If

Singer were correct, then

well.'

It

it

does make sense, and

to think that such talk runs

deeper than the

is sick.'

3 Arguments for the Consciousness Criterion: Deontology
Utilitarianism

common when

it

and rights-based

comes

(or Kantian or deontological) theories

to the exclusion of non-sentient

concern. Deontologists disagree with the

utilitarian's

life

have much

and natural objects from

in

direct ethical

emphasis on pleasure or preference

satisfaction but share the latter's exclusive concern with
sentient forms of

life.

Indeed, Kant and

Rawls, the towering figures of deontology, exclude not only non-sentient
beings but most sentient
beings

(all

28

Singer,

non-human animals)

Animal Liberation, p
‘

29

as well,

what with

their emphasis

on

rationality.

29

However,

8

•

Habermas' discourse ethics

is

substantially different

from the theories of Kant and Rawls but

indebted to both and has similar problems, particularly with respect to non-humans

some

self-criticism.

See Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,
p 21 Of.

is still

Admirably,

heavily

this inspires

84

deontological theories are in a, leas,
one respect

the concept of a right'

abstract

is

enough

more

issue of

who

counts morally:

to not preclude anything
from possessing rights:

^

0n haS d
“
° r her 2
mTh
b one f
which
has a proper claim.

ta h a
just
taft'demmd'
demand. 3
3. that
th at to
1

on the

flexible

'

'

Zrz in "

upon which one has a
the privilege (freedom

that
4.

°
by what is regarded as an
authoritative source such as God, a
ruler, law, a social group,
custom, tradition,

conscience

The exclusions
discussion)

it is

arise

from the selection of

on which a given theory bases

rights.

incoherent to attribute rights to plants
and

criteria (rationality, in the
tradition

Nevertheless,

some philosophers

under

still

non-human animals. 31 Disappointingly,

includes Paul Taylor. While his book
Respect for Nature

or

argue that
this

devoted to an environmental ethical

is

theory based on Kant (especially the
Groundwork), and while he rejects Kant's
view that apparent
duties to

is

non-humans are always

indirect duties to

logically inconceivable for animals

and plants

to

humans, Taylor nevertheless argues
have rights and (2) even

if

we

(1) that

it

could put

together a nghts-based analysis of our duties
to animals and plants such an analysis
would be
undesirable because

it

would be confusing. Taylor claims

that

There are four aspects of moral rights that make it
conceptually impossible for
either animals or plants to be bearers of moral
rights, (a) A bearer of moral rights
is assumed to be a member of
the community of moral agents, (b) There is a
connection between being a bearer of moral rights and
having

self-respect such
inconceivable for something to have self-respect it is
inconceivable for
it to be a bearer of moral rights,
(c) It must make sense to say that a being
is able
to choose to exercise or to enjoy a right if it
makes sense to say it has that right,
(d) A bearer of moral rights has certain second-order
entitlements in virtue of its
that, if

moral

it is

rights.

This argument
cases, such as children

rights.

31

not going to

and coma

He

because the

patients, of

whom

it

rights.

Taylor, Respect for Nature, p 246.

three criteria exclude so-called 'marginal

does

make

sense to say that they have

—

logically cannot

—give recognition

to such

Stone, Shrader-Frechette, and others have argued that, since legal

of convention, the only obstacle

novelty of the concept.

first

refers to in the fourth criterion include such things

claims that 'society cannot

Angeles, p 263 f.
1 am speaking here about moral

rights are a matter
32

fly

The second-order entitlements Taylor

as the right to redress.

30

is

in

the

way of legal

rights for plants

and animals

is

the

85

entitlements' to animals

and

plants.

Here Taylor

which includes an account of and a

ethics,

adopt

his

at

odds with

his

to

them are owed them

theory of environmental

nonhuman

that such language

view that non-humans do have inherent
worth.

we owe

own

life.

claim that using the language of
rights with

non-humans would be confusing. He says

worth, the duties

his

call for restitutive justice
for

Taylor offers no substantive support
for
respect to

is

as their

'If

mid

is

not necessary

if

we

animals and plants have inherent

due.® Now,

if

that does no, sound like

animals and plants have rights, what does?
To deliberately avoid the language of rights
seems to

me,

in the light of claims

language and

is

environmental

male-female

such as

this, to

introduce a confusion.

It is

an arbitrary

restriction

on

motivated by Taylor's desire to separate the
spheres of interhuman and

ethics.

ethics.

Such a division
will say

I

is

as untenable as separating the spheres
of intermale

more about the connections between interhuman

ethics

and

and

environmental ethics in the next chapter. Taylor's
positive views about the inherent worth of
nonsentient

are discussed in later sections of the current
chapter.

life

Tom
movement,

Regan, the preeminent deontologist in the philosophical
arm of the animal rights

is

admirably open-minded about the possibility of rights for
non-sentient

life.

He

avoids the project of restricting moral considerability by
confining himself to the study of sufficient
conditions for establishing that something

is

a rights-holder. Ironically, while

Regan

lacks the kind

of complex theory of duties to non-sentient beings that Taylor
has developed, Regan, like Taylor,
believes that

it is

possible that such beings have moral standing but also (and this

is

where he and

Taylor part company) rights. 34

4.4 Consciousness Does Not Exhaust Value
In

embracing

first

hedonistic utilitarianism and then preference utilitarianism Singer

rejects Kant's rationality criterion for

33
34

—Three Arguments

moral considerability and puts

in its place a

broader but

Taylor, Respect for Nature, p 254
the present essay the question of whether beings having moral standing have rights can be regarded as

’In

an open question, though
1

Ethic, p 43

1

n

1

in

my view they do

1

Regan,

The Nature and

Possibility

of an Environmental

86

related criterion, that of consciousness.

Is

asks a hypothetical question designed
to

conscious experience

show

that

it is

ail

that

we

value? Robert Nozick

not:

uppose there were an experience machine
that would give you any experience
y u desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate
your brain
so

that
you would think and feel you were writing
a great novel, or making a friend
or
readmg an interesting book. All the time you
would be floating in a tank with
electrodes attached to your brain. Should
you plug into this machine for life
preprogramming your life's experiences?

Until one finds a satisfactory answer
[to the question of what matters
for people
other than their experiences], and determines
that this answer does not also apply
o amm als one cannot reasonably claim that
only the felt experiences of animals
u
limit what
we may do to them. 5
’

Now,

all

that Nozick's thought experiment

shows

is

that experience alone, without

vendicality, might not be as valuable as experience
with veridicality.

It

does not show us that our

material existence has value, only that consciousness
plus the reality of the conscious experience

(whatever that

reality

might consist

of)

may be more

valuable than consciousness alone.

Therefore, Nozick's thought experiment does not argue
for the value of material existence without

consciousness

e.g.,

plant

life.

However,

it

does argue against our axiology's being exhausted by

consciousness alone, and so points us in the right direction.
G. E.

Moore placed conscious experiences

thought that the hedonistic
intrinsic value, as

utilitarians

evidenced by

his

at the pinnacle of his axiology.

were wrong

Nevertheless he

to suppose that only conscious experience has

response to Sidgwick:

’No one,’ says Prof. Sidgwick, ’would consider it rational to aim at the production
of beauty in external nature, apart from any possible contemplation of it by
human beings.’ Well, I may say at once, that I, for one, do consider this
rational... Let us

as

you can; put

imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful
it whatever on this earth you most admire
mountains,

—

into

rivers, the sea; trees,

and sunsets,

and moon.. .And then imagine the ugliest
world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing
everything that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason, and the whole, as
far as may be, without one redeeming feature.. .Supposing them quite apart from
any possible contemplation by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that it is
better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly? Would it
not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the
other?

35
36

36

Nozick, pp 43-45.
Moore, p 83 f.

stars
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Moore's rhetorical question strikes

and

me

as being very friendly to environmental
philosophy,

puzzling that, while other aspects of his
ethics are

it is

philosophers, this passage has up to

now been

in the context of purely aesthetic
values,
in that context.

commented on by environmental

ignored. This

and the case Moore

may be because
is

the problem

making has been widely

However, a similar thought experiment of Richard
Routley's

side-steps

is

cast

criticized

some of

those issues and does not depend (as Moore's
seems to) on our imagining ourselves having
Godlike

powers of world creation but no access to the world
created.

The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds
that one should be able to do
what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm
others and (2) that he is not
likely to harm himself irreparably...
Let us call this principle basic

(human) chauvinism...

The

last man (or person) surviving the collapse
of the world system lays about
him, eliminating as far as he can, every living thing,
animal or plant (but

painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What
he does is quite permissible
according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental
grounds what he does is

wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric
values to regard
Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps
that radical thinking
and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance
of
corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). 37

There
that,

even

if

last sentient

is

no need

to criticize here the principle Routley describes.

the others in (1) include

being

(all 'higher'

all

sentient chauvinism) not very friendly to the remaining plant

long as the last sentient being

is

it

fails

only wish to point out

conscious beings, imagining the last person to be also the

animals are extinct) makes the principle

utilitarianism in a similar setting,

I

life

(call

on the

to rule out the permissibility of

not harming herself. For her

own

it

in this case basic

planet. As

would

Singer's

wanton destruction so

pleasure she

may

destroy

everything from lobsters to redwoods.

Now some may want to
non-sentient

life?

17

Routley,

p.

207,

Even

if

we

stick to their

grant that she

is

guns and say, ’So what

if

she destroys the remaining

experiencing pleasure in something bad, so long as

88

there

is

p.easure .here, rha,

the last person's pleasure

obviously

is

is all

rhar counts.’ Bur

anyone who says

(1) pleasure in the bad, or

is

(2) a

this contradicts herself.

justifying the claim that the
pleasure

if

bad kind of p.easure, then there

something of value besides pleasure-namely,
whatever she would appeal

is

For

to in

a bad pleasure. The appeal
must be to something other

is

than pleasure.

Most people
prove that

find the behavior of the last
person unacceptable. Routte/s story

we do and

should value

nonhuman and even non-sentiem

remain a landmark of environmental philosophy.
But

will

quite another to give a substantive explanation
of

The Value of Plants
The

as

no-rights-for-plants

ironic twist,

one thing

and

to

for having

make

to

done

that case,

so

it

and

value or should value non-sentient

life

P art of a Valuable Environment

view

attractive in that

is

the ascription of rights to plants would

most

why we

it is

life,

seems

seem

it

allows vegetarians something to eat;

to leave us in the position of Abaris.

some of the veiy people who do

However,

in a

believe that plants have moral standing are
not

animal liberation extremists, as one might expect, but
rather are opposed to vegetarianism. These
include the environmentalists

have been discussing

I

in the last

two chapters: Leopold,

Callicott,

Rolston, and Hettinger.

Now,

there can be no doubt that cutting a stand of trees could be

doing so would contribute to the erosion of the
rely

on those

fields for

first

rely

on the

trees...),

who

rely

and to

on the

down too many trees

trees for food or shelter (or

that extent

may be

humans

down

a tree be

wrong

who

(prima facie) wrong.

count, and animal liberationists and other pro-environment types

count. But could cutting

in itself,

to the extent that

a small farm, the family owners of which

both food and income. And cutting

dangers for those animals

who

fields of

wrong

rely

in a forest creates

on the animals

All are

agreed on the

would agree on the second

without reference to the pains caused to

or at least other sentient life? Leopold evidently thinks so.
Individual thinkers since the days of Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the

despoliation of land

is

not only inexpedient but wrong.

89

All ethi's so far

evolved rest upon a single premise:
that the individual is a
community of interdependent parts. His
instincts prompt him to
compete for his place in that community,
but his ethics prompt him also to
coperate (perhaps in order that there
may be a place to compete for)
he land ethic simply enlarges the
boundaries of the community to
include

member

of a

I

soils,

In short, a

waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively: the land.

land ethic changes the role of

nd-commumty

to plain

member and

Homo

sapiens from conqueror of the
it.
It implies respect for
his

citizen of

fellow-members, and also respect for the
community as such. 38
1

here

good of the

is

a latent tension in Leopold's

individual,

exponent, Callicott,

which

who

I

counts plants.

on what

).

stability,

But notice that

He does

basis plants

address shortly. (This tension

and beauty of the

among

unnoticed by his principle

the individual

biotic

community.

members

of the

is

right

It is

when

it

wrong when

it

community Leopold

not go into his reasoning veiy deeply, and
Callicott likewise never explains

might have value

important to the integrity,
like instrumental value,

is

concentrates his attention on Leopold's rule:
'A thing

tends to preserve the integrity,
tends otherwise.

will

view between the good of the community
and the

stability,

in

themselves—that

and beauty of the

although Callicott makes

it

is,

beyond being 'overwhelmingly

biotic communities.'

40

This sounds

more

plain that he does believe plants have intrinsic

value.

The land

ethic,

it

should be emphasized, as Leopold has sketched it, provides for
natural beings to a share in the life processes of the biotic

nonhuman

the rights of

community.

Concern

for

animal (and plant) rights and well-being

land ethic as to the

I

human

see

little

humane

is

as

fundamental to the

41

ethic.

substantive basis for the intrinsic value of either plants or animals or even

beings in Leopold's writings, and less in Callicott's truncated version, so

I

am somewhat

mystified by the above claims. Leopold does claim (above) that the land ethic ’implies respect
for.. .fellow-members,

but what

is

the basis of that respect? Both Leopold and Callicott emphasize

the importance and value of communities, and use that value as a basis for measuring the value of

,x

Leopold, p 204f
19

Leopold, p 224f.

40

Callicott, p
41

Callicott,

21

pp 31, 32

90
all

else (with the value of a
creature or activity being
determined

enwronment

as a whole,.

The following passage proves

a

by how

it

affects the

good exam pl e of the

qualified rights

granted to plants and animals by
Leopold:

22 000 §her plantS 311(1 animals
nati ve to Wisconsin,
whPth
whether more ^
than 5 per cent can be sold, fed,
eaten,
’

it is doubtful
or otherwise put to

faT^hT
T(as believers
I

And, in turn, by

Creatures are members of the
biotic community and
stabihty depends on its integrity,
they are entitled to

if

Callicott:

The land

ethic manifestly does not accord
equal moral

worth to each and every

member of the biotic community; the moral worth
of individuals
note, human individuals) is relative, to
be assessed in

(including, take

accordance with the
particular relation of each to the collective
entity which Leopold called 'land.' 43

A
in

confusion between two very different
accounts of the value of individuals

Leopold and

Callicott's writings.

I

will explain

what these two

is

imbedded

different accounts are

that neither will suffice to establish the
intrinsic value or rights of individual

members

and show

of the biotic

community.

4- 5 -l

Th e

Individual

Members

Constitute the

Summum Bonum

Animals and plants (and fungi and monerans and viruses)
not only
environment, but in fact define
affected.

Are

we

that each part of

It is

it

complex makeup. They constitute the environment being

its

entitled to infer

from the

fact that the

environment has positive

intrinsic value

has positive intrinsic value as well?

an ancient opinion, going back

be good and yet contain much which
its

affect the

maker good’ [29a3], and

is evil.

at least as far as Plato's Timaeus, that the

Plato has Timaeus say that 'the world

yet the subordinate gods built into

human

is

world might
beautiful and

beings feelings which he

describes as 'terrible and necessary,' such as 'pleasure, the chief incitement to wrong,' hence
'polluting the divine element' [69d3] with our 'worse part’ [69e5] or ’base part' [71el].

42

Leopold,

p.

Callicott,

p 28

43

210.

And while

91

Plato

would have us believe

containing

all intelligible

well-advertised in the

that the perfection

beings' [31a3], his

and uniqueness of the world

low opinion of

women and

same dialogue [90eS-92c5]. Existence

be a punishment for the

folly of a

These two threads,

man, reincarnated

as a

is

than

evil in

implicit in the Timaeus, are taken

—

Nor do they excuse the creator by arguing

the world, and so the value of the world
evil.

Rather, they

all

up

in

many

cultures as the explicit

to Aquinas to Leibniz.

This

Chisholm

phenomenon

in their

work on

of ’mixed goods'

aesthetics

positive intrinsic value from nothing

simple case

is

that of shame.

is,

feeling

might

shame must

itself

more than the

You might think

mistaken

explicitly

fact that

be good. Consider a more complex

death are also good,'
nature

is

44

when he

Germany

in

it is

Callicott, p

33

all

pans

more good
the value

evil—ugliness,

pain,

by Brentano, Moore, and

part of something which does.

implicitly

shame

is

for

II

'If

was a good

nature as a whole

assumes that the
its

some wrong-doing

A

person

thing, but that does

—was a good thing.

is

good, then pain and

intrinsic value of the

plant-life parts.

A

involved in that person's

civilian, allied or axis soldier

sufficient to establish the intrinsic value of

44

of

case, that of a just war.

Word War

explicitly asserts that,

and when he

sum

thankfully, a positive

that someone's feeling

—

is

all its

and axiology: one cannot conclude that something has

feel that the allied effort against

Callicott

good, and so

(the best possible world).

was studied

not commit her to the view that each casualty

So

What

evil in that creation

that there just happens to be

good, but you would be mistaken to conclude that the pain which

is

is

try to explain the role of

bad but necessary part of the good whole

as a

supposed to

is

not their theodicies but the fact that these
philosophers affirm not only the

and disvalue of the good and
sin

is

into a 'lower' form.

not usually denied. These philosophers do not argue
that the world

are good also.

in part to its

or animal

goodness of God but also the goodness of God's creation.
Yet the existence of
is

due

animals as particulars

woman

problem of evil, famously by Christian philosophers
from Augustine
interests us here

is

whole of

92

4 5 2
'

'

~

Members Contribute Causally

Individual

to the Realization of the

Summum

Perhaps animals and plants (and humans)
have a rights claim which
extrinsic, contingent

condition-namely, their contribution to the

the biotic community. This strategy

is

problematic, and

analysis of nghts in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism
has the

'something that society ought to defend

m the interest of utility.

1

That

is,

me

we

which

rights do

should

we have

Leopold and

we have

rights

45
of.'

we

Why

view of the

Callicott's

comes out

is

summum bonum

today, or the moral rights

I

have

I

were unknown here

now the mustangs
them

is

at that

Mill,

p 52.

at that

now
all.

figure out

The answer

we must

is

figure out

which moral

which

rights

is

figure out

which

rights

biotic

community. But

this

inherently unstable and geographically

It all

depends on

how you and

right thing to

if

anything

is,

(or

I

and

killing or corralling a

do 500 years ago due to the

—they were disrupting the

time

I

rights

you have
five-

time and in that place to the preservation of

time and in that place (for example,

itself a

To

which entitlements would

and beauty of the

in relation at that

are an integral part,

not really rights at

45

it?

have today might not be the same as the moral

in five years.

and our actions stand

community

first

integrity, stability,

North America might have been the

corralling

right as

suggests a theoiy basing rights on utility with

because the biotic community

heterogeneous. The moral rights

in

Mill's

day to day, year to year, place to place and (what's worse)

differently

person to person. That

the biotic

not new.

(an empirical question, given utilitarianism's
axiological assumption). Similarly,

maximize the preservation of the

I)

and beauty of

Mill turns the question of

(the deontologist’s question) into the
question of

humans, animals, and plants should have we must

years-later

ought

should have

respect to the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community.

calculation

it is

same form. He defines a

which entitlements would maximize the general
happiness. Thus,
moral

dependent on an

stability, integrity,

should notice that

in the possession

to figure out

is

biotic

wild horse

fact that horses

community they invaded; but

of their biotic community, and killing or

disruption of that community). Such radically contingent

'rights'

are
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4 5 3 More Di fficulties for the Leopold /Callicott
Theory
-

-

There are other problems with identifying
the preservation of the beauty,
stability of the biotic

community

Rolston, nor Hettinger explains

as the

summum

bonum. Neither Leopold, nor

what the terms mean

in this context.

integrity,

Callicott,

The puzzles

and

nor

associated with

beauty and subjectivity are just one problem,
and perhaps not even the biggest. Perhaps
the
question of beauty

bonum on our

is

irrelevant in environmental ethics; do

conceptions of beauty, which after

culture to culture? Furthermore, the biotic

but

it is

all

we

want

really

to base the

summum

vary notoriously from person to person,

community might be

stable in

some sense

of the word,

also saturated with instability in other senses
(e.g., mutation, geographical relocation,

natural extinction, constant climatic change).
integrity

is

I

frankly have no idea

supposed to pick out. The problem with these

last

what

quality of nature

two expressions

is

that they are so

dependent on context.

Even the expression

'biotic

though they are speaking of the

community'

is

troublesome. Leopold and Callicott use

entire biosphere. If so,

one might say

cataclysmic changes that the biosphere has survived in the past,

anything but small-time, short-term ’damage' to
as ever,

with perhaps spectacular

survives our tenure (even

reptiles, trees, etc., there

if

we

new

it.

It

chance of the entire

that, given the kind of

impossible for

'recover,' to

humans

to

all

mammals,

large

insect,

birds, fish,

amphibians,

diatom, fungus, bacteria, or protozoa

evolve). Alternatively, even

if

at

humans were

the beginning,

to

somehow

destroy every non-human organism and start living off of Star Trek-like 'food replicators,' the

biosphere would remain intact;
respects stable, and no doubt

it

do

be as beautiful and stable

populations going extinct; they would serve as the gene pool from which, as

more complex forms of life would

as

populations of animals and plants evolving from whatever

succeed in destroying

is little

would

it is

it

would simply

many would

find

consist of

it

one

beautiful.

species.

It

would be

in

many
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Perhaps these are quibbles. They might
indeed be

trifling if

Leopold were offering a

theory of environmental ethics outside of
the ethics of human-animal and
human-human
interaction, but he

is

not.

morality to encompass
If

Rather, he

women and

is

suggesting an expansion (analogous to the
expansion of lay

minorities and to

some

extent

non-human animals)

the preservation of the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic community

is

to

of ethics.

be put

forward as the measure of all actions, then some
care must be taken in the understanding of

its

terms.

To return

to the

main

issue:

There

is little

question that Leopold and Callicott believe that

individual plants and animals have intrinsic value.
However, they have focused most of their

attention on the claim that the biotic

an explanation of

how

intrinsic value of the

means

community has

intrinsic value.

Callicott has yet to present

the intrinsic value of individual plants or animals
can be inferred from the

whole of nature. The best he

to or parts of the

whole of nature. But

or an indefinite (whether positive or negative

this

establishes

is

that individuals are valuable as

only hints at either a kind of instrumental value

we do

not know) intrinsic value. In our quest for

elucidation on the matter of plants' rights or intrinsic value

we

should turn to other

environmentalist philosophers.

4.6 Telos and The Intrinsic Value of Organisms

Rolston bases the value of non-sentient

life

on the

fact that

every biological organism

changes the world in a non- accidental way.

The genetic
to be.

set

is

a normative

This does not

mean

set-, it

distinguishes

that the organism

is

between what

is

and what ought

a moral system, for there are no

moral agents in nature apart from persons, but that the organism is an axiological
system, an evaluative system. So it grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and
resists death. We can say that the physical state the organism seeks, idealized in
its programmatic form, is a valued state...
A moral agent in deciding his or her behavior ought to take account of the
46
consequences for other evaluative systems.
[Emphases in the original.]

46

Rolston,

p. 99f.

95

Rolston does seem to contradict himself
sufficient for [being the sort of thing that

when he

commands our moral

cannot be a good kind without situated
environmental
leads

him

says both that 'being an organism

attention ]'

4
fitness.' *

47

Somehow

and

is

organism

'an

the latter criterion

to conclude that 'Plasmodium vivax (a
mosquito-borne microbe that causes malaria)

bad organism

and.. .its situated environmental fitness in
the

Leopold and Calhcott, offers a

holistic

human

is

bad

account of environmental ethics, and

it

suffers

the problems already mentioned above (in the
discussion of integrity and

a

49

ecology

.'

is

stability).

Rolston, like

from some of

However, he

also offers a relatively substantive, teleological
account of the value of non-sentient individuals.

Taylor (and also Goodpaster, Arbor, and Bernstein) has
similarly teleological

criteria for

establishing the value of non-sentient organisms. Notably,
these criteria do not

depend on our

being able to take the point of view of such organisms.

We recognize objects and events occurring in [the organism’s] life as being
beneficent, maleficent, or indifferent. The first are occurrences
which increase
powers

to preserve

its

existence and realize

destroy those powers. The

The goal

of these philosophers

of value and put in

processes

is

its

is

to dethrone the property of being conscious as the locus

stead the property of being alive. The goal-directedness of biological

supposed to provide an even more fundamental account of the value of that property.

The property of being
a telos,

its

good. The second decrease or
third have neither of these effects on the entity. 5 "
its

and having a

alive

is

not an arbitrary criterion of value; rather, being alive entails having

telos entails having a good,

namely the

realization of that telos,

and therefore

(pace Singer and Regan) an interest.
Trees, like animals and other plants, but unlike machines, have end-states which
are not decided by human beings. Given the right conditions and barring

interference they will in the course of natural events reach this state. There

is

nothing mysterious or improper about insisting that whatever helps trees achieve
their natural end-state

47
4X

4V
50

M

is

in their interest

Rolston, p 100.
Rolston, p. 102
Rolston, p 103.
Taylor, 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature,’ p 21

Arbor, p 337.

51
.
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In th e face of their obvious
tendencies to maintain

^Slng S5

° f imereS,S ° n th€

2

^ ^

and heal themselves, it is very
°f
(and plams 8 ene rally)'in

The

interest principle either grows to fit
what we might call a 'life principle’ or
requires an arbitrary stipulation of
psychological capacities (for desires, wants

etc.)...

[My emphasis.]

Trees, are organisms that naturally
develop and have within themselves the
capability of repairing damage and adapting,
to at least some extent to
unfavourable surroundings. It is quite natural,
indeed virtually automatic to
think of a tree's career in teleological terms,
in which its life is viewed as a
journey to reach a fully mature state...
I suggest we take talk of
a tree or plant as suffering harm as
a result of
eing subjected to less than adequate water,
seriously and unmetaphorically and
that we explicate this harm in terms of the
lack of water hindering the natural
development of the tree.

The

implications of this view are

practice of bonsai

methods used

and sees a

to stunt

’similarity

and deform the

called Violation of Telos' in Rollin’s

drawn out

between

this

explicitly

perversion of normal development and the

feet of Chinese

book Animal

by Arbor, who condemns the

women

Rights

and

.’

55

Borrowing from the section

Human

who

Morality, those

extend a

teleological basis of value to plants might indict not only
topiary (analogously to Rollin’s

arguments against the cropping of animals'

tails

and ears

for show), the art of

whimsiccal shapes, but also any breeding project which has a similar

trimming plants into

effect (analogously to Rollin's

case against the deliberate breeding of defects in dogs, for example the
foreshortened faces of
bulldogs, or the accidental but accepted perpetuation of those defects which
are genetically linked
to

some other

desired characteristic, for example the link between coat color and deafness in

Dalmations).
Resistance to the view presented by these philosophers

argument appealing to an analogy between non-sentient
machines

in Arbor, above).

significantly different

52

The argument

is

p.

319.

^Goodpaster, ’On Being Morally Considerable,’ p 320
54

Bernstein,
55

p.

47,

Arbor, p 336

sometimes based on an

and machines (hence the reference to

that the operations of non-sentient

from the operations of machinery.

Goodpaster, ’On Being Morally Considerable,’

life

is

A

plant

is

life

are not

like a car, neither

knowing nor

97

caring how, why, nor whether
plants.

It is

no use trying

it

runs. Just as cars have

no purposes of their own, neither do

to figure out the telos of a car, except
metaphorically

to the goals of sentient beings. Rollin presents
a reductio along these lines.

and with reference

56
It

can be

formalized as follows:
(1)

Ecosystems have interests, since they behave in a homeostatic
restore states of equilibrium.

(2)

If (1),

then

(3).

Thermostats and

(3)

The reductio presumably
premise because, after

were

all

that

interests,

all,

were needed

way and

toilets

have

interests.

applies to individual plants as well. Suspicion

is

cast

thermostats and toilets do behave in the manner described and,
to establish that

something has

interests,

if

first

that

then they too would have

and the second premise would be unassailable.

Obviously,

if

the

view

life

is

able to defeat the mechanist view of
great machine

humming

along

to

win out over the consciousness view,

nature—the view

—which

is

behind

its

adherents must be

that holds that the physical world

this identification of

some

which distinguishes

characteristic

life

from non-life

is

just a

the biological processes of

plants (and non-consdous animals) with the merely physical processes of machines.

point out

on the

They must

in a non-trivial, ethically

relevant way. Unfortunately, two of the environmentalists previously mentioned appeal to exactly

the sort of characteristics that
that 'the typifying

mark of a

fall

victim to Rollin's reductio: Goodpaster quotes Sayre in saying

living system... appears to

be

its

persistent state of

low entropy,

sustained by metabolic processes for accumulating energy, and maintained in equilibrium with

environment by homeostatic feedback processes.'
plants' rights,

functions

he argues for their

which preserve the

57

And Kantor

interests) says that 'they

'integrity'

it is

56
57

is,

a car

getting us to

is

(although he argues against

have self-regulating and homeostatic

of the organism.' But Kantor also points out the following:

In the case of cars... functions... are defined in terms of

wants... That

its

doing well

where we want

human needs and

if it is

functioning well, and

go

ways that we would

to

in

Rollin, 'Intrinsic Value for Nature,' p 20
Goodpaster, 'On Being Morally Considerable,' p 323

it is

functioning

like to

if

98

go-comfortably or quickly or

efficiently. On the other hand, we
can say that a
doing well without having to refer back to
human needs or wants even
their doing well runs contrary to our
wants (e.g., the mold on my bread may be
doing well and the poison ivy on my path
may be flourishing ). 58

plant

is

if

Arbor would agree, for he says that machines
do not have 'end-states which are not
decided by

A

human

beings

59

Rolston has a similar view:

.'

car has no nature of

means

to

human

own; it does not exist by nature. An automobile
have no self-generating or self-defending

its

tendencies... When a

human

steps out of a car, she takes

programs, interests of the car away with her,
the

first

a

is

good... Cars

all

of

all

the purposes, needs,

which she gave to the car

in

place.

But none of this is true when a human walks away
from a deer or a
delphinium. The car does not 'need' spark plugs except
as a locution for, 'I need
spark plugs for my car'... Machines have an end only
mediately as the extrasomatic
products of human systems...

The values that attach to machines are therefore entirely
instrumental,
derivative from the persons who have created these
instruments. But the values
that attach to organisms result from their nonderivative,

genuine autonomy
(though environmentally situated) as spontaneous natural systems.
The
standards of performance, of excellence, are in the organism
itself, relative to
60
reference frame

its

.

Bernstein says simply that artifacts do not 'naturally develop [nor] have
within themselves
the capability of repairing

damage

61
.'

The thread running through
non-living artifacts

is

these distinctions between living animals and plants and

the fact that living things do not only exhibit teleological processes, but their

goals are their own. These
exhibit the former, but

from

all

Rollin's reductio?

two

facts together distinguish

none of which can claim the

Remember

that

we want

Rollin

would

living things

certainly

can have goals of their

answer

'no.'

He does

Does

this

artifacts,

fact that the goals of

own

is

not

trivial.

some

of which

save the environmentalists

the distinction between

both non-trivial and ethically relevant. Now, the

own whereas

latter.

them from

life

and non-life

machines are

But

is it

strictly

car
58

59

60

telos of a thermostat
is

to run.

Kantor, p 169.
Arbor, p 337.
Rolston,

p.

105.

61

Bernstein,

p.

47

is

our

recognize this distinction himself, as evidenced in the

to regulate the temperature in a room; the telos of a

Connected with

be

ethically relevant?

following remarks:

The

to

this telos are needs; the car

needs

oil,

gas,

99

antifreeze, air in

and so

its tires,

forth.

Must we

the scope of moral concern...?

assert, then, that cars fall within

There is, happily, a difference between an animal
and a machine
between spider and car. The telos of a spider is its
own... The telos of a car
62
extrinsic to it, imposed by the mind and hand
of man.
But Rollin does not believe that the possession of
one's
considerability, for he then says that 'even
extrinsic telos

interests.

1

1

have already

telos

more important than having an

that the needs of the animal

is

own

fall

is

sufficient for

moral

intrinsic versus

into that special category of needs

criticized the claim that the interests-view
of

is

we

an

call

moral considerability

excludes plants (section 4.3.1, above).

Animal
Rollin's

liberationists

who

think that the extrinsic/intrinsic telos distinction (to
borrow

terminology) runs with the non-life/life distinction and the morally
non-

considerable/considerable distinction must figure out what to do about an
argument of

which would use that

first

Callicott's

distinction to exclude domesticated animals from moral consideration:

Domestic animals are creations of man. They are living artifacts, but artifacts
nevertheless, and they constitute yet another mode of extension of the works of

man

into the ecosystem... There

is

thus something profoundly incoherent (and

insensitive as well) in the complaint of

some animal

behavior' of chickens and

is

would make almost
chairs.

as

bobby calves

much

64

liberationists that the 'natural

cruelly frustrated

Callicott could bring Kantor's point about cars to bear

functions of dairy cattle, veal calves, broiler hens,

wants. After Rolston
smaller pen'

is

we

etc.,

really just shorthand for

'I

need a smaller pen

This view about the goods of domesticated animals

if

they are bred to

fit

62

Rollin,
63

Ibid.,

as she

is

a dairy cow, require reference to

Animal Rights and Human Morality

p 40

64

Callicott, p

30

,

p 39f

in nature,

for

is

my veal

human needs and

and 'my veal

calf

needs a

calf.'

not correct. Domesticated animals

our purposes, they are never entirely

without interests of their own. They seem to have dual

inasmuch

It

on domesticated animals. The

are defined in terms of

can say that there are no veal calves

are unlike machines in that even

on factory farms.

sense to speak of the natural behavior of tables and

roles; the 'needs' of a dairy

human needs

cow

might,

or desires, but the needs of that

100

same cow, inasmuch

as she

is

a cow, do not. In this way, domesticated
animals and plants

distinguish themselves from machines.
It

seems that the property of 'having a

telos of one's

judgments of those who think the consciousness

criterion

is

own’ might be underwriting the
too narrow to pick out

all

the morally

relevant beings in this world.

4.7

A

Multitude of Tele

Up
have

tele,

to this point

we have

seen that the environmentalists have not denied that
machines

only that they do not have tele of their own.

intend onality, at

all

then what about

entities that are not

biological life?

and therefore,

Plumwood

Plumwood

as Val

If

puts

machines can have
it,

'can

tele,

or

outrun extensional description,'

machines but are also not what

we

usually think of as

claims that

there

is an extended family of teleological concepts, and
while some of these may
require meta-levels of consciousness and may apply only to so-called higher
animals, others can be applied without any anthropomorphism to non-conscious
beings. Notions of growth, of flourishing, for example, are implicitly teleological

and do not presuppose consciousness; some, concepts such as function,
directionality and goal-directedness of a self-maintaining kind, are applicable
natural systems and processes generally. Mountains, for example, present

to

themselves as the products of a lengthy unfolding natural process, having a
certain sort of history and direction as part of this process, and with a certain kind
65
of potential for change.
Earlier in this chapter

I

my concern that the vegetarian refutation of the

expressed

objection not have the result that the animal liberationist attitude toward non-sentient

the meat-eater's dismissive attitude toward food animals.
to avoid replacing 'the dualism of reason

in

which moral and value

status

is

inorganic and mechanical world.'

and

it

would be

66

step further, wanting

and nature by a new dualism of the organic/mechanical,

Now,

distinctions are

pointless to argue against

if

an indispensable feature of language,

Plumwood simply on

the basis of her introduction of the

her intent were to escape dualisms altogether.

Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature p 135
Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature p 36
,

66

mirror

achieved against an excluded and alien class in the form of the

teleological/non-teleologieal dualism, as

65

Plumwood goes a

life

Sorites

,

1

101

However, she

also implies another dualism,

artifact/ non-artifact,

one that

is

unnecessary and mistaken: that of the

with the distinction being based on the criterion
of 'having a telos of one’s

own. Note the contrast between her discussions of
a stone and of

We

already have

want

much

to come,' says the

of the vocabulary of natural agency: That
stone doesn't
mason of one that is indeed a being thoroughly

embedded

m the context and mysterious history of
our endeavours with

a soda bottle:

its

weight

its

place,

67

and which anyway says

'no'

to

.

The Coca Cola

bottle when individuated as part of a human
instrumental context
not (or not without a further context) framed intentionally,
and we can neither
hinder nor assist its journey. Unless it is individuated as an
artifact, that is,
subsumed within a context of human agency and intentionality (in
which case it is
subject to the considerations of interhuman ethics), there
is no obvious intentional
68
context to place it in
is

.

Plumwood's view gives us the means to
as far as that goes

discussed.

telos,

it is

The only

making

philosopher

I

it

no

different

difference

is

reject the

second premise of

from the views of most of the philosophers previously

that she has a broader view of which sorts of being can have a

easier to include ecosystems

have discovered arriving

at

and non-organic

things.

So

far,

of

the only other

such a broad axiology through any similar foundation for

value (though not going quite so far as to attribute tele to natural objects)
It is

Rollin's reductio, but

is

Rolston.

likewise shortsighted to say that the only value in the system is its production
although this is of greatest moment within it. True, the astronomical and

life,

geological phases are precursors to

instrumental value. Nature

is

life, but that does not reduce them to mere
not inert and passive until acted upon by life and

mind. Neither sentience nor consciousness are necessary for inventive processes
to occur...

Impressed with the display of life and personality on Earth,
attach most of our ethical concern to persons and to organisms; but
incorrectly

we correctly
we may

assume that mere things are beyond appropriate and inappropriate

consideration.

A

'mere thing' can, however, be something to be respected, the project of

projective nature. Crystals, volcanoes, geysers, headlands, rivers, springs, moons,
cirques, paternoster lakes, buttes, mesas, canyons

natural kinds.

They do not have organic

—these

also are

among

the

integrity or individuality; they are

constantly being built, altered, their identity in

flux.

But they are recognizably

background and surroundings. They may have striking
particularity, symmetry, harmony, grace, story, spatiotemporal unity and
continuity, even though they are also diffuse, partial, broken. They do not have
different from their

wills or interests but rather headings, trajectories, traits, successions, beginnings,

endings, cycles, which give

67

them a

tectonic integrity.

Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature p 36
Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature p 138
,

68

,

1

They can be

projects

102

(products) of quality. The question
but 'What deserves appreciation ?' 69

The downside of Plumwood's view
distinction

now

is

is

that

not 'Can they suffer?' or

includes a

it

between wild nature and domesticated nature and

disdain for the latter.

I

find

no

significant difference

The soda
purposes.

bottle takes

human

The scraping

is

paralleling Callicott's

uncomfortably reminiscent of
intrinsic natures of the rock

basically an

his

and

amalgamation of minerals.

characteristic of being a soda bottle only in relation
to

purposes. So that

consider a less obvious artifact

and not even

is

alive?'

human

possible to consider the soda bottle as a mineral thing
(like a rock) without that

It is

reference to

on the further

new dualism

between the

of the soda bottle. Each has a physical structure
which

'Is it

realize

tool

it

do not seem

I

which requires references

to

Plumwood,

a Paleolithic scraping tool. Most of us could pick one of these
up

was anything more than a

and the soda

to be just butting heads with

bottle,

human

no

less

rock.

But that

is

precisely the point;

than the dairy cow, have dual

it is

a rock.

identities, only

one of

—remember what he

goals. Rolston (perhaps inconsistently

said about machines' having only instrumental value) seems to recognize
this

when,

after

hypothesizing two realms of value, the cultural/urban on the one hand and the natural/wild on
the other, he writes:

A domain

of hybrid values is generated under the simultaneous control of both
a resultant of integrated influences from nature and culture... This happens
when human labor and craft put natural properties to use in culture, mixing the
foci,

two

to

good

effect in agricultural, industrial, scientific, medical,

applications... Examples

going

and technological
might include landscaping a home, taking penicillin, or

skiing...

Perhaps, strictly speaking, there are no purely urban values, since some
contribution of natural properties can be noticed in every cultural activity (the

muscles that

move

the

violinist's

cease to reside in nature. Also,

arm

at the

strictly

in town we never
humans may have no access to

symphony). Even

speaking,

purely wild values, since even a wilderness

is enjoyed with cultural supports
(Gore-Tex jackets, matches, bird guides, the training in botany that permits hikers
to understand where they are). We cannot revert entirely to nature and remain

human

69

70
.

Rolston, p 198f.
organism (p 103f).
70
Rolston, 33 If.

On the other hand, he denies any but
He does not explain this exclusion

instrumental value to cells

in

a multicellular

103

It

would seem odd

parts of nature

to exclude,

from Plumwood's otherwise inclusive realm of value,
those

which have merely suffered the misfortune of having
been modified by humans

and put to use by them (or modified and put

to use

by chimpanzees, bees, beavers, or dung

beetles, for that matter). Indeed, the rejection
of artifacts from that realm
to the

human/nature dualism which Plumwood

is

concerned to

example) the multifaceted character of a stone scraping

and nature where

in fact the

tool a certain

mark

in (for

boundary between humanity

beam houses on

a history and process at the end of which the old identity

does that apply to the glass soda bottle?

I

would say

that here

macroscopic prejudices. The fusion of lime, soda, and

chopping of wood and the

tries to

a certain contrast between artifacts like the soda bottle
on

the one hand and scraping tools or the posts of post and
is

it

boundaries are hazy and the continuities certain.

One might be concerned about

there

criticize;

would grant a redoubt

fitting of

beams and

readily visible to our eyes, that does not

mean

posts,

that

we must
no

silica tells

and

it is

is still

the other. In the

not in

avoid being misled by our
a history than the

less

some sense

Fortunately, Plumwood's rejection of artifacts as value-bearers

How

retained and visible.

the old identity in the former

if

latter,

is

is

not

retained.

not entailed by the rest

of her view. Artifacts can be incorporated into the realm of value without contradicting any other

component of her

theory. Indeed,

I

hope

it is

evident that that incorporation

her general view on what kind of things can be said to have a

4.8

An

Alternative Path:

The Problem of the

Philosophers like Taylor and

showing that other beings have a
justifies the

claim that

we

itself

implied by

telos.

Biological Individual

Plumwood attempt

characteristic in

to

common

broaden the moral community by
with

us, the possession of

which

should treat them with some respect, as autonomous individuals. The

characteristic they focus on, telos,

So one

is

result of taking telos to

seems

to apply to all material things,

be a morally relevant feature

is

if it

applies to anything.

that everything material in the

universe seems to be deserving of moral consideration. This might be an undesirable implication
of an ethical theory. After

all,

environmental ethics has developed out of a desire to change the

104

world, a project which presupposes drawing
distinctions for which the telos-based ethic
seems to

be unable to equip

us.

this chapter.

it

their

view

is

First,

Whether there

would be only

is

a problem here will be discussed in the next
section of

fair to Taylor,

self

to point out that

not the only one to entail such sweeping value claims.

Another way to ground environmental

The two

Plumwood, and the others

ethics

basic features of this kind of theory are an

is

through a kind of enlightened

acknowledgment of the

and a refusal to draw a sharp distinction between the

study has long provided a basis for the

latter, as

self

and

self-interest.

intrinsic value of the

environment. Biological

its

evidenced by these remarks of T.H. Huxley's:

Histology then takes up the tale, and shows that the majority of animals,
including man, our primal type of individuality, are built up of a number

of units,
of these have considerable independence, and it soon is
forced upon us that they stand in much the same general relation to the
whole
man as do the individuals of a colony of coral polyps, or better of Siphonophora
(jellyfish) to the whole colony. This conclusion becomes strengthened
when we

the so-called

cells.

Some

number of free-living animals, the Protozoa, including
the simplest forms known, which correspond in all essentials, save their
separate and independent existence, with the units building up the body of man.
Both, in fact, are cells, but while the one seems to have an obvious individuality,
what are we to say of the other ? 71
find that there exist a great
all

Relative to a single cell of

than

is

my body,

the rest of

the sky and the earth. But then there

body; are the

E. coli

bacteria

which

live in

system (but which do not originate with

problem gets deeper
placed in

as

we

my body while

is

my body is

become

my gut as

72

and John Seed

71

egoistic basis for valuing the

71

Huxley, p 75.

12

Callicott, p

17

Callicott, p.

1

If.

73

14.

as others)

my body—-their’ DNA is

a part of

who

a

pan

of the ecosystem

cells

a biologically necessary part of

are cells of

my digestive

not ’my’ DNA), part of

(when does a

part of

my

me? The

my environment,

me?) and quantum mechanical confusions over

where the properties of observers end and observed begin.
Shepard

less

the problem of deciding which

bring in considerations of time

eating,

no

Callicott

is

among

those (he cites Paul

see in these ecological and physical considerations an

environment not merely instrumentally but

intrinsically.
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How to

account for the value of 'others'—human others
and now nonhuman
74
has been the principal problematic of nonegoistic

natural others

If

—

ethics.

quantum theory and ecology both imply

in structurally similar

ways

in

both the

physical and organic domains of nature the continuity
of self and nature, and
the self is intrinsically valuable, then nature is
75
intrinsically valuable.

As Callicott observes, the intrinsic value of the

self

is

if

usually taken as an unproblematic

given in most ethical theories (even those theories
which are not egoistic in the usual sense). This
environmentalist strategy,

if

viable, has the dual

advantage of (1) grounding environmentalism

a widely-held axiological assumption and hence
(2) not forcing environmentalists to

on narrower theoretical disputes
problem

is

(e.g., utilitarianism

or deontology?) at the outset,

in

come down

where the

simply getting the environment included in ethical debates as something
valuable

in

itself.

The

result of this concept of nature as ’extended self

thing has intrinsic value. As Seed puts

There

is

6

seems to be that every material

it,

an identification with all life. Then follows the realization that the
between 'life' and 'lifeless' is a human construct. Every atom in this

distinction

body existed before organic

life emerged 4,000 million years ago. Remember our
childhood as minerals, as lava, as rocks?
Rocks contain the potentiality to weave themselves into such stuff as this.
We are the rocks dancing. Why do we look down on them with such a
condescending air? It is they that are the immortal part of us. 77

This conception of the extended self recognizes no culture/nature distinction; even a soda
bottle

4.9

is,

after

all, 'rock.'

The Problem

of Evil and the Problem of Junk

Now would

be a good point

at

which

to

mark where we

are

and whence we came.

We

have gone through a number of answers to the question 'who and what deserves moral
consideration?'

The

mainstream animal

74

Callicott, p
75

14

173.

Callicott, p

174.

76
77

1

Callicott, p

Seed,

p.

243.

traditional

and

liberationist's

still

dominant answer

answer

is

is

'humans and nothing

else.'

The

'animals possessing a certain level of consciousness.'
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Some

environmentalist philosophers answer 'everything that
lives (including ecosystems).'

Plum wood's answer

is

'everything,' as does, or so

mean

My

'everything except artifacts.'

it

modification of Plumwood's view answers

would seem, the shared view of

Callicott

everything that has, had, or will have a material existence.

Sorites-like, at a perverse

We seem

'everything'

we

value the world,

we have ended up

which, paradoxically, seems to undercut the very motives with
which
destructive factory emissions are

made

we

etc.

in the world; the possibility follows

must accept that
from

its

it is

for the

valuing everything,

began. Even the most

of what Carl Sagan reverentially calls

Leopold, Callicott, Rolston, Plumwood,

I

to have arrived,

and impractical axiology. Having been motivated by concern

environment to reappraise the way

something bad

and Seed. By

'star stuff.'

possible for there to be

actualization as indicated in these

philosophers complaints about past and present environmental conditions as brought
on by

humans

(it

also follows from, in Rolston's case,

malaria, which do not have their origins in

Moore and

the Routleys, that

in intrinsic value.

But

if

we

human

—not

just

Plumwood and

humans,

behaviours).

We

as cancer

might have thought,

and

like

could choose one world over another on the basis of a difference
Callicott are right,

theories really follow, then either every thing

modified)

judgments about phenomena, such

is

and

if

the conclusions

I

drew from

their

already intrinsically valuable (Plumwood

to be sure, but also not just sentient creatures,

and not just

living

things and ecosystems and 'natural' rock formations but also soda bottles, aerosol cans, factories

and so on; or everything

a

is

pan

of an intrinsically valuable whole, nature,

my

'extended self

(Callicott).

As presented so

far,

these theories do not seem to be terribly helpful in any practical way.

Let us begin with a confusion (or potential confusion) in Callicott's view.

argumentatively as follows:

(1)

The

(2)

If (1),

(3)

.-.

self

is

intrinsically valuable.

then nature

Nature

is

is

intrinsically valuable.

intrinsically valuable.

We

can present

his

view
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What

is

leftover

from

this

argument, even

if

parts versus the value of wholes. Callicott has
the
intrinsic value of the

we

accept

it, is

the problem of the value of

same problem here

as in his

argument from the

whole of nature (discussed above). He cannot go from the
conclusion of this

argument to any claims about the

intrinsic value of particular parts of the world.

The most ardent

apologist for God's creation can, without obvious
contradiction, assert that the existence of certain

kinds of people (murderers, etc.)

whole (perhaps
Furthermore,

all

like

is

intrinsically bad,

even

if

such people serve as parts in a good

ugly parts of a beautiful painting, or dissonances in a musical
composition).

apologists will assert that the existence of such people should be
prevented, by

character-building or
that every part of

what have you. More mundanely, even

me

is

of positive intrinsic value

(e.g.,

if

line (1)

is

my ulcer). Now,

true,

if

how much

practical help

it

can be. After

all, all

does not follow

the extended-self view

of nature cannot help us to establish the intrinsic value of parts of nature,
then
of

it

it is

difficult to

see

of our interactions are with particular parts of

the whole.

Plumwood’s

me)

is,

like Callicott's,

machines and
far as telos

her

difficulty

own

is

is

different.

The conclusion of her

(as

modified by

not suggestive of any environmental imperatives. Factories and war

cities exhibit telos

(on her broad reading of the term), so there

concerned, but to respect these as

environmental activism suggests) not

confers some, but not in

in her axiology

view

teleological

all

much

all tele

as anything else.

is

nothing to do, as

But certainly either (as

are to be respected, or possession of a telos

cases equal intrinsic value. In either case, the prominent place of telos

must be playing second

than one) on the basis of which

we

(at best) fiddle to

some other

can rank competing tele

(e.g.,

criterion (and possibly

more

that of the rain forest versus

that of Brazilian beef ranchers).

The

difficulty

environment. What

Plum wood

to

is

is

not just in separating out malevolent

Callicott to

do with the

do with the

fact that the

tumor

would each of these philosophers appeal

fact that a

activity vis-a-vis the external

cancerous tumor

exhibits a telos?

to in justifying

human

its

What other

destruction?

is

part of

me? What

is

axiological criteria

The same problem

arises
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in the case of the species of bacteria

are mentioned by Rolston,

who

which causes malaria.

as far as

I

can

a concern with this problem of figuring out

them, "bad kinds.

ways

in

It is

difficult to

tell is

how

use these two examples because they

the only environmental philosopher to express

to understand

and what

to

do with,

as

he

calls

be sure, but he seems to claim that there are two different

which something could be considered a bad kind.

kind without situated environmental

with a situated environmental

I

79

think of an illuminating example of the

an organism cannot be a good

Second, ’one might find examples of organisms

fitness.'

fitness that

First,

seem bad arrangements.' 80 Unfortunately, he cannot

first sort

of bad kind, and he explains

example (the malaria-causing microbe) of the second. He

away

his

only

also claims that there are 'deformed

organisms in nature, bad organisms of their kind, and even monstrosities that have no natural
kind, unfitted for any habitat.'

But again he gives no examples, and again he makes excuses for

these supposedly bad kinds ('even mutants and monsters play their
are suspicions regarding his grasp of the meaning of the
In fighting the

mainstream view that denies

word

82

roles'

).

is

drawn.

think that this blindness

I

we

are

left

with

'kind.'

intrinsic value to anything but

comparably conscious creatures), environmentalists tend to be blind to the
goodness

All

humans

(or

fact that, unless

defined into nature, distinctions between good and bad events in nature must be

bom of zeal

provides another answer, in addition to those she

herself offers, to Joni Seager's question regarding the absence of environmentalist interest in the

campaign against hunting.

83

The

uncritical idolization of

any qualms about predation, but demands,
predation-positive attitude

Chapters 2 and

3).

Rolston, p

lOlf.

Rolston,

102.

p.

(I

examine

More strange

take Rolston to be saying that

'x

81

82
83

Rolston, p 103.
Rolston, p. 103.
Rolston, p 103.
Seager, p 213.

and Rolston both seem

even pain

same paragraph from which
fitness' means

has situated environmental
is

rules out

to believe, a

predation-based anti-vegetarian arguments in

their refusal to admit that

in the

meshes with the kind of goods to which x
80

critically their

still is

Another expression

as Callicott

non-human nature not only

genetically programmed.'

this is
'x

is

an

intrinsic evil.

taken might be helpful:

I

has an ecosystemic role which

109

Pain

is

a bad thing in

between

intrinsic

humans

or in animals. But this fools us until

and instrumental

we

distinguish

pain.

Instrumental pain has contributory
reference to further goods; intrinsic pain has
no such reference. Intrinsic pain is a
bad thing, absolutely; but only instrumental pain
is characteristic of nature, where
intrinsic pain is a nonfunctional anomaly.
Pain is routinely instrumental in
ecological defenses, captures, and transfers of
goods, and the pains imposed in
agriculture are homologous. They are not intrinsic
pains; they must be judged in
their instrumentality and with no presumption
against innocent suffering 84
.

Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to
do with good and evil if our
is taken from the vantage point
of ecological biology. Pain in particular
is primarily information. In
animals, it informs the central nervous system of
stress, irritation, or trauma in outlying regions
of the organism. ..An
appraisal

arctic wolf in
experience pain in her feet or chest because of the rigors
nothing bad or wrong in that 85

pursuit of a caribou

may

of the chase. There

is

Rolston

s

.

remarks are puzzling

Callicott a confusion (or

perhaps ignorance

extrinsic value (a confusion

bound

positive extrinsic value, that

is,

(e.g.,

in their

to

we

the fact that

itself

nothing
effects,

new

it is

can give

that that

a

it

its

which

is

an

ethicist).

that

when

But what makes pain such a
is,

considered intrinsically (or in

intrinsically evil

does nothing to further an argument that

(bad in

itself)

is

nothing bad or wrong

it is

is

having

all

that

pain in nature

all

witness to pain's

we

brings

motivator
pain

we

is

is

value
to our

it

precisely

an

evil.

cyclist

is

who wants

to 'feel

extrinsically good;

he

and so when he concludes by

are entitled to point out that yes, there

is

It is

can be extrinsically good (have good

intrinsically good,

in that'

wound

itself),

remind us that pain

nothing extrinsically bad or wrong in that. However, there

84

terrific

such as communicating desired information, as in the case of a

saying that 'there

are

the pain of a newly-inflicted

the bum'), and vice versa. All that Callicott does

all

We

expediency for the realization of further ends that

care).

felt evil;

a better word) over the concepts intrinsic and

to cause trouble to

the preservation of our health, as

attention so that

is

apparent self-contradictoriness, and he shares with

something

intrinsically bad,

is

and

it is

those wondrously good effects. Rolston seems to suffer a deeper confusion in his claim

Rolston, p 82.

85

Callicott, p

32.

is

instrumental, not intrinsic. These are not exclusive categories, and indeed

110

wherever there
all

pain

is

is

pain of positive instrumental value there

that

comes to

it

pain of negative intrinsic value, for

of negative intrinsic value. 86

Another problem

when

is

which

when

artifacts) contradict

naturally

is

arises

philosophers such as Callicott and Rolston (and Plumwood,

themselves by leaving out of their sweeping

human. They make

it

seem

as

though human

lists

of goods

activities are supernatural

inventions to be despised to the extent that they are not analogous
to the activities of anything

One

else in nature.

particularly troubling

sympathy and the actions that sympathy
animals.

He

example

inspires

Callicott's disdain for

human

attitudes of

toward non-human (and especially wild)

characterizes the animal liberationist's concern with animal suffering
as

uncourageous, prophylactic, sugar-coated,

artificial,' 'self-indulgent,' 'soft,'

He and Rolston and even Taylor

anti-natural.

distress (Rolston

activity).

is

and (most

are opposed to humans' aiding wild animals in

and Taylor make allowances when species are endangered because of human

The following scenario should

suffice to drive

home

the unacceptability of the

environmentalists' stand on this issue. Imagine that the mountain gorilla has, due to
efforts

by conservation groups and African governments, achieved

Then imagine

population.

gorilla families,

Callicott,

tellingly)

that a painful

and

fatal virus

a healthy

dili gent

and viable wild

begins to sweep through the various

decimating them. According to the pro-pain, pro-death ethic espoused by

and the Kantian theory worked out by Taylor, humans should not intervene. The holism

of Rolston might permit intervention but does not require

If it is

it.

ever the case in our contemporary world that the imminent extinction of a

whole species

is

due to

entirely natural causes,

we

should not try to stop the

natural sequence of events from taking place in order to save the species....

when

it

comes

And

to instances of bacteria-caused diseases, almost everyone has a

tendency to be on the side of the organism which has the disease rather than

86

One might

object that there

is

no such thing as pain without an object and, following Moore and Brentano,

someone else's misfortune. This is parallel to Mill's desire
Whether there is some one thing 'pleasure' or 'pain'
is a dispute that lies outside the main concerns of this dissertation. However, the issue might not be of great
import where we are speaking of the kind of pain (physical pain, psychological terror) to nonhuman animals
that animal liberationists wish to avoid and which Callicott here seeks to argue is good
cite as

an example of a good kind of pain pain

in

to rank pleasures qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

87

Callicott, p.

243).

33f He also says

that 'animal libbers expect [farmers] to subsidize their tender sensibilities' (p

Ill

viewing the situation from the standpoint of the
organism.

Humans have no duty

living bacteria inside the

of benevolence to preserve rare species from
natural
may have a duty to other humans to save such species as
89

extinction, although they

resources or

museum

Presumably,

we

It

seems

to

me

pieces.

should also throw out our birdbaths and birdfeeders.

that such views entail an

odd

sort of devaluing of

what human beings

are.

Indeed, environmentalist philosophers often write with the
conviction that humans are at best a
disposable

pan

of the landscape or at worst a malignancy. They hold
a similarly negative view of

no other animal. They have no praise

to offer

compassion

revealing.

for other animals. This

is

humans, not even when humans
It

shows up

act out of

their views as simplistic

flawed naturalism, a foundation which underwrites an a priori rejection of
uniquely
activity in nature.

to take pity

in the wild

and

act accordingly.

is

no reason

to reject their claim that sentience

considerability. That claim

is

regard

valuable than

environmentalism

is

see

it,

not a necessary condition for moral

Which

is

to say, the

fundamental claim of

compatible with the fundamental claim of ethical vegetarianism.

my refutation

this in

is

perfectly consistent with a rejection of their anti-humane, anti-

interventionist, anti- vegetarian theses.

I

less

typical

To these questions the environmentalists have no answer.

natural death?

chapters. As

is it

Why should we

such charity as any more disruptive than predation, such life-saving as any

have shown

human

Every animal consumes other animals or plants, but only of humans

on members of other species

That

and deeply

I

hope that

of each group's arguments against the other in these last

the fundamental mistake

common

to each

two

group has been an adherence to a

monistic axiology. Each group (again, with the exception of Regan) posits one necessary quality
(pleasure, preference-satisfaction, rationality, preservation of the biotic

88

in a

world of junk

Taylor, Respect for Nature p
,

89

Rolston, p

154f

as being

making something worthy of moral consideration. This leaves the

intrinsically valuable or as

animal liberationist

community)

1

77f

(plants, rivers, ecosystems, planets, etc., all of zero intrinsic

I

112

value),

and traps the

uniquely

human

naturalistic environmentalist in

activity as essentially alienated

more or

less subtle

misanthropy (seeing

from or destructive to the

biotic

community).

Monistic ethical theories are easily refuted, as
Callicott himself seems to recognize.

Moral philosophy

historically has striven for theoretical unity

and closure often
moral common sense. Consider, for example Kant's
deontological dismissal of the moral value of actions
tainted with 'inclination,'
even when the inclination in question is wholly
at considerable sacrifice of

altruistic. Or consider the morally
outrageous consequences that some utilitarians have
been led to accept in order
faithfully to adhere to the theoretical foundations
of utilitarianism. 90

Yet, for the sake of that

incommensurability in hard

show

many

them

to let

in particular to avoid 'moral

immediately dismisses Mary Anne Warren's attempt to

drive one

s

cases

is

I

also

place to argue for

1

my view,

Perhaps

is

this

is

many

much about
is

a

how

easy cases, too
the hard (often

possible,

a controversial claim, but here

and so
is

I

not the

it.

problem, but one related to
general, the problem

is

by commenting

how

briefly

on a somewhat

different commensurability

the problem of ethics and nature has been discussed here. In

formulated as that of finding intrinsic value in non-sentient nature. The

might make us think of numbers and commensurability, and some of these

philosophers (especially Rolston) do speak in these terms, but

why. Suppose that every

either

accept that there

there are too

do not believe that across-the-board commensurabilty

will close this chapter

'value'

we

important in ethics, but one might question

theorizing. In

reject the necessity of theoretical unity.

is

if

possible win-win solutions to (prima facie) conflict, to worry so

tragic) cases.

word

and

and environmentalism are compatible

Now, the study of hard

variety of values.

it is

theoretical unity,

cases,' Callicott

that animal liberationism

important

same

living thing

commensurable or they are

and natural object has

I

think that this

intrinsic value.

not. If they are, they are either

all

is

a mistake. Here

Those values are

equal, or they are not.

Taylor subscribes to the egalitarian view. Egalitarianism not only underwrites

his

unacceptable

claim that one should be indifferent between the existence of a bacteria and the existence of a

vu

Callicott, p. 50.

Taylor, after Kant, also rejects the value of acts done from inclination, but Callicott

overstates the case.

The presence of inclination does not

Taylor makes the case that

we have

'taint'

an act which

is

also

a duty to develop our inclinations so that they

done from

duty.

match our duties

Indeed,
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gorilla but also raises the possibility that

two

bacteria are of greater value than one gorilla.

Rolston subscribes to a hierarchical view, but as
similar question:

how many gazelles

we saw

a cheetah worth?

is

the hierarchical and egalitarian axiologies break

Even
ethics.

The

if

intrinsic value or inherent

such as ourselves.

down on

seems unanswerable. So, both

that

the quesiton of commensurability.

worth of some object (rather than some

not ontological junk, that

it is

more than

Little

that

is

respect to them.

We

it

must be taken

in

state of affairs)

into account

We

implied by such value.

comparative calculations of the worth of things

why my

And

they were commensurable, such comparisons would prove of
minimal use in

serves as notice that

reason

in the previous chapter that raises a

order to determine

by moral agents

do not use mere

how we

should act with

look to the relations between ourselves and others as well. This

duties to

my own children are

different

from

my

is

one

duties to children in South

America. Such relations also obtain between ourselves and nonhuman beings. These relations

must be invoked by

ethical vegetarians.

argument against vegetarianism: ’meat
comparative calculation involving the
itself

Recall Porphyry's seventh objection to the Sorites

entails

an

injustice to a kindred creature.'

intrinsic values of

A

simple

myself and some other animal cannot by

serve as the foundation for this basis for vegetarianism. This

is

no

different

from the

facts in

a case of interhuman ethics.

The same can be
just

life

said for plant

an attitude of disregard for
has

made just one

ancestry. So,

allow us to

we

live.

atmosphere. So,

plants.

life.

Here are two reasons why

First,

like a feeling of

Not only are they important

we

wrong

to have

plants are our relatives. Assuming that

uninterrupted appearance on earth,

should have something

it is

we and

plants share a

DNA-based

common

community with them. Second,

as food, but they replenish the

even

oxygen

in

plants

our

should have feelings akin to gratitude toward them. Note that a feeling of

gratitude goes beyond just valuing plants as resources. Similar things can be said about non-living

natural objects and ecosystems.
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Of course, these views do not
American

originate with me.

I

examined similar views

in Native

ethics in the preceding chapter.

So

far,

I

have shown that environmentalists

vegetarianism (Chapters 2 and 3).
liberationists

I

fail

have also shown

to argue successfully against

in the present chapter that the

do not make their case against the moral significance of non-sentient

animal

life

(and

natural objects), which might have prima facie claims on us
on the bases of teleology, relatedness,

and/or

reciprocity.

liberationists rest

In the

end

it

seems that differences between environmentalists and animal

on mistakenly exclusive

axiological assumptions.

The two camps can

these assumptions without damaging their respective agendas. Even so, there
that their practical implications

society.

justice

is

The

relationship

examined

come

into conflict with the needs

is

some concern

and aspirations of human

between environmentalism, vegetarianism, and movements

in the next chapter.

give up

for social

Chapter 5

ANIMALS

The

5.1

Crisis

One

IN

UTOPIA

Mentality

finds in environmentalist literature philosophers
justifying or motivating the

development of an environmental

We of the west,

by appealing to something

ethic

like

the following argument:

or the north, or the Occident, or the ruling classes,
engage in environmentally

destructive practices.

A

certain

way

of perceiving and evaluating the

non-human world

legitimates these practices. Therefore, in order to change
these destructive practices
find

new ways

of perceiving and evaluating the

we must

first

non-human world.

These philosophers claim that the rejection of anthropocentrism

is

one of the minimal

conditions for achieving a sustainable environment. They further argue
that anthropocentrism
itself is

embedded

in all current ethical theories.

Such theories are not merely implicated

in the

current destruction of the environment; they cannot help but excuse that destruction.
Therefore,
traditional western ethical theorizing

must be

rejected.

This line of reasoning invites a paradox.

should

we adopt

a

this

is

first

answer

the reason

land of ethics?' The answer

we want

then ask, 'Why do

mind. The

new

we

is

To put

it

to save the environment?'

that

if

we do

all.

It

Why ought

into familiar terms

it?

is

because of the

anthropocentric as

it

this is

Two

utility to

gets.

I

want

to ask,

'Why

necessary to save the environment.

particularly obvious answers

not save the environment

I

ethic,

will turn again to Mill.

we

come

will destroy ourselves.

then

it

I

to

But

if

seems that we have not

As

I

mentioned

something that society ought to defend

Because of the general

environmental ethics on the basis of
rights

read this argument

underwrites the 'new,' which turns out to be just an extension of

chapter, Mill believed that a right

of.

is:

I

should adopt the 'new, environmental'

jettisoned the old ethic at

the old.

When

utility

human need

humans afforded

To have only

in the previous

me

the object of that right affords.

is

like saying that the

is

To motivate

environment should have

thereby. Needless to say, this

utility-based rights

in the possession

is

as

to have no rights at allfsee Chapter
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4),

and to be a non-human with only
human-utility-based

There

is

rights

is

to be especially impoverished.

also something rather unsatisfying
about moulding one's ethical beliefs
in this

way

in

order to meet one's needs-i.e„
to believe something (here,
an ethical theory) not because one
believes

needs

it

to indeed be correct, but because
one believes

in question are

human

The other answer
want
not

to save

owe

it

because

it

it

to

be expedient.

On

needs, which returns us to
anthropocentrism.

to the question,

'

Why do we want

has inherent worth, or because

to save the environment?',

we owe

environment

effect that

itself.

theones, then

it

If

it is

something

we have come

we must

to

to believe this, equipped as

work out new

ethical theories, theories

are obviously doing so in the absence of such theories.
But

environment-friendly views?

not deter one from holding ’green’ views.
theories

that such rejection

is

—

when

If this is so,

necessary

environmentally responsible manner
So,

is

if

we

we

worth)—that

is,

are with the standard ethical

how

human

chauvinism.

which are environment-friendly,
did they

come

to have

ethical theory does

then the reason for rejecting the standard

are to value the environment and behave in an

false.

addressing from an environmentalist standpoint the question of ’why reject

conventional ethical theorizing?'

we

find

one answer which

which indicates that somehow immersion
chauvinism. The

we

seems that being equipped with conventional

It

that

do, at least in pan, for the sake of the

does not seem that those ethical theories lead
inevitably to

Those who are trying

is

to the environment (one does

it

a debt of gratitude to one's parents
merely because they have inherent

any answer to the

top of that, the

first

answer

is

presupposition must have been

is itself

in conventional ethics

anthropocentric and another

does not determine one to

unacceptable, and the second answer
false.

tells

human

us that our

Indeed, ethical theories such as Paul Taylor's Kantian system

of environmental ethics seem to give the

lie

to this belief

and to give good reason

to believe that

the ends of environmentalism, animal liberationism, and other radical or reformist causes can be

spoken to by a modest

And

shift in axiologies rather

than a

total rejection of entire ethical theories.

yet this paradox of reform crops up again in the problem of motivating modest shifts in old

axiologies!

My wish is

not to defend the viability of old theories.

I

merely want to point out

this
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interesting puzzle,

which occurs

introductions of so

many

me

to

The
relationship

crisis

mentality apparent in the

we

anthropocentrism, biocentrism-^loes

schools of thought in the seventies

topic of this chapter

is

is

any measure, the answer

is

number

of

yes.

environmentalist philosophies which explicitly address
the

between environmental

them both from

really

are willing to launch into a program to
save the

and interhuman

issues

issues.

I

present, briefly, the general

views of deep ecologists and ecosocialists and the focal
points of their antagonism.
critique

it

the velocity with which environmentalist
philosophers broke into a

If

critical

ponder the

goes... well,

matter what our motives are so long as

mutually

I

papers and books on environmental ethics.

As far as the environment

environment?

as

a vegetarian standpoint.

I

I

will

then

believe that both of these schools have

neglected human-animal relationships in constructing their
environmental-social utopias, and they

have done so

expense of the coherence of their programs.

at the

ecofeminism can answer
call ecological

my

vegetarianism and address the questions

5.2

how

between what one might

will look at a feminist

argument against

about ethical vegetarianism's relationship

raises

and

to,

injustice.

deep

ecologists.

'orthodoxy.'

The

an environmental philosophy with many

is

environmentalism that

and

it

I

then show

Deep Ecology
Deep ecology

as

interhuman

in,

will

critiques, effectively serving as the bridge

utopianism and animal liberation. Finally,

potential complicity

I

I

have focused on so

However, there

difference that

is

is

is

explicitly

it

a difference

interhuman

is

one of its chief virtues;

thus far in this dissertation)

the kind of

Callicott are referred to

between these two and the deep ecology

affairs,

deep ecology

concerned with the implications of

environmentalism. This

have not addressed

Sometimes Leopold and

relevant to the subject of this chapter

Callicott express little interest in

Arne Naess

far.

affinities to

its

is

politics,

is

that,

whereas Leopold

as laid out

economics,

chief vice (and one of

a tenacious obscurity.

by

its

founder

etc. for

two main reasons

I
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The deep ecology view has been
List

1

laid out

on two occasions

I:

Rejection of the man-in-environment image
in favour of the relational

.

total-field

unage.

2.

Biospherical egalitarianism.

3.

Principles of diversity

4.

Anti-class posture.

5.

Fight against pollution and resource depletion.

6.

Complexity, not complication.

7.

Local

List

in lists of tenets:

II

autonomy and

and of symbiosis.

decentralization.

1

(the 'deep ecology platform):

The well-being and

flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth
themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These
values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for
human
purposes.
1.

have value

in

2.
Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these
values and are also values in themselves.

Humans have no

3.

right to reduce this richness

and

diversity except to

satisfy vital needs.

The

4.

flourishing of

substantial decrease of the

human life and cultures is compatible with a
human population. The flourishing of nonhuman

life

requires such a decrease.

Present

5.

the situation

is

Policies

6.

human

interference with the

nonhuman world

is

excessive,

and

rapidly worsening.

must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,
The resulting state of affairs will be
from the present.

technological, and ideological structures.

deeply different

The

7.

ideological change

mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling
than adhering to an increasingly higher
There will be a profound awareness of the difference between
is

in situations of inherent value) rather

standard of
big

8.

and

living.

great.

Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation

or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

1

2

Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep,' pp. 95-98

The explanations

directly

2

that follow are given along with the

list

Devall and Sessions, p 70. The deep ecology platform is the product of a collaboration between Naess
and Sessions, The following explanations of II. 6 and II. 7 are from p 73.
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Social values are for the

6 and 7 of

terms of

list II

(note that in

nonhuman

needs;

ecosocialist critique of

ways of

life,

1.3,

restricted to points 3, 4, 6,

4 the requirement

will

and 7 of list

for a population decrease

It

deep ecology). The

to points

expressed only in

diversity called for in 1.3 includes 'diversity of

inasmuch

and military domination. The

as class

anti-class posture in 1.4

is

human

supposed to follow

antagonisms encourage homogeneity (except inasmuch as
is

obscure.

'the

He

says that

complexity-not-complication principle favours division of labour, not fragmentation
of labour.

favours integrated actions in which the whole person

this

and

touch on the problems with the population issue in
the

exploiter lives differently from the exploited'). Naess'
explanation of 1.6
'the

is

I

of cultures, of occupations, of economies,’ and
hence signals deep ecology’s opposition

to economic, cultural,

from

I

II.

most part

is

an expression of opposition to the assembly

line,

active, not

is

and by

mere

reactions.’

’division of labour'

Presumably,

Naess refers to

the idea that different people will have different skilled jobs. The desire for
local autonomy in 1.7
follows from the fact that 'increased local autonomy... reduces energy consumption'
(a conclusion

based on the energy requirements of import-export
also

traffic)

presumably would protect the diversity desired

Naess and Sessions point out, but from the values

in

that 'Some economists criticize the term "quality of

in 1.3.

list

life"

I

One cannot

here, and there

issue

I

will

is

is

no need to do

unfortunate;

conclude

quantify adequately

I

will

this section

so.'

I

come back

what

is

II.

6 follows not only from

as well. Regarding

because

But on closer inspection, what they consider to be vague
the term.

and hence pollution. Local autonomy

is

it is

II.

II.1-II.5, as

7 they only say

supposed to be too vague.

actually the nonquantitative nature of

important for the quality of life as discussed

believe this reluctance to say

to this in the context of the

by noting the gulf between

(1) the

more about the

quality of

deep ecology-ecosocialist debate.

deep

ecologists'

understanding of

the complex relations between environmental issues and social concerns and (2) the various

degrees of separation between these two spheres ’recognized’ by other environmentalists:

and charity praised in moral society, cannot tell
what is good and bad in amoral ecosystems, nor what is
and wrong when humans deal with ecosystems. That is [a] category

Social philosophers, with justice

environmental
right

mistake.

3

Rolston, p

181

3

ethicists

life
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Family obligations in general come before
nationalistic duties and humanitarian
obligations in general come before
environmental duties. 4

And then
not

all,

there

is

Taylor's desire to

non-human animals

deny

rights to non-persons

(which he takes most,

as well as plants to be) but then to
allow that such entities could be

conceived of as having rights but not in the same
sense that humans have
gives the

lie

nonhuman

if

to such desperate separations

rights.

5

Deep ecology

between the concerns of interhuman and human-

ethics.

5.3 Social Ecology

Deep ecology diagnoses the cause

of our environmental

ills

as anthropocentrism.

It

then

goes on to recognize that dropping anthropocentrism will entail
some changes in social relations.
Social ecology, or ecosocialism, diagnoses the cause of our
environmental
relations themselves.

all

In the

words of prominent anarchist

our present ecological problems arise from deep-seated

more

ecosocialist

dominating nature has

primary source

its

in

we

as our social

Murray Bookchin,

social problems... To

concrete: economic, ethnic, cultural, and gender conflicts,

core of the most serious ecological dislocations

ills

face today.'

among many

make

others,

'nearly

this point

lie at

the

6

the domination of

Furthermore, even

'the idea of

human by human and

the

structuring of the natural world into a hierarchical Chain of Being.' 7

As far as

we know,

the

first

people to write about the connection between environmental

degradation and exploitative social relations were Marx and Engels. Here are just two examples:

The

social science of the bourgeoisie, classical political economy, is predominantly
occupied only with the directly intended social effects of human actions connected
with production and exchange. This fully corresponds to the social organisation

of

which

it is

the theoretical expression.

When

individual capitalists are engaged

production and exchange for the sake of the immediate profit, only the nearest,
most immediate results can be taken into account in the first place. When an
in

individual manufacturer or merchant sells a manufactured or purchased

commodity with only the usual small profit, he is satisfied, and he is not
concerned as to what becomes of the commodity afterwards or who are its
purchasers. The same thing applies to the natural effects of the same actions.

4

Callicott, p 94.
5

'

Taylor, Respect for Nature

,

p.

254

Bookchin, 'What

is

Social Ecology 9

Bookchin, 'What

is

Social

7

',

p 354

Ecology 9 p 365.
',
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What

did the Spanish planters in Cuba, who burned
down forests on the slopes of
the mountainsides and obtained from the ashes
sufficient fertilizer for one
generation of very highly profitable coffee trees, care that the
tropical
rainfall

washed away the now unprotected upper stratum
8

of the

soil,

bare rock ?

leaving behind onlv
y

The long production time (which comprises

a relatively small period of working
time) and the great length of the periods of turnover entailed
make forestry an
industry of little attraction to private and therefore capitalist
enterprise, the latter
being essentially private even if the associated capitalist takes the
place of the
individual capitalist. The development of culture and of industry
in general has
ever evinced itself in such energetic destruction of forests that
everything done by
9
it conversely for their preservation and restoration
appears infinitesimal
.

The

ecosocialist

view

is

that this state of affairs

is

legitimated in

pan by

a free market

ideology which excuses the anti-environmental excesses of capital on the basis of the
market's

being a

fair

game

in

which

capital

which raw materials are the

and labour compete with themselves and each other and

'free gift

of Nature to capital

in

10
.'

we realize that the present market society, structured around the brutally
competitive imperative of 'grow or die,' is a thoroughly impersonal, self-operating
Unless

mechanism, we will falsely tend to blame technology as such or population
growth as such for environmental problems. We will ignore their root causes,
such as trade for profit, industrial expansion, and the identification of 'progress'
with corporate self-interest

11
.

Bookchin's vision of an adequate alternative to the present market society reads strikingly
like the first

list

of points of the deep ecology position (above). His recommendations include

decentralization, use of alternative energies, organic agriculture, 'versatile industrial installations,'
recycling, 'production of high-quality goods that can last for generations,' 'substitution of creative

work

for insensate labor,'

and

Bookchin advises an anarchist

communal
local

x

Marx,

10
11

12

p.

politics

modeled

295f.

Parsons, ed., p 171.
is Social Ecology?', p 355
Bookchin, 'What is Social Ecology?', p 370f.
in

Bookchin, 'What

artful

after

and engage

in public affairs.' In addition,

(improvements on) Athenian democracy and
is

to be checked

in a confederacy of interdependence.

cited in Parsons, ed., p. 184

Marx, cited

be

means of production. Parochialism

communities participate

Engels,

9

control over the

'the leisure to

1

"

by having the
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5 -4 Social Ecology versus

Deep Ecology

a truism in religion and politics that the
more two groups' views have in

It is

more cantankerous
Deep

their relationship.

ecologists

seem

Deep ecology and ecosocialism

Michael

Ecology [Englewood

E.

no exception.

The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and

Zimmerman, ed„ Environmental

Cliffs:

the

have two main objections to ecosocialism, and these
are

to

presented clearly by deep ecologist Warwick Fox in
Parallels' (in

are

common,

Philosophy:

From Animal Rights

Its

to Radical

Prentice Hall, 1993], pp. 213-232). Fox accuses
ecosocialism (as

represented by Bookchin) of being anthropocentric and
unrealistically deterministic.

Advocates of these approaches say in essence: 'Since the real root
of our problems
is... capitalism, for example, we must first
get our interactions between humans
right (...with respect to the redistribution of wealth...)

and then everything else
(including our ecological problems) will fall into place.’ Any
form of direct
concern with the question of the relationship between humans and the
nonhuman
world is thus trumped by concerns about the resolution of specific interhuman
problems. The

nonhuman world

retains

its

traditional status as the

—human action—takes

against which the significant action

place.

background

13

Bookchin... correctly observes that

it is possible for a relatively ecologically benign
society also to be extremely oppressive internally (he offers the example
of ancient Egyptian society), and yet, on the other hand, he fails to see that the

human

reverse can also apply

human

—

that is, that it is possible for a relatively egalitarian
society to be extremely exploitative ecologically. For Bookchin, to accept

would be to argue against the basis of his own social ecology,
since in his view a nonhierarchical, decentralist, and cooperative society is ’a
society that will live in harmony with nature because its members live in harmony

this latter point

with each

other’... Bookchin... insists far too much that there is a straightforward,
necessary relationship between the internal organization of human societies and
14
their treatment of the nonhuman world.

Bookchin replies to these
Fox,' but his reply

is

criticisms in ’Recovering Evolution:

A Reply to

focused rather narrowly (though justifiably) on his

own

Eckersley and

writing.

I

would

like

to take this opportunity to offer a reply not tied to a particular version of ecosocialism. Instead,

would

like to

The
itself.

The

show

first

list

13

14

Fox, p 221
Fox, p. 220

that Fox's criticisms are in part inconsistent with the deep ecology he defends.

thing to notice

is

that ecosocialism

is

no more anthropocentric than deep ecology

of priorities which Fox attributes to ecosocialism—first, solve capitalism, then

else will follow

—

is

I

a misleading caricature of ecosocialist priorities and strategy, as

I

think

is

all

evident even in the very brief presentation
in the above section.

It is

precisely because

ecosocialism, like deep ecology, acknowledges
the entanglement of interhuman and

nonhuman

affairs that

other.

not mere sloganism on the

It is

there

and resource depletion

is

in fact no

meaningful or effective way of prioritizing one over
the

pan

of ecosocialists to claim that fighting against
pollution

entails fighting against a particular ethic
of the

conception of private property (whether one recognizes
that

Fox to
with a

reject this proposition

to (1) ask nicely

call

human-

this

is

marketplace and against a

what one

he would have to reject deep ecology point

1.5,

is

doing or not). For

replacing

it

perhaps

the owners of property and the means of production
would please

if

stop polluting and wasting resources while
(2) holding that

it is

in the

end entirely up

to

them

(morally as well as legally).
Fox's charge of

that

determinism

one may certainly speak

in

is

simply disingenuous, for he admits in the same paragraph

terms of certain forms of

human

social organization being

conducive to certain kinds of relationships with the nonhuman world
than
that he complains that Bookchin insists far too

signaling

what

capitalism

is

is

an uncharitable and

that there

is

it is

Such are two possible

is

conducive. That

is,

let

Then

deep ecology

issues of social

Ecological

and

us

this is

determinism or just 'conducivism'

the same: reject the unrestricted market.

replies to

deep ecology's

criticisms of ecosocialism.

Some
at.

of the

Put more

as a school has developed a pathological reluctance to take clear stands

political policy.

Movement and

Naess and Rothenberg's

the Big Political Issues'

those short pages they consider the

affinities of

Naess and Rothenberg, p 156

15

less

than three pages on

on

The Deep

speak volumes in virtue of their brevity. In

deep ecology with capitalism, socialism,

communism, and anarchism, and end up with no

15

let

us note the actual relationship between

content of the ecosocialist dissatisfaction with deep ecology has already been hinted
bluntly,

only then

ad hominem argument. Let us suppose that

market, and the abuse of the Earth. Whether

the prescription which follows

It is

a straightforward relationship...',

'merely' conducive to, rather than determinate of, ecological disaster.

consider the extant to which
capital, the

virtually

much

others.'

more

conclusions.

The depth of the discussion

is

124

sounded when they explain
socialist slogans.

the prognosis

is

call this ’pathological'

I

for the patient.

practical contradiction with

worst,

it is

socialism's ecologically

implicit (not

its

merely

Deep

not to

condemn with mere words

purported goals. The result
tacit)

work needs

to be

done

listing respective

but to indicate what

ecology's refusal to engage in social critique

at best,

is,

is

in direct

an incoherent program. At

approval of social injustices.

To take just one example: deep ecology
criticism to the effect that

good and bad points by

deep ecology

is

point

simplistic

II.

and

4 becomes the target of
insensitive.

to support this accusation after the

Indeed, not

much

ecosocialist

much

critical

deep ecologists have incriminated

themselves. While at least some deep ecologists seem to recognize the inverse
correlation

between

quality of

relationship

between the high quality of life/low

among

life/high birth rate

their

and population (McLaughlin,

life

p. 182),

birth rate of westerners

those people in the Third World

cheap labor and abhorrent working conditions

child workers in the Pakistani rug industry).

which seems to assume that we are

all

even they seem blind to the causal

(in

some

Sometimes

just 'doing our

who

are propping up the former with

cases slavery—e.g., the condition of

this blindness

own

and the low quality of

comes across

in

language

thing':

human numbers overlooks the importance of styles of life that
humans adopt [my emphasis], A person living in an industrial area places far
Considering only

greater stress on the biosphere than does a person living in the Third World [not
mention the stress the former person places on the latter person]. 16

to

At other times this blindness comes across in meager, vague, but dark hints at suggestions for
policy:

It is

important... that such attitudes [favouring a reduction in

should be

known by people

at large.

Otherwise there

groups with a reduction as a distant goal
taxation and other tools of influence.
Just

who

is

to

be taxed, and why?

is little

human

population]

prospect that the

will press for appropriate

changes in

17

A baby tax? The

racist

and

classist

(remember

Thatcher's poll tax) implications of such a suggestion, at the domestic as well as global level, are

such that

if

16
l7

not

it is

this,

hard to seriously believe that

what then? An

McLaughlin, p 216.
Naess and Rothenberg,

p.

alternative

142.

this is

would be

to

what Naess and Rothenberg have
change the

in

mind. And

social relations so that First

World

125

affluence

is

not riding on the Third World's back (and so that
analogous relations in the domestic

sphere are altered as well). Addressing

this last

suggestion requires (as ecosocialists recognize) a

substantive critique of international capitalism's relation to both
global poverty and global

These

pollution.

relations are concerns outside of the interest of the

deep ecology platform,

although the symptoms and the need to do something radical about them
are given lip-service to
1.3, 4,

7 and

and

11.6

limiting population,

8.

Of course, given

their

endorsement of governments’ having

policies

and their belief that economic and technological changes conducive to

population reduction cannot be effected in time, they might not,
as

in

an emergency measure. This

if

pressed, preclude sterilization

not just a nightmare found in distopian science

is

fiction.

It is

a

crime that has been practiced even in the United States with the sanction of the legislatures, the
courts,

and of course the medical establishment. 18 Will deep

ecologists take a stand against this

solution to their favorite problem?

So

how

do the deep ecologists propose getting from here to there?

One answer

follows:

A term

that is useful here is ’naturalist,' in its original, deep romantic sense
(Sessions and Devall, 1985, pp. 79ff). We engage not teachers as we know them
today but instead people who have internalised the deep ecological norms, even if

make them more central in the day-to-day dealings of
here that such naturalists, by their very example, can get

a small minority, and

communities.

It is

people aware of things that they never thought of before, and they
19
with internalising of norms in the larger populace.

Bookchin questions the
efforts for

change

viability of

will thus help

such ecological proselytizing without complementary

in social relations:

Can we blame working people for using cars when the logistics of American
society were deliberately structured by General Motors and the energy industry
around highways? Can we blame middle-class people for purchasing suburban
homes when cities were permitted to deteriorate and real-estate hucksters
merchandised an 'American Dream' of subdivisions, ranch-type dwellings, and a
we blame blacks, Hispanic peoples, and other minority
groups for reaching out to own television sets, appliances, and clothing when all
2"
the basic material means of life were denied to them for generations?
two-car garage? Can

18

'Most of the dissenters

but that

it

20

that sterilization

did not apply to their cases

unbalanced person
19

felt

'

—

Gosney and Popenoe, p

Naess and Rothenberg,

p.

would be

a

good thing

for the defective or mentally diseased,

such complaints only as one would expect from a mentally
xiv

159f.

Bookchin, Toward an Ecological Society, p 39
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Naess and Rothenberg speak the truth

and

capitalist

socialist politics things

essentially green politics will

deeply different, but

title

'In

short, there

which can be modified and used

be something deeply

different.'

21

clearly both in

sane ecopolitics, but

in

Indeed,

is

will

it

be something

will that be... nothing at all?

5.5 Vegetarian Critique of the

The

when they write,

Two

of this chapter

is

one word about animals has been

Ecologies

’Animals in Utopia,’ yet the reader will have noticed that not
said until

now. This

is

because the issues of animal welfare and

animal rights go almost untouched by either deep ecology or social ecology.

How

will the

vegetarian critique of these two systems of environmental ethics differ
from the critique of the
animal-insensitive mainstream?

The answer

is

that the failure of environmentalisms to address

the animal rights issue involves them in self-contradictions. This section

is

dedicated to picking

out of each view whatever might indicate a stance on the issues of animal rights,
animal welfare,
or vegetarianism. Each set of ’pickings’

is

then followed by a critique of that movement’s

failure to

deal adequately with those issues.

5.5.1

The Vegetarian

Critique of

Deep ecology pretends
as in 1.2,

ecology

Deep Ecology

to be sensitive to the sufferings of

an egalitarianism between the

is

as

weak on

social relationships.

principle" clause

suppression.'

22

is

species.

However, when

the issue of human-animal relationships as

nonhuman animals and
it

comes down

it is

on the

to specifics

inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates

Naess does not explain what he means by

some

'realistic praxis'

deep

issue of (interhuman)

—

So, for example, 1.2 says 'biospherical egalitarianism

to favor,

in principle.

The

"in

killing, exploitation,

and 'some

and

killing.'

Avoiding such explanations undercuts the meaningfulness of deep ecology.
For example, hunting

is

implicitly

takes exception to needless suffering.

21

22

Naess and Rothenberg,

p.

He

160.

Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep,' p 95

condoned by Naess throughout
says that

'it

is

a serious matter

his

work, although he

when

animals are
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submitted to painful experiments in order to

Human

colourings.

is

industry.'

human need

vital

chemicals used, for example, in food

beings are closer to us than animals, but there

need driving the food cosmetic
an unsatisfied

test the

an unsatisfied

Is

driving hunting at

all

no

unsatisfied vital

human

need driving the beef industry?

vital

times in

is

all

Deep

places?

ecology's

Is

answer

hard to discern as Naess and Rothenberg are loath to take a substantive stand on what
counts as

a vital need:

The term

'vital need' is vague to allow for considerable latitude in judgement.
Differences in climate and related factors, together with differences in the
structures of societies as they now exist, need to be considered. Also the
difference between a means to the satisfaction of the need and the need must be
considered. If a whaler in an industrial culture quits whaling he may risk

unemployment under the present economic

conditions. Whaling is for him an
important means. But in a rich country with a high standard of living whaling
23
not a vital need.

Presumably, in keeping with

II.

3, this last

point can be

made with

is

respect to any use of

nature, not just whaling. 'A rich country with a high standard of living' does not exist merely by

the grace of God. The people in that rich country
misanthropically put

it,

'interfere'

invoking the same duality between humans and nonhumans that their

'biocentricism' supposedly disqualifies)

a parody of the argument above:

if

no

less

than the whaler does.

conditions; farming

but in a rich country with a high standard of living farming

is

is

would be wrong

that fanning

that whaling

is

wrong

Vital need'

is

in

some

noted
It

this

contexts.

is

is

for

said,

and with

this point

may

The

original

argument seems to be vacuous.

truth, that the perilous

It

cannot be called upon

between humans and animals. Henry

when he wrote

vivisector will assert that his practice

Naess and Rothenberg,

p.

30.

risk

not a vital need. The implication in

(reading 'necessary' for

'vital'):

vagueness of the word 'necessary'

must leave a convenient loop-hole of escape to anyone who wishes to justify his
own treatment of animals, however unjustifiable that treatment may appear; the

23

with

him an important means;

too problematic a concept to lean on uncritically.

over one hundred years ago

may be

can make

in this context, just as the implication in the original case

to pinch hit for specifics regarding the proper relationship

Salt

We

a farmer in an industrial culture quits farming he

unemployment under the present economic

this case

with naturefas Naess and Sessions

is

necessary in the interests of science, the

128
flesh-eater that he cannot maintain his health without
animal food, and so on
through the whole category of systematic oppression 24
.

Other deep ecologists have followed Naess and Rothenberg

in failing to

come

to grips

with the animals issue. Devall and Sessions devote one brief
paragraph sympathizing with
callous

way technological

society treats

nonhumans

to criticizing animal liberation philosophy (with

substantive argument), charging

paragraph

criticizing

it

25
.'

Then they devote another

no references, no philosophical

with leading to

human

'the

brief paragraph

charity,

and no

chauvinism. They devote a third brief

animal liberation philosophy for not acknowledging the moral standing of

non-sentient beings. This concludes Devall and Sessions' discussion of human-animal
relationships.

of

of one page in length, at the end of which one has hardly even a vague idea

It is all

where they stand on animal

liberationists'

exploitation

itself.

One only knows

that they

issues.

McLaughlin goes through the same routine when he

liberationism for being based on an individualist ethic; no alternative

endorsement of

Callicott's distinction

distinction entails

any particular

New Age
spiritual

context.

policies

with respect to either

animal

offered except for a brief

as

though that

any noticeable stand on behalf of
rule.

Like

all

self-styled

prophets, Pulitzer Prize-winning poet and deep ecologist Gary Snyder rides on the

gravy train with an eclectic collection of non-western traditions and peddles them out of

An

excellent

example of this

is

the following

Eating the ova of large birds
the fleshy sweetness packed

around the sperm of swaying trees

The muscles

of the flanks and thighs of
soft-voiced

p 106f.
Devall and Sessions, p 54.
Salt,

26

criticizes

26

must now bring attention to the exception which proves the

Eating the living germs of grasses

25

animal

.

for failing to take

SONG OF THE TASTE

24

is

between domestic and wild animals,

Having lambasted the deep ecologists
I

like the

approach; Devall and Sessions follow their mentor in offering no alternative

approach to the same

animals,

do not

McLaughlin, p 160.

cows

poem and

its

companion

essay:
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the bounce in the lamb's leap
the swish in the ox's tail
Eating roots grown swoll
inside the soil

Drawing on

life

of living

clustered points of light spun

out of space

hidden

in the grape.

Eating each other's seed
eating
ah, each other.

Kissing the lover in the
lip

This

homage

from 'people who

to

mouth

Up

of bread:

27
.

to burgers, lambchops,

live entirely

and ox

by hunting, such

act requiring a spirit of gratitude

and

celebration of flesh-eating that

Snyder's

is

of context or differences in needs

care,

tail

as the

soup apparently derives

Eskimo, [who]

and rigorous mindfulness

poem and

between Eskimos

essay divorces

in Alaska

.'

know
28

its

inspiration

that taking

life is

an

But the orgiastic

itself

and Iowans

from any considerations
in the grain belt.

On

the

contrary, Snyder seems to think that merely borrowing certain attitudes and rituals from Naive

Americans

will suffice to

excuse our (speaking as a non-Indian)

own consumption

of meat:

How to

accomplish [an understanding of non-harming as an approach to all of
and being]? We can start by saying Grace. ..To say a good grace you must
be conscious of what you're doing, not guilt-ridden and evasive. So we look at the
nature of eggs, apples, and oxtail ragout. What we see is plenitude, even excess,
living

a great sexual exuberance...
Snyder's uninhibited disclosure of his feelings for the meat on his table

fail

how

to see

general view seems to be that
will suffice to give a

27
28

Snyder,
Snyder,

some

culture sounds like thunder in writings like Snyder's.

crystals, poetry,

and nods to

women

I

much more

expensive, as anyone

agree with Dolores LaChapelle that

in

Devall and Sessions, p

12

in

Devall and Sessions, p

12f.

ritual

is

who

The

and indigenous peoples

ceremonial stamp of approval to the exploitation of animals (sort of

to a notary public, only

I

admirable, but

saying grace turns meat-eating into a harmless activity.

The shallowness of New Age

knows).

is

has been in a

New Age

like

going

store

or should be an important part of our

fives.
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However,

I

am

disturbed by the uncritical and naive

connection with animal consumption

29
.

way in which

this

is

usually discussed in

The mere presence of ceremony does not

legitimate

indigenous peoples’ consumption of animals anymore than going through a funeral
legitimate burying

action

appropriate.

is

in order to

of

someone

somehow

I

am

A

alive.

ritual

just

along these lines was urged by

Salt:

London or

New York; on the

is

poet; but

what

manufacturer ?

I

have shown

of animal liberation.

if

contrary, an act

which

is

perfectly

Nemean

he had purchased the

skin,

lion, is a subject for painter and
ready dressed, from a contemporary

311

why

I

think that deep ecology has been lax in

The problem, though, runs deeper than a mere

interest in meat-eating notwithstanding).

The absence

ecology the otherwise unspoken means to the

have no stand on land use,

human- nonhuman

latter's

ends.

availability of food, quality of

its

responses to the concerns

lack of interest (Snyder's

of a clear stand

question entails the absence of a clear stand on deep ecology

itself, for

on the vegetarian

vegetarianism offers deep

To have no stand on vegetarianism
life,

growing food (grains need not be

the population question, and the

less

land for grazing and

inefficiently converted into

cow

more

efficient

use of land in

flesh). This in turn allows for

decrease in land set aside for large fields and other necessities of the meat industry

and slaughterhouses) and an increase
of land makes

it

possible to feed

accessibility of nature

and the

in wildlife populations

more people using fewer

availability of food are

and

Including LaChapelle's example of ceremony

p 83.

in

diversity.

(e.g.,

The more

a

feed lots

efficient use

resources. Both the increase in

conducive (together with changes in

relations of distribution) to the goal of improving the quality of

article 'Ritual is Essential,' in
30

is

interaction at the level of individuals.

Vegetarianism in practice means

Salt,

or

often a sign of crass vulgarity in the other. Hercules,

clothed triumphant in the spoils of the

29

fur,

Red Indian

natural in the one case,

ethics of

which some

associate myself with their culture will not suffice to establish the propriety

inhabitants of

to

in

does not follow because an Eskimo, for example, may appropriately wear
feathers, that this apparel will be equally becoming to the

It

deep

one part of an entire context

would

not living in an Eskimo-like context, and the borrowing of their rituals

my borrowing their diet. An objection

a

is

ritual

life,

which

in turn

is

conducive to

connection with the consumption of salmon

Devall and Sessions, pp 247-250.

See her
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a (non-oppressive) decrease in birth rates. The stand against cruelty

is

also a stand for better use

of other resources such as those science and education resources
(including the scientists

themselves) which are devoted to the use of animals as laboratory equipment. As
Marjorie Spiegel
notes, 'Billions of tax-dollars are spent each year to literally torture animals

benefit

—while many humans

in this country lack access to

—supposedly

even basic health

for our

31

care.'

Finally,

vegetarianism offers concrete suggestions for an ethical practice that expresses and develops the

nonhuman

kind of sensitivity to

values and suffering to which deep ecology only pays

New Age

lip

service.

5.5.2

The Vegetarian

Critique of Social Ecology

Social ecology

deep

is

even more disappointing than deep ecology on the animals

human-animal

ecologists, ecosocialists take little interest in

disappointing

because social ecology in so

is

The

ecology's theory.

situation

ecosocialist writings (in

suffering; there

is

which contains
animals issue,

Consider

is

relations; the reason this

is

do not even

offer

up deep ecology’s

Ted Benton,
lip

service to animal

cite.

the exception, but his otherwise sophisticated analysis of animal oppression,

also a thoughtful critical analysis of socialism's inadequacies with respect to the

is

marred by the surprising appearance of two arguments against vegetarianism.

how remarkably contradictory these two arguments

are with respect to socialism in

general and ecosocialism in particular:

The

rights

argument

[e.g.,

of Regan]

is

very

—

difficult to

square with the practice of

most advocates of animal

animals for food at all
implies an obligation to vegetarianism
killing

—

(I

rights think that

it

think they are wrong about

growing vegetable crops involves habitat changes which cause the deaths of
animals which would otherwise live where crops are grown, so that the rights of
these animals have to be put into the balance, too: it is a fact about the human
predicament that we cannot live without causing the deaths of other animals).
this

This passage

11

12

is

footnoted thus:

Spiegel, p 62.

Benton, p

more

respects represents the practice to deep

so bad that, with the notable exception of

my experience)

nothing to

Ted Benton

is

many

Like

issue.

159f.
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Quite independently of this general argument,
it is also clear that the modem
agn-food' system implicates virtually all food
production in animal abuse, in ways
which make the option of vegetarianism increasingly
difficult to sustain. See, for
p e, J Erlichman Vegetarians Face Dairy Dilemma,' Guardian, 18 October

^^ ^

I

’

33

5

with the footnote's argument

will deal

the present author;

it is

first.

The

article

by Erlichman

unfortunate that Benton did not summarize

argument, however, seems to go

main

unavailable to

own

points. Benton's

like this:

(1)

Modem methods

(2)

If (1),

(3)

If

(4)

.'.

then (2b)

its

is

of food production are animal abusive.

we

cannot be vegetarians.

(1)
(2b), then

It is

it is

OK for us

OK

for us not to

not to be vegetarians.

There are two problems with
is

be vegetarians.

this

argument, both arising from ambiguity.

actually too vague to count as meaningfully true or false.

Company might be

abusing animals in

its

First of all, line

The Archer Daniel Midlands

production, but the organic farmers over in the next

county are not.
Secondly, time

is

brought in as a factor in

line (1)

and then dropped. But the

(hypothetical) truth of (1) has no straightforward bearing on the moral obligation of

vegetarianism in either the past or the future. Either the time factor must be dropped from
it

must be introduced

past food production

in the other premises.

was animal abusive. So

change the word 'modem' to

it

cannot be dropped, because

must be introduced

'current' for reasons of

grammar)

(2)

If (1),

(3)

If

(2b), then

It is

OK

it is

we

OK

if

for us currently not to

p.

237, n.24.

(I

be vegetarians.

be vegetarians.

sound, only addresses vegetarian practice and does no damage to

ethical vegetarianism as a moral doctrine.

Benton,

all

cannot currently be vegetarians.

for us currently not to

This argument, even

not true that

thus:

Current methods of food production are animal abusive.

then (2b)

it is

in the other premises

(1)

(4)

33

It

(1), or

There

is

nothing odd (indeed, everything reasonable)

133

about saying to oneself,
to avoid

it,

The owners

the satisfaction of

practicing vegetarian in the

of production have fixed things so that, no matter

my needs

implicates

me

sense right now, but

full

in

animal abuse. Well, maybe

can join with others to alter

1

I

try

cannot be a

I

this situation so

that the animals can be free of their oppressors (including this reluctant one!),
and

who

how

I

and those

are like-minded can be free to be neither oppressor nor oppressed (forced to support
the

system of abuse).' That Benton, a radical philosopher,

fails

to see this

most

is

surprising.

Would

he have a poor but well-informed American renounce the cause of Third World labour just because
she herself might be able to afford no better than clothes from K Mart, which stocks almost
nothing but imported items produced in singularly exploitative conditions? Of course not. This

comparison brings out a problem with

and one which excuses the
of a person to control

all

killing

(2).

vegetarianism

If

taken to be a progressive ideology,

is

and even eating of animals where

it is

unavoidable, the inability

the political, geographical, and economic factors in her

as to avoid these activities does not preclude her

life

in

such a

way

from being an ethical vegetarian any more than

the analogous situation precludes the K Mart shopper from being a Marxist. So

much

for that

argument.

The other argument

slippery.

is

(1)

Humans cannot

(2)

If (1),

then

Line (1)

is

is

is

doubtlessly true (except in very science-fictiony

causing the deaths of other animals.' But this

consider vegetarianism as the doctrine that

There

is

it is

Then

OK

line (2) says

for

humans

no comparison between the

and reaping

fields of

like this:

not obligatory.

scenarios!). For line (2) to be true, vegetarianism

other animals, then

it is

(3).

an empirical claim, and

eating of other animals.

formalize

without causing the deaths of other animals.

live

Vegetarianism

(3)

One way to

is

would have

not what

it is.

to just be 'the practice of not

For argument's sake,

humans should not engage
'if

humans cannot

live

us

in the needless killing or

without causing the deaths of

to engage in needless killing

killing of

let

and eating of other

animals.'

indigenous animals involved in ploughing, sowing,

human-destined grain and the

killing of

indigenous animals involved in
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ploughing, sowing, and reaping the

and pig-destined grain
second

toll

many more fields

involved in the production of enough cow-

same number of people

to feed the

as that first field

the millions and millions of cows and pigs and chickens that are killed—that indeed
are

deliberately bred in massive numbers year after year for this specific fate.

compare the
intentional

would. Then add to the

I

conclude that to

incidental animal deaths involved in the production of several tons of tofu with the

and massive slaughter involved

be laughable were

it

in the production of several tons of

not so tragic.

These considerations suggest another

criticism,

anti-vegetarianism and to other ecosocialists’ lack of

be concerned with

hamburger would

social justice

and not critique

one that applies to both Benton's

commitment

either way.

explicit

inconsistent to

It is

at least the inefficiency entailed in feed-grain

production (one might also add a critique of the conditions, physical and psychological, of
slaughterhouse workers

We

44

Make no

).

mistake: the very expression 'feed-grain'

is self- accusatory.

are not using cows to convert human-inedible grasses into cow-flesh, rather

to convert

huge amounts of perfectly edible grain into

Benton's program

is

largely negative,

historical starting point

much he may

and

still

are using

them

fewer amounts of meat.

showing up the inadequacies of both liberalism and

socialism with respect to the animals issue. While he

Relations to ecosocialism, his critique of

far

we

makes almost no references

Marx from the animals

issue standpoint

in

is

Natural

a good

applies to contemporary eco-socialists like Bookchin (however

distance himself from Marxists) and David Pepper.

that critique in dealing with the next question:

why

Some

reference will be

made

to

has socialism in general and ecosocialism in

particular ignored the animals issue?

5.5.3 Past Connections

Socialism has anthropocentric, even
Engels. Their environmentalism

toward nature which

14

Adams and

rides

on

is

if

environmentally conscious, roots in Marx and

predicated on an indirect concern with appropriate behavior

their direct concern with appropriate behavior

Proctor-Smith, p 300f

between humans.
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This attitude toward the environment

is still

among

manifest

shamelessly than in the works of David Pepper,

who

ecosocialists,

asserts a 'Marxist socialist, monist,

anthropocentric position of egalitarian development and growth through
scientific ingenuity, to satisfy materially limited

collective,

and no where more

but ever richer

human

human needs through

35

He

proclaims proudly (on behalf of

whom?)

that 'eco-socialism

anthropocentric (though not in the capitalist-technocratic sense) and humanist.
bioethic and nature mystification.’

animals. Benton notes the following

Manuscripts:

first, 'the

to

view humans

as different in kind

from other
in the

1844

use of the human/animal contrast as Marx's central device in the ethical

content Marx gives to his vision of

Benton has

rejects the

two elements supporting human/nature dualisms

critique of the estrangement of labour

'

It

is

36

The problems begin with Marx's tendency

3

democratic,

planned production that emphasizes resource conservation, non-pollution, recycling and

quality landscapes.'

nature".’

labour and

in

under regimes of private property second,
1

;

human emancipation

mind passages such

'the specific

as involving the "humanization of

as the following:

The animal

is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not distinguish
from
itself
it.
It is its life- activity. Man makes his life-activity itself the object of
his will and of his consciousness... Estranged labour reverses this relationship, so
that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life-activity, his

essential being, a

mere means

38

to his existence

.

On the one

hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes
everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers human
that all objects
reality and for that reason the reality of his own essential powers
become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and

—
—

realize his individuality,

So, animality

is

become

his objects.

39

a state to be avoided, and nature

is

a thing to be appropriated.

What

could be more anthropocentric than to devalue animals and regard the value of nature as merely
the value of

utility (including

because there

35

36
37

3x
39

is

no denying (indeed, much affirmation

Pepper, p 224
Pepper, p. 232.

Benton, p 24.
Marx, in Tucker, ed

Marx,

in

here the value of study and aesthetic appreciation)? Furthermore,

p 76
Benton, p 30.
,

in the Manuscripts') the

many
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commonalities between humans and nonhumans, especially
nonhuman animals,

must be not only
existence

different

would be merely

human

essence

from but above the animal part of the human (otherwise an
animal-like
different, not necessarily of less value).

Man

(the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely active
in any but his animal
functions—eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling
and in
dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer
feels himself to be
anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and
what is human

becomes animal.
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating,

etc.,

are also genuinely

human

functions. But in the abstraction

other

human

animal

activity

40

which separates them from the sphere of
and turns them into sole and ultimate ends thev are

all

’

.

Benton brings to our attention

at least three unfortunate

consequences of Marx’s

conceptions and relative evaluations of animals, particularly where there
physical need with animal need. First, there are

is

an identification of

two problems centered on humans themselves:

This suggests a denial of the complexity and diversity of the emotional,
psychological and social lives of other animals. Such a denial renders merely
rhetorical Marx's characterization of history as ’nature developing into man,’ and
cuts off two significant sources of insight into human nature and history. The

which would require giving serious theoretical content to the idea of 'nature
developing into man,' would be an inquiry into the prehistorical origins of the
human species, and the processes of our differentiation from other primate
lineages [such a project cannot be enlightening, says the dualistic Marxist view,
because there is no shared essence between modem humans and our ancestors]
first,

The second,
(that

is,

in part

dependent

a recognition of the kinship of

for

its

rational justification

humans and other

on the

first

animals), would be a

comparative psychology and ethology [rather than just comparative physiology]
which what is genuinely distinctive about human beings could be viewed in the
41
fight of what is shared between human and non-human animals
in

.

The

third

problem

is

intertwined with the

first

two but more

directly relevant to the issue

of our moral obligations to other animals:

under regimes of private property, humans five a merely animal existence [and
is considered bad, and is one of the motivators of the critique of capitalism]
what space is left for a critique of the condition of animals themselves under
If,

this

regimes of private property ?

42

As the writings of Pepper indicate, these

difficulties

Even Murray Bookchin, who seems (unlike Pepper)

40
41

42

Marx,

in

Tucker, ed

Benton, p 42f.
Benton, p. 58

,

p 74

do not begin and end with Marx.

to recognize a

broad range of moral
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avoids any direct treatment of animal rights. Although he

patients,

himself from Marx, this unfortunate omission

human and nonhuman,

of the

First

is

nature

that

which
It is

It is

is

is

due

to the fact that

two realms

distinctively

as 'second'

when we

'first'

same

duality

nature, respectively.

consider those occasional exceptions in the nineteenth century

off to

have influence over progressive movements in our

who

utopian communitarian movements,

like

own

time.

I

believed that there was an intimate

connection between justice for humans and justice for animals.

It is

and

this

human.

thinking particularly of socialist Henry Salt,

44

he buys into

a disappointing fact that social progressives have for the most part ignored animals.

particularly sad

ideal.

often at pains to distance

the (we could say 'mere') physical or animal aspect of our existence; 'second' nature

which somehow never took

am

referring to the

is

is

the Shakers,

who

I

am

thinking also of the various

included vegetarianism in their social

not clear that the Shakers' diet was predicated on a concern for the welfare of the

animals themselves, and Salt never pursued the justice for animals-justice for humans connection
to

any great depth except

cruelty to

have

humans

rights).

(it is

to point out the Kantian line about cruelty to animals translating into

clear,

though, that Salt did not deny, as Kant did, that animals actually

Nevertheless, vegetarianism could have played a significant role as part of a general

culture of resistance to domination, urbanization, mechanization, etc. Vegetarian socialists could
also have appealed to anarchist Peter Kropotkin's ethological studies of animals not only to fight

against the competitive norm, for which his

book Mutual

Aid:

A

Factor of Evolution (Montreal:

Black Rose Books, 1989) was much-needed ammunition against Spencerian social darwinists, but

43

writes approvingly of nonWestem attitudes toward nonsentient objects of nature, noting that in 'this
early technical imagination, work was distinguished by its capacity to discover the "voice" of substance, not
simply to fashion an inert "natural resource" into desired objects Even when claiming that 'we are at a

He

.

.

.

'

hopeless epistemic distance from such attitudes, Bookchin betrays his belief in the intrinsic value of all
mines, that ivory
aspects of nature: 'We know quite well that ores do not reproduce themselves in exhausted
But
ceremonies
hunting
does not conceal an animate being, and that animals do not obligingly respond to
as
bounty
its
cherish
these fancies may serve to inculcate a human respect for nature and cause people to

more than exploitable "natural resources'" (Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom p
Then there is Edward Carpenter, a friend of Salt's. Carpenter was an active
,

44

233f. ).
in

'vegetarianism, feminism,

nudism, and sexual freedom

Fabian Socialism, prison reform, anti-pollution legislation,
of homosexuality as a legitimate natural preference' Gregerson, p 79

—

[including] defences

138
also as

an opening salvo

of animals, as the

I

in a fight against the artificial separation of the lot of people

book addresses interspedes cooperation

from the

lot

as well as intraspecies cooperation.

present here a section of a remarkable speech which was given at a meeting
of the

Massachusetts Soriety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals on March
30, 1869. The speech

was given by

New

England Transcendentalist James Freeman Clarke. To me,

represents a lost opportunity; with almost no alterations (there
'animal') Clarke could

have been speaking of the relation of

What

is

is

just

this

speech

one occurrence of the word

capital to labour:

Cruelty?

—that

Brother Kirk has told us about cruelty

it is

the love of inflicting

me

add that it is bom from the sense of power. It is the diabolical
feeling which grows up in the human heart out of the love of power and its
possession. If you give men power, they love to see it exercised, and then
sometimes comes this corrupt love of inflicting pain. But I do not think that most
of the cruelty inflicted in our community arises from that source. I do not think it
is so devilish as that. I believe it oftener comes from the other motives that have
been spoken of again and again to-night. If there is anything infernal about it, it
is the infernal love of money; it is because men are in such a hurry to get rich that
they sacrifice everything else to that. If they can get a little more pay by letting a
poor animal suffer, they will do it. They do not want to hurt him; they do not
care anything about it, one way or the other. They had just as lief he would not
suffer. It is a matter of pure indifference. All they want is to get their heavy load
carried, and be paid for it. All they want is to get their money for the white flesh
45
of calves. It is the love of money.
pain. Let

5.5.4

The Present Obstacles between Vegetarianism and the Two Ecologies
It is

one thing

to trace the history (or lack of

it)

of animal concerns in socialism and other

progressive and communitarian movements. Another question
Prioritization

is

attention that, as things

is,

why

the lack of concern now?

the problem. People do not see the animals as deserving of the kind of

now

stand,

we have

not adequately granted to our fellow humans.

Nero fiddled while Rome burned, many in the West agonise over the fate
of seal pups and cormorants while human beings elsewhere starve or are

Just as

enslaved.

45

46

Clarke, p 2.
Carruthers, p.

xi

46
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However,

in The

Dreaded Comparison:

Human and Animal

Slavery

(New

York: Mirror,

1989) Marjorie Spiegel argues against the practicality of separating animal liberation from human
liberation:

Any oppression

helps to prop

up other forms of oppression. This
common, shared

to link oppressions in our minds, to look for the
fight against

Spiegel's

book contains numerous photographs and sketches

between the treatment of blacks

today. She

knows

case

in antebellum

that people will be taken aback

suffering precisely because

first

many believe

that the greater worth

hand, this

is

starkly illustrating the

it

and obvious

injustice involved in

for example, find

even the

represents an attempt to put the cause

on a par with the causes of oppressed human groups

for the alleviation of the animals' condition

liberation)

vital

and

America and the treatment of animals

makes such a comparison odious. Some people,

women’s

it is

by comparisons between human and animal

expression 'animal liberation' offensive precisely because

(e.g.,

why

as one, rather than prioritizing victims' suffering. 4,

them

similarities

the

is

aspects,

by using language that draws attention

to the similarities.

On

the other

not always the reaction of opponents; at least one philosopher finds the concept of

'animal liberation' appalling precisely because he finds the concepts of ’women’s liberation' and

’black liberation’ appalling.

48

Spiegel argues that prioritization

is

a mistake. She notes that

and traps us

into 'actively struggling to prove to our oppressors... that

oppressors.'

The

first

propagandize and

most of our

factor lets the oppressors divide

recruit. This

efforts to

is

might sometimes be a prerequisite
prioritizing that attaches to false

for success

dilemmas

it is

we

'it’s

are similar to our

lets

them

should not choose to devote

not to deny that success on one front

on another. Rather,

—

we

and conquer, the second

not to say that, as individuals

one particular movement. And

'often leads to infighting'

it

it is

to criticize the kind of

either us or the animals!' This kind of prioritizing

erroneously characterizes liberation as a zero-sum game.

47
48

Spiegel,

p.

26.

Levine, ’Philosophical Vegetarianism.'

as the boundless self-assertion of its

E

g.,

Levine writes that 'anyone

who

perceives women's liberation

female protagonists and the grotesque self-abasement of its male

protagonists will appreciate Singer's analogy,' p 15.
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Why do

people prioritize in

this

way?

I

think one answer might be a lack of imagination

and information. The information readily available

to

most persons about meat

is

confined to

information about meat as a potential purchase; the facts surrounding the
waste of grain and the
conditions of slaughterhouse workers (to
in the advertising of billion- dollar

imagination

I

mean

name just two

direct

human

hamburger chains and poultry

neglecting the fact that, even

if

there

is

concerns) are not included

distributors.

By

'lack of

no causal connection between the two

forms of oppression, every liberating movement can learn from the others about the many guises
of oppressive practice and

Another reason

all

to resist them.

for the neglect of animals

speech nor the means of
children

how

is

the simple fact they do not have the power of

(politically recognizable) protest.

Hence,

like

working and exploited

over the world, their issues are easy to ignore.

5.6 Ecofeminism:

A

Radical Response to the Critique

Ecofeminists as a group have
relationships

between the many

made one

sites of

of their central concerns the examination of the

oppression. Ecofeminists have different approaches to

studying the problem of human/nature relations and vary with respect to what they believe are
the most fundamental causes of the abuse directed toward

women and

ecofeminists share a basic insight. As spelled out below in Karen

J.

account,' that insight has exhibited a theoretical potential that goes

of patriarchy vs.

woman and

nature.

However,

Warren's 'minimal condition

beyond a narrow examination

patriarchy vs. nature:

I use the term, eco-feminism is a position based on the following claims: (i)
there are important connections between the oppression of women and the
oppression of nature; (ii) understanding the nature of these connections is

As

necessary to any adequate understanding of the oppression of women and the
oppression of nature; (iii) feminist theory and practice must include an ecological
perspective; and (iv) solutions to ecological problems must include a feminist
•

perspective.

There are
to joint

4<)

49

at least

two

different

methods of categorizing philosophers' various approaches

woman/nature oppression, but any attempt

Warren, 'Feminism and Ecology,'

p.

4

will necessarily simplify

what people are
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actually doing in the field. For example,

Plumwood

divides ecofeminist theorists into three

groups:

Those who locate the problem for both women and nature in their place
which have their origin in classical philosophy and
which can be traced through a complex history to the present.
1

.

as part of a set of dualisms

2.

rise of

Those who would locate the problem for both women and nature in the
mechanistic science during the Enlightenment and pre-enlightenment

period.

Those who would

3.

on

offer

an explanation of the

link

based on

difference, e.g.

sexually-differentiated personality formation or consciousness. 50

However, on

this

category. For example,

grouping,

we

Plumwood

find Ariel

finds

some ecofeminists

fall

into

Kay Salleh and Elizabeth Dodson Gray

more than one

in both (1)

believe Susan Griffin could likewise be associated with both groups. Another

method

is

and

(3).

I

to

categorize ecofeminists along the lines of the nearest view in feminist ethics generally. Thus,

following Merchant

51

we

can identify the most prominent schools as

ecofeminism, social ecofeminism (after Bookchin),

ecofeminism (Plum wood's third group). These

socialist

liberal

ecofeminism, Marxist

ecofeminism, and cultural

labels are limited in their usefulness.

The

positions

overlap and ecofeminist philosophers rarely proclaim their allegiances by referring to themselves

with these

labels.

While Marti Kheel might be overstating the case when she says

ecofeminists, 'no single ethical theory

is

sought

52

at

all,'

it

nevertheless

is

that,

among

apparent that

ecofeminist philosophers tend to bring to bear on their analyses of human/nature relations eclectic

assemblages of

'the insights of ecology,

feminism, and socialism.’

53

Greta Gaard identifies as the

singular vision that unites ecofeminists the acknowledgment of 'the framework that authorizes

these forms of oppression
ecologists,

and feminists]

[i.e.

the forms that are the concern of socialists, animal liberationists,

as patriarchy,

an ideology whose fundamental self/other distinction
54

based on a sense of

self that

is

separate, atomistic.'

These three

form a natural alliance by virtue of their shared opposition

—ecology/feminism/socialism

to that disconnected sense of self (here,

50

Plumwood, ’Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments,' p

51

Merchant, Radical Ecology pp 183-210
,

52

53
54

Kheel,

p.

Gaard, p
Gaard, p

243.
1

2.

is

121

142

inconveniently,
issues of racial

way

we must

exclude liberal feminism). Ecofeminists have also
been attentive to the

and cultural domination.

I

will try to illustrate these aspects of

of a brief presentation of the ecofeminist critique
of deep ecology.

to point out

somewhat

5.6.1

one area of

social criticism in

particularly in

though,

I

would

its 'cultural'

like

aspect,

is

lacking.

The Margins around Ecofeminism
Prominent philosophers

camp

which ecofeminism,

First,

ecofeminism by

who

are at least partially affiliated with the cultural ecofeminist

include Susan Griffin, Elizabeth Dodson Gray, and Ariel Kay Salleh (Merchant
identifies

Salleh with social ecology, but Salleh’s critique of deep ecology depends on

some of the

assumptions usually associated with cultural ecofeminism). Cultural ecofeminism
difference theory (see

of the views of

Plumwood's

Dodson Gray,

although not in a

way that

third grouping, above). As explained in

difference theorists emphasize the

rests

on

Plumwood's discussion

embodiment of human

beings,

reduces psychology to biology:

The need of the male child to disown the primary sexual identification with the
female parent and to differentiate himself from the female results in the
formation of masculinity in negative terms, by exclusion, and especially by
exclusion of nurturance. The resulting personality must kill what is tender,

emotional and dependent, and has a need for mastery and control, to be active
and transforming with respect to nature...
Different bodily and reproductive experiences of

—

of orientation to others, and of nurturance
attitudes to nature

and a

The problems with

this

different psychology

view

women—of limitation,

result in different, less

and personality.

as a foundation for

damaging

55

ecofeminism are rehearsed regularly

in

the literature. Plum wood urges two objections: the difficulty of using this view to 'explain the

higher cultural value attached to the masculine side of the various dualisms, since difference
automatically inferiority

1

;

and the

fact that the

view

since the differentiating reproductive experiences

but the feature of hostility to nature

56
is

not.'

it

'suffers

v,

Plumwood, 'Ecofeminism,' p 129
Plumwood, 'Ecofeminism,' p 130f

not

from excessive scope of explanation,

appeals to are apparently culturally universal,

There

is

also the danger, noted

women's own perpetuating of the woman-nature connection

55

is

by Merchant, that

will only bolster the assumptions of
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an ideology that devalues nature and, through
identifying
likewise devalues

it

makes
just a

it

difficult to

is

nature, keeps

them

in roles

57

Furthermore,

.

admit that

few of the objections
There

women with

men

'this

special relationship of

women to

nature and politics

can also develop an ethic of caring for nature

.’

58

These are

in the literature.

another problem with

this view,

and

it is

unintentionally brought to light by

something Seager says just before she defends difference theory.
Given the obvious

fact that there are class, race, income, and status
differences
within and between countries, it is at first glance difficult to
imagine how we can talk about a distinctive 'women’s' contribution
to
environmentalism without falling into the simplistic essentializing and

among women

universalizing that the notion of a 'women’s perspective' often engenders

While Seager

is

59
.

ready to recognize the reality of these differences as a challenge to

difference theory, the very formulation of the problem seems to assume a bipolar
gender ontology

which marginalizes those who
gender
so

identification,

much by

and/ or

fall

outside of traditional categories of sexual orientation, and/or

social role identification.

The margin

is

unintentionally fortified not

the mere inclusion of the following remarks but by their inclusion without any

discussion of the point

I

am

Male-assimilated

raising:

women

are

still

the most successful corporate

—otolaryngologists even report

that women coming up through the ranks
of male-dominated organizations tend to force their voices into lower octaves as

leaders

their status rises

Janis Birkeland

Some

60
.

makes almost the exact

pair of claims:

mistakenly construe ecofeminism as conceiving of

women

as a

'homogenous

whole' (in opposition to men) without making adequate distinctions between
different races, nationalities, classes,

have some

similarities in experience

and so on.. .The notion that women could
and consciousness across national and class

boundaries, due to certain shared conditions,

who

is

especially troublesome to those

reduce social problems to the existence of classes

61
.

We have seen women adopt
when

'masculine' personal processes to varying extents
they wish to be part of a power structure, and, more optimistically, we have

seen some

57

58
59

60
61

62

men become

caring, gentle,

and nondominating

Merchant, 'Ecofeminism and Feminist Theory,' p 102.
Merchant, Radical Ecology’, p 193f
Seager, p 269.
Seager, p 103.
Birkeland, p 21

Birkeland,

p.

23

62
.
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Ariel Salleh says

something that has similarly marginalizing
implications:

The

suppression of the feminine is truly an all
pervasive human universal.
just a suppression of real, live,
empirical women, but equally the
the lemirune aspects of men's
It

seems

woman who

me

to

does not

way

that the

feel that

own

constitution

the problem

is

which

is

It is not
suppression of
the issue here 63
.

phrased would be veiy discouraging to a

she identifies with the 'essential woman'
theorized by these

ecofeminists. For not only does the mainstream
patriarchy challenge her sense of self-worth by

(whether overbearingly or subtly) making her
of

what a woman

feel

this

is

its

conception

but the cultural ecofeminist critique likewise
unfairly challenges her

is,

worth by not acknowledging her position and thus

Of course,

at ease for not fitting in with

ill

self-

implicitly associating her with the opposition.

only in the absence of a more sophisticated presentation
of the issue of social

construction of gender, and given their reluctance to embrace
biological reductionism the

way

might be open for philosophers of the cultural ecofeminist school to
somehow reformulate

their

hypothesis accordingly. However, this task must not be taken on as
a slight adjustment to bring in

those

who

are in the margins, for that approach

would

itself, it

seems to me, assume either the

kind of double-gendered conception of persons implied in Salleh’s remarks or a
kind of gender

continuum, with pure masculinity one

tempting way of bringing

no one
for

I

is

at either

men who

realized that both

it

and pure femininity the

falls

somewhere

vested in patriarchy.

I

in

—a

between

Salleh, p.

to

This

By

344

make more
is

used to embrace

this

Although

I

turn a critical eye to Salleh's claims,

explicit the fact that liberation

more

attention to

it

will

the oppressed can be analyzed

in

agents against the other).
in

more

do

a

I

is

a set of purely

we can 'rank'

a person.

It

also support her recognition of the need

always liberation of the oppressor as well as the oppressed

progressive critiques (see for example Plant, pp. 158-159).

how

a better job

systems of oppression contribute as well to the alienation

of avoiding the implication

that

movements on behalf of

a standard game-theoretical model (one group of self-interested rational

One way

to approach this

is

to encourage allies themselves (e

g.,

feminist

men)

to

subjective discussions about their motivations for (and rewards of) putting their positions of

privilege at the disposal of oppressed groups.

activism

is

in

and showing

of the oppressor, progressives

bring

is

continuum view myself until

and the double-gendered conception assume that there

too often a merely parenthetic point

bringing

The second

potentially liberating conception

masculine and a set of purely feminine characteristics against which

63

other.

everybody, since the operating assumption would presumably be that

in

end but rather

feel totally

limit

The primary

This

is

particularly relevant to animal rights theory and

beneficiaries of the animal liberation

movement

are not the activists themselves.
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seems doubtful that gender-identification,
sexual-orientation, and

social role identification are

going to allow for that kind of
uni-dimensional quantification. 64

Whatever problems the difference-theoretical
trend

in

ecofeminism has

it is

only one

source that ecofeminists have mined not
only for their critique of existing
systems of domination
but also for their critique of their
environmentally progressive ideological
neighbors, the deep
ecologists.

5.6.2

The Ecofeminist Critique

of

Deep Ecology

Ecofeminists have praised with qualification the groping
intuitions and aspirations that

seem

to motivate

deep ecology, inasmuch

hints of a substantive critique of

found much that

Plumwood,

main

Kay

Ariel

human/nature

criticisms

and there of

social concerns,

However, ecofeminists have

duality, etc.

unsatisfactory, even offensive, in

is

believe that three

as there are hints here

deep ecology philosophy and

also

practice.

I

can be pulled out of the writings of such ecofeminists as Val

Salleh, Marti Kheel,

and Joni Seager.

I

rely here primarily

on the

last

of

these, but the gist of these criticisms can be found in the writings
of the other three and of other

ecofeminists.

5.6.2. 1 Critique of the totalizing 'Self

The

identification of oneself with

Andrew McLaughlin and Ame Naess
More

all

(below),

precisely stated, the ultimate

ecology]

Self-realization.

is

of nature, as spoken of by John Seed (above) and
is

problematical.

norm

of Ecosophy

T

[Naess' term for deep

In Naess' system, Self is not understood as being the

same as self, but rather includes everything. To expand one's identification
outward from one's self to other humans is to move toward Self. To go further
toward an identification with all of nature is to identify with Self. This norm of
Self-realization 'thus includes personal and community self-realization, but is
conceived also to refer to an unfolding of reality as a totality.' [Naess, p. 84] This
all inclusive sense of realization is an endorsement of the self-realization of

—people and the

all

64

To

see

why

one end and the words 'pure

to write at the 6-inch

answer

that

is

Given a sense of the interconnectedness of

fundamental problem, try the following experiment: Pick up a

this is a

'pure masculinity' at

rest of nature.

mark?

not ridiculous.

femininity' at the other.

ruler.

Now, what on

'Perfect 50/50 transgendered' 9 'Hermaphroditism'?

I

all

Write the words

earth are

you going

suspect that there

is

no
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existence, the realization of each
others.

is

65

connected to the self-realization of

Ecofeminists have identified at least two problems with this view.
the difference between the dominating role of
nature,

of self

it

calls

women

on

against developing in the

not women.'

first

history and

down

First, in

with respect to both

'if

women

and

and to give up a sense

's')

to the present time have

place. As Seager notes,

ignorance of

been propagandized

anyone needs practice

at selflessness,

it is

66

The second problem
chapter.

in history

to continue to forget themselves (Naess small

women throughout

which

men

all

It is

deep ecology,

The

difficult to

as

one of

self-defeat,

and has been remarked on

in the previous

square the total identification with the universe with the concrete aims of

Plumwood

analysis of

is

notes.

humans

as metaphysically unified

equally true whatever relation

humans stand

with the cosmic whole will be

in with nature

—the

situation of

exploitation of nature exemplifies such metaphysical unity equally as well as a

conserver situation, and the

human

self

is

just as indistinguishable

bulldozer and Coca Cola bottle as the rocks or the rainforest.

Plumwood admits
in particular

—do not mean

that there does

to

subsume

seem

some

to be

from the

67

indication that deep ecologists

individuality entirely, but

—Naess

on the whole deep ecology

'seems to reflect a desire to retain the mystical appeal of indistinguishability while avoiding

many

68

difficulties.’

5. 6. 2. 2

Critique of the Diagnosis of ’Anthropocentricism'

Perhaps the deepest problem of deep ecology
the fundamental problem in human/nature relations

65

66

its

is its critical

is

human

starting point, the claim that

anthropocentrism. The assumption

McLaughlin, p 193f
Seager, p 236.

with
Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery’ of Nature p 1 77f. See the previous chapter for problems
her
theory
of
modification
my
out
of
falls
Plumwood's dismissal of artifacts. The unwieldy axiology that

67

,

relations That solution is not
presents a similar problem, but one that might be solvable by appeal to
theory is the identification of self
ecology
available to this view, since the most valued relation in the deep

extensive critical analysis of this
with everything (achievement of ’Self-realization) Plumwood offers an
of this dissertation. See
concerns
main
aspect of deep ecology, albeit one which goes beyond the
6589.
Feminism and the Mastery' of Nature pp 1

Plumwood,
Plumwood, Feminism, p 179

6X

1

,
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is

that

some monolithic

set of

human

values has led the

human

race to drive other species to

extinction and obliterate diverse habitat for purposes of monocultural agriculture
(e.g. burning
forests in Brazil to create fields for cow-destined grain), or just out of accidents
arising

carelessness

bom

of lack of interest in habitat issues (e.g.

deep ecology's lack of adequate

oil spills).

I

from

have touched already on

analysis of social problems; the ecofeminist critique of

anthropocentrism effectively identifies the basis of

Here

this lack.

I

will present just

two

specific

concerns of deep ecology which ecofeminists claim are better diagnosed as the result of
androcentrism.
there

First,

is

deep ecology's favorite

As

issue, population.

I

noted previously, the absence

of any concrete suggestions by the deep ecologists, coupled with their desire for 'government

programs' of some kind, should suggest to anyone some rather disturbing scenarios, including

programs of

revisitations of past

to

women

and especially to

sterilization.

women

Ecofeminists highlight this vague stand as a danger

in the Third

World; once again, the blame can be placed

squarely on deep ecology's simplistic anthropocentrism.
Intervening in reproduction always means, above

all,

intervening in women's

female reproductive organs, and in the exercise of individual reproductive

fives, in

freedom. Population control always implies the exercise of centralized

—

a government, often aided by international development agencies (all
in imposing restrictions on women’s
of which are dominated by male actors)

authority

reproductive

—

activities....

without consent

Women have been subjected to

name
First

If

sterilizations,

in Puerto Rico, in India, in China. Unbridled racism

rampant sexism are intertwined with the
control.

mass

—

nothing

politics of international

else, this recent history of flagrant

human

and

population

rights abuses in the

advocacy by predominantly white, male,
69
World environmental groups particularly dubious
of population control

makes

its

.

Not only does blaming overpopulation on a nonspecific humanity create dangers

women;

it

also blinds

deep ecology to the causes of overpopulation

economic practices which of themselves are a greater threat
long-term, freedom-enhancing solutions
participation of

69

women

Seager, p 2 6f
ed pp 310-319.
1

,

(e.g.,

Salleh,

oppressive, imperialist

to the environment),

and hence

to

enhanced quality of fife through equitable

in education, business,

See also Ariel

(e.g.,

for

and government).

7
'Working with Nature Reciprocity or Control

',

in

Zimmerman,
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A second
deep ecology

failure arising

from the anthropocentric diagnosis

is

the absence of a substantive

critique of hunting. Altering only slightly Kathleen Barry's remarks

international traffic in

women, Seager

on the

writes:

all the men who are hunters, poachers, fur 'farmers,'
hunting
suppliers, hunting guides, skinners, trappers, furriers, fur designers, consumers
buying furs for women, importers of exotic animals, hunting-lodge owners, safari

Considering

leaders, trophy collectors, ivory carvers, aphrodisiac users

and ivory-dagger toters,
one cannot but be momentarily stunned by the enormous male population
engaged in the destruction of wildlife. The huge numbers of men engaged in
these practices should be cause for declaration of an international
emergency... But what should be cause for alarm is instead accepted as normal
male behavior.
Wildlife preservation and the protection of animal species are high on the
agenda of most mainstream environmental groups. But while environmental
groups take up the issue of animal extinctions in their save-the-elephant, save-the-

panda, or save-the-tiger campaigns, they seldom take on the issue of hunting per
se... Whatever the underlying cause, it is instructive to note the disjuncture

between the enthusiasm
culprits in the fur trade,

make

for environmental campaigns that identify women as
and the absence of environmental analysis that would

clear the complicity of

populations

men

in

the slaughter of the world's animal

70
.

Seager’s suspicion that hunting has

become too

’normalized’ as a part of male culture to be

a viable candidate for critique from the male-dominated deep ecology school

is

supported by Marti

Kheel’s analysis of the enthusiasm for hunting in the writings of philosophers Randall Eaton, Jose

Ortega y Gasset, and Aldo Leopold. Kheel might have added Gary Snyder to her study; compare
his

attempts at eroticizing meat-eating

(’a

great sexual exuberance. ..a giant act of love’) with

Eaton's claim that 'the hunter's feeling for his prey
respect.... The

hunter loves the animal he

is

one of deep passion, ecstasy and

71

kills .'

Again, besides being a failure to address cruelty to animals, deep ecology's

anthropocentrism-based analysis of species-extinction

is

as diluted as the cruelty-based analysis of

animal exploitation. Just as Clarke realized that claims of some lack of character on the part of

humans

generally could not serve as the foundation for a results-orientated program against

animal abuse, deep ecologists must realize that the same holds true with respect to species-

70
71

Seager, p 213.
Kheel, p 131
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Both are driven largely by the greed of particular people, not the
animal-hatred of

extinction.

all

humanity.

5.6. 2. 3 Critique of

Deep Ecology Culture

problems are raised by the sort of practice that has come to characterize deep

Finally,

ecologist activism. Earth First!, the

represented by

outdoorsman

men who had

first

deep ecologist

activist organization,

seemed

to

be

vested themselves in the Marlboro-Man, Grape-Nuts image of the

as eminently masculine. Seager writes, Their

common

practice of using

women-

identified terms as taunts, such as calling their critics 'wimps,' 'sops,' or 'effetes,' panders
to a

blatant sexist and

homophobic

Seager goes on to quote Earth

women

like

bias

Seager

though the worst thing

Edward Abbey's

Murray Bookchin have nothing to

fail

cites

as

First !er

essay rationalizing the exclusion of
ecologists

—

to

an

women

acknowledge their values

article

by Sharon Doubiago

'attack'

fear from me.'

73

in the

in

Seager also
74

roles.

being" [which

is]

distressingly shallow.'

ecologist culture has

salvation,

75

racist

cites

Not

which Doubiago notes that deep

by

its

’Fat old

an Earth

it is

male-identified

Perhaps the most distressing characteristic of deep

US immigration

in Ethiopia

policies, all

and the AIDS

virus as earth's

by prominent Earth
in

76

First!ers.

deep ecology

Arne Naess, the 'father' of deep ecology, expressed
concerns about inequalities within and between nations. But his concern with
social cleavages and their impact on resource utilization patterns and ecological

72

Seager,
73
74
75

p.

226.

Seager, p 226
Seager, p. 228f
Seager, p 230

76

Seager,

p.

23 3f.

deep

ecologists are

founder.

In his germinal article,

First!

surprisingly,

Seager expresses disappointment in what she sees as the promise inherent
as conceived of

72

This includes an 'invocation of "native ways of

been the embracing of the famine

and the advocacy of

to be womanly.'

based on traditionally feminist consciousness;

willing to claim almost any source of environmental inspiration as long as

('intuitionists, mystics, transcendentalists...').

is

on Murray Bookchin:

from decision-making
as being

world
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destruction appears to have gotten lost in the translation, because
invisible in the later writings of deep ecologists. 77

However,

to the extent that the feminist critique of

Naess, and to the extent that
representation of Naess, then

my own critique
it

that Naess'

problematical relations with nature, as well as his

concrete implications of his ecological views,

when

it

came down

what

to the question of

left

own

but

deep ecology philosophy applies to

of deep ecology

would appear

all

it is

is

based

in

pan on a

own anthropocentric

reluctance to

come

fair

diagnosis of our

to grips with the

deep ecology open to an ideological crapshoot

to do.

5.6.3 Ecofeminism as a Vegetarianism

Ecofeminists do often write of nature, as deep and social ecologists do, in a
specificity

Nature:

and does not address the animals issue

Women,

Ecology,

and the

directly, e.g.

way that

lacks

Carolyn Merchant's The Death of

(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980).

Scientific Revolution

That particular tendency of some ecofeminists to implicitly subsume animal exploitation under the
treatment of the issue of the exploitation of nature

However, unlike the body of the deep and

grown

many

to include

is

the subject of criticism by Greta Gaard.

78

social ecology literatures, ecofeminist literature has

direct challenges to factory farming, the fur industry,

and the eating of

animals, and vegetarianism seems to be turning into a kind of ecofeminist norm, and perhaps even

a

norm

of radical feminism generally.

sensitivity,

bom of the totalizing

and female

—

e.g.,

subjects.

This might be creditable in part to feminist philosophers'

concept of 'man' and

of that part of 'mankind' sometimes

particular sites

79

known

its

accompanying erasure of the experiences

as ’women,’ to the fact that oppression always has

the relationship between husband and wife, between scientific institutions

It is

assumptions about what

also found at particular sources

women

—

e.g., capitalist

norms and epistemic

are as well as evaluational assumptions about their worth (to the

of
extent that these can be separated). Ecofeminists also recognizethe fact that different forms

oppression are mutually reinforcing (see the discussion of Spiegel, above, as well as Adams

77
7S

Seager, p 232.
1-12.
Gaard, ’Living Interconnections with Animals and Nature,' in Gaard, ed pp
195-218
See Adams, 'The Feminist Traffic in Animals,' in Gaard, ed., pp
,

79
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analysis of similar connections

between meat production and the exploitation of women

Sexual Politics of Meat and Neither

Man Nor

Beast). This sensitivity has almost

made

in

The

the

expression ecofeminism' a misnomer (to ecofeminists' credit) inasmuch as
ecofeminists have well-

noted not only the differences between

men and women

with respect to degree of complicity' in

the abuse of nature but also the difference between First and Third World peoples.
It is

no

critique of the

surprise, then, that

consumption of animals

the most intimate

way

for specific purposes

and

ecofeminist writing

as, to

is

devoted to sophisticated, detailed

put a slight twist on a statement by Carol

which most Westerners

in

down by some amorphous

identifying

much

interact with nature.

at particular times

critiquing those particulars gives

it,

and

relations, the critical

and

social ecology

Animals are not kept

one believes that a

ways

places. Ecofeminism's interest in

as a progressive environmentalism, strengths

that the other ecologies lack, both from the vegetarian standpoint

If

Adams,

force called humanity. Individual animals are abused in specific

by particular people

environmental concern.

80

J.

and the standpoint of

fully progressive vision

must address human/nature

assumptions of ecofeminism have a number of advantages over deep ecology

and are more amenable

environmentalism but also vegetarianism

to the

(for

view that progressivism

an example of the

entails not only

latter entailment see

my critique

of Benton, above).

5.7

A Feminist Argument

against Vegetarianism

Vegetarianism cannot be held a priori exempt from the possibility of being connected to
oppressive mindsets and practices.

A

fondness for animals has often gone hand-in-hand with

cruelty, or attitudes of cruelty, to people:

Hitler

and

80

and everybody. Such

its

'code'

the success that people have in divorcing one sphere of relations

from another.

'The eating of animals

as well the

is

Schopenhauer and women, Wagner and Jewish people,

is

the most pervasive form of animal oppression

most frequent way

Traffic in Animals,' p

196.

in

which most Westerners

in

the Western world, representing

interact with animals

'

Adams, 'The Feminist
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In her article 'Should Feminists

Be Vegetarians?'

Society 19:2, pp. 405-434) Kathryn Paxton

commitment
I

on ’animals

certain scientifically

with a

Here

life.

1

come

arbitrary

is

(1)

commitment

to social justice.

and privileges white male Westerners

to the defense of vegetarianism.

some important questions about our concepts
first

Culture and

examination of George's argument that

critical

of George's concerns, and by the end of this section

Her

in

grounded claims about the nutritional needs of women, non-caucasians,

prove that ethical vegetarianism

the prime of

some

in utopia’

Women

George goes one step further than pointing out that a

to vegetarianism might not prove anything about one's

close this chapter

infants, etc.

{Signs: Journal of

argument runs

The vegetarian

is

will

do sympathize, however, with

be clear that her arguments

raise

of virtue and social responsibility.

as follows (formalized

diet

it

I

in

a health risk for

from pp. 415-417):
all

humans except men

of 20 to

50

years of age in industrial countries.

(2)

Not everyone

(3)

If

(4)

The moral rule requiring vegetarianism systematically imposes greater
burdens on some people.

(5)

If (4),

(6)

(1)

and

(2),

likes plants as

then

an item

in their diet.

(4).

.'.

then

(6).

Ethical vegetarianism

.’.

The justifications of line

is

(1) are, as

wrong.

I

mentioned, based on nutritional studies cited

George's paper. The main dangers of veganism (no animal products at

vegan

diets are too

low

in

energy and too high

calcium needed by adolescent

girls

danger of a lacto-ovovegetarian
quantities required

is

accurate, there

is

in

in the diet) are (1)

bulk for infants and toddlers, and (2) the

occurs in almost unusable form in plant sources. The main

diet

seems to be that

it

includes no good sources of iron in the

by young children and pregnant women,
no substitute

all

in

for which,

if

George's representation

for beef.

George says that the claim

in line (2)

may appear

trivial,

but food preferences are partially

genetic in origin and are not 'easily or completely amenable to education.
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The burdens

that (1)

and

(2) imply

(if

vegetarianism

is

true) are supposed to be clear.

Accepting and complying to the norms of vegetarianism puts a burden of risk on those mentioned
in the justification of (1)

and a burden of unpleasant

points out that (2) implies an additional burden
itself is 'a

burden that

is

living

on those mentioned

on those involved

disproportionately borne by

women

in

in (2).

George

also

food preparation, which

not only in our society but worldwide

as well.'

Now, the

fact that a

Keeping a promise

is

moral norm puts a burden on someone

is

a

81

What

As

However,

I

is

such a norm,

said earlier,

line (1)

to reject

it.

unacceptable, and George claims that 'traditional moral

is

norm which 'would

others in circumstances beyond one’s

vegetarianism

no reason

occasionally a burden, as George points out, but such occasional burdens are

not evidence against the norm.
theory’ supports this,

is

I

am

it is

own

systematically require self-sacrifices not required of

control'

(my emphasis).

82

Since (4) shows that ethical

unacceptable, hence line (5).

not going to argue about claims based on nutritional studies.

depends not only on the truth of such

studies, but

on the claim that there are no

other viable alternatives (in addition to balanced vegetarian diets) to meat-eating, such as dietary

supplements. George makes just

this claim.

Supplementation, however, especially for multiple dietary requirements, carries
significant risks for many people because of toxicity, low availability, and
interactions

among supplements.

83

Oddly, though, the problems she catalogs in her footnote to
issue at

hand

that

it is

this

passage are so tangential to the

hard to count them as evidence for a claim that dietary supplements are

simply not a viable alternative to meat-eating. For example, she notes the presence of heavy
metals in some supplements and the dangers of 'ingestion of improper amounts of some minerals.

The

first

problem

is

solved by competent, responsible manufacturing, the second by consumer

vegetarian. But to
education. These issues should be addressed whether or not the world goes

supplements
say that they are arguments against the eventual use of such

81

82
83

George, p 415.
George, p 415
George, p 419.

is

like saying the
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Corvairs hazardous design or drivers' failure to use seatbelts are arguments
against the use of
automobiles.

Georges concern that

'the availability of

such supplements presupposes. ..a sophisticated

medical and nutritional understanding by policymakers and consumers' seems misplaced
coming

from someone whose own arguments find
Perhaps

we

their foundations in the medical establishment.

should simply agree that people do need to be educated in

this

way about

their

own

bodies.

Leaving questions about line (1) aside, do (1) and (2) entail the proposition that

'the

moral rule requiring vegetarianism systematically imposes greater burdens on some people? To

answer

question

this

George has

in

we must

first

answer

this one:

what

is

the

moral

rule, at least the

one

mind, requiring vegetarianism? She writes:

The

[traditional theoretical] arguments for ethical vegetarianism pick out as
relevant the capacities for sensitivity to pain and sufficient intelligence so that
suffering can matter to the being. These features about animals and the supposed
fact that few humans need meat or animal products for health or survival, coupled
with the value claim that we ought to reduce suffering or respect rights, produce a
moral rule requiring vegetarianism.

Singer, Regan,

and

virtually all other philosophers defending the

status of animals claim animals are our equals
84

food.

I

I

my interpretation.

in

which

But there are two problems with referring to

this as

First, this

blanket rule, formulated as

unconditional practical imperative (like 'thou shalt not

whom am
I

familiar.

All

depending on circumstances,
mentions that

—and George points
killing

X4
x5

we

'Singer's utilitarian position

take utilitarianism seriously

George, p 413.
George, p 413.

this

animals for food

kill') is

(it is

ill

like

—allow

out on the same page

may be

it is

an

endorsed by no animal liberationist
that,

permissible. For example, she

would permit these consumptions

a strong welfare interest (say, for reasons of

if

moral
them for

have included the previous paragraph mainly to show the context

the moral rule requiring vegetarianism.

But

.

gather that the italicized section represents what George takes the moral rule requiring

appears and thus justify

with

kill

[emphasis added]

vegetarianism to be;

it

and that we may not

health), but these

for persons

would be exceptional

who have
85

cases.'

not the view that bringing about the outcome with the
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most happiness

always permissible; rather,

is

the most happiness

animals

is

is

the view that bringing about the outcome with

always obligatory), then obviously there will be cases where such use of

not merely permitted but in fact obligatory.

So much

problem with George's presentation of the moral

for the first

vegetarianism. The second problem

order principles.
food,'

it is

If

is

a failure to distinguish between first-order and second-

the moral rule requiring vegetarianism really were 'we

then (4) would be true. But George's rule

from the more basic

rule requiring

is

actually, as she

may

not

kill

animals for

seems to understand, derived

rule 'we ought to reduce suffering [utilitarianism] or respect rights

[Kantianism],' coupled with facts about us and animals (which are empirically discovered). As a

more

specific

and

practical rule,

We may not kill animals for food' comes with an understood

ceteris parabis clause, as does, arguably, 'thou shalt

not

kill.’

But,

more fundamentally, because

vegetarians derive their principles of behavior with respect to animals in part from empirically

discovered information (the facts about us and animals), application of those principles (for which
George's rule

is

but a rough and ready guide)

is

not expected to be outwardly uniform.

other hand, the more fundamental principles from which vegetarianism

is

On

the

derived are expected to

be outwardly uniform in their application. Utilitarian vegetarians, for example, do not demand
that everyone in

all

circumstances refrain from eating animals, but they do

act so as to increase happiness.

is

not really 'we

may

not

unnecessarily.' If that

is

kill

From

that everyone

the utilitarian perspective, the rule requiring vegetarianism

animals for food' but more accurately 'we

so, then,

demand

from

at least

may

not increase suffering

one traditional moral perspective, vegetarianism

does not demand, systematically, that some humans risk their health (= their happiness) on a
vegetarian diet. So, there

One might

George,

reason to believe that line (3)

is

false.

object, saying that a different version of line (3)

antecedent based on what
fact place

is

I

more burdens on

men between

is

available. This

one has an

have said above, which seems to point out that vegetarianism might
those

who do

twenty and

fifty in

not need to eat animals. These people (according to
industrialized countries)

would be prohibited from

so George claims) quality of
eating meat because their consumption of meat has the unique (or

in
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entailing unnecessary deaths of animals.

They would have

to suffer through watching the vast

majority of people enjoying animal flesh. At fancy restaurants they
would be confined to the salad
bar.

This reveals the problem with line (5).
principles

It is

not

difficult to derive

which systematically place burdens on some people rather than

adults have systematically

more

sound, secondary moral
others.

For example,

responsibility for the welfare of children than vice versa.

have responsibility for the welfare of animals, but there

is

Humans

almost no reciprocal responsibility. Yet

these systematically differential burdens are not reason enough to reject the fundamental
principles

on which they are founded.

It is

appropriate to mention here that George uses the word

'arbitrary'

and

its

correlates

several times in her arguments against ethical vegetarianism, for example in the expression
'arbitrary

moral burdens.’ She never

arbitrary moral

burden

is

one which

an

offers

is

but she seems to think that an

explicit definition,

'greater... for

some groups because

of aspects about

themselves that cannot be changed and are thought to be neutral to the interests served by the
86

rule'

—

in

which case

I

hope

I

have already shown that such burdens are not actually points

—and that an arbitrary

against an ethical theory

The second use

belief

is

one that

of 'arbitrary' only applies to vegetarianism

claims [that meat

is

not necessary in the

human

primary support for ethical vegetarianism.'

88

if,

as

is

George

diet] are mistaken’

But, again as

held with 'no good reasons.'

8

'

asserts, 'the nutritional

and these claims

George admits, the

are 'the

nutritional claims

are only partly mistaken. Furthermore, to consider those claims as the primary support for

vegetarianism

is

to overstate the case.

The

basic principle of ethical vegetarianism

suffering

and dignity of non-human animals matters; and

eating of

non-human animals

is

usually wrong.

of eating meat were true, there would

86
87
88

George, p 414
George, p 422.
George, p 422.

still

Even

that

if all

is

why unnecessary

is

that the

killing

and

of George's claims about the necessity

be such a thing as the unnecessary consumption of
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animal products, unnecessary either in quality (veal) or in quantity (the heart-endangering

amount of beef eaten

A third

in the

United States). So vegetarianism would not be an arbitrary

use of 'arbitrary occurs where George states that 'there

is

another reason to think

that the moral rule of ethical vegetarianism rests on arbitrariness,' and goes
studies

on the health benefits of vegetarian

diets

have

all

belief.

on

been done on men.

to explain that

89

Vegetarian diets appeal to men's self-interests because these diets can be quite
low in fat and may reduce men's incidence of heart disease. Although powerful
lobbies continue to press for meat consumption, the power struggle takes place
entirely

on male terms. The debate

entirely overlooks possible differences in the

wholesale adoption of restrictive dietary practices (whether they be allplant or heavily dependent on meat consumption) on women and children, as
90
well as on people of color, old people, and people living in other cultures.

effects of

George's point about the medical establishment's neglect of women
bit of

that

bad science does not undermine vegetarianism by making

women's health

position to

demand

issues with respect to diet

redress

on

is

this

does not

it

well-taken. However, this

arbitrary.

have been overlooked,

that point. Again,

have to consume some meat, but

it

is

we

Rather,

are simply

when we
left in

see

a

might indeed be true that some people may

mean

vegetarianism

the position that the unnecessary killing and eating of

is false.

nonhuman animals

Again, vegetarianism

is

wrong.

If

a white

male does not have to eat meat, and indeed benefits by not eating meat, then he should not
meat. The irresponsibly restrictive studies of the medical establishment might

at least

eat

be useful

in

establishing the truth in this case.

There
[traditional]

is

a fourth use in George's article of the

arguments

for ethical vegetarianism

be shown to appeal to and serve the
91

privilege.'

which

It

would be best

word

may be

interests of the

'Moreover, these

accused of arbitrariness because they can

dominant

to consider this use in light of

criticize evaluative repercussions of

'arbitrary:

vegetarianism on

George gives an argument which can be formalized

class in retaining

two more arguments

women and non-Westem cultures.
as follows (from p. 425):

1

^George,
91

p.

of George's

vegetarianism were adopted universally, then 'excused classes (those
who must eat meat and so would be excused from the prohibition against
If

(1)

90

power and

423.

George, p 424
George, p 429.
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would still suffer feelings of responsibility for the evil
associated with killing and eating animals.
eating meat)

If

(2)

vegetarianism were adopted universally, then excused classes would

suffer social

condemnation.

(3)

The excused

classes in (1)

(4)

If (1), (2),

(5)

Vegetarianism causes

(6)

If (5),

then

Let us assume, as

I

(3),

then

(2) consist of

women and

children.

(5).

women to

be viewed as a moral underclass.

(7).

Vegetarianism

(7)

As

and

and

is false.

we have done

throughout, that George's nutritional claims are

all

true.

have been arguing, such claims do not militate against vegetarianism, which only prohibits the

unnecessary

killing

and eating of animals. George admits that vegetarianism can allow

physiological risks which have assumed,

her arguments against
If

up

for the

to this point in her paper, such a prominent place in

it:

the main concern were about

risk,

advocates for animal rights such as Regan

women need

could simply respond that,

if

excuse (based on the

Regan's] Liberty Principle) from a duty not to

[i.e.,

milk or meat, they have a valid moral
or

kill

harm animals. Women whose health would be jeopardized or whose fetuses
would be injured are excused from a duty to make themselves worse off for the
sake of another.

92

This acknowledgment should suffice to establish that,

vegetarianism were universally

if

adopted, some people would indeed be excused from adopting an entirely vegetarian
George's justification for line (1)
responsible even

for

an action

if

if

not culpable for a

she or he caused

is

that even
93

to occur.'

person

who

Now, there does not seem

evaluatively interesting) about feeling that one caused an action to occur

occur.

Here we would be

required of

little

92
93

94

it

in line (4).

different.

Perhaps

George, p 425.
George, p 425.
George,

p.

425, n

left

with an interpretation of

line (1)

which

is

feels

responsible

be anything wrong (or

to

if

is

still

in fact

too

one caused

weak to do

the

it

must be a

is

getting at

a feeling of misplaced responsibility. There

is

a sense in which the

responsible' that

to

work

George

The notion of 'feeling
it is

self-defense

kills in

In a footnote, George says that 'one

killing.'

94
it

'a

diet.
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person
her

killing in self-defense

own

is

not responsible

—the sense

in

which someone

else's

action limited

options (given her reasonable desire or instinct to go on living). Similarly, there

sense in which the

were limited

at

member

of the excused class

own

responsibility

which carrying the

entire

is

responsibility).

thus qualified, she

burden leads

to.

When

in

which her options

is

a person in this kind of situation realizes

more

able to let go of that feeling of culpability

George would seem to agree with

apparently not enough for her, for she feels that something

appearance

—the sense

a

conception (she must eat meat by virtue of having a certain land of physiology, for

which she of course can bear no
that her

not responsible

is

is

in the fourth premise).

one's necessary killing

responsibility, since there

but

it is

going wrong here (hence line

(l)'s

She does not indicate what an appropriate attitude toward

and eating of animals should

responsibility. Perhaps, in

is

this,

be, but evidently

it is

not a feeling of

an unvegetarian world, the excused classes avoid that feeling of

is

a veritable orgy of flesh consumption going on around them on the

part of unexcused classes. But that does not

mean

that those

who

eat

meat should not

feel

some

sense of remorse at having to depend upon other animals for their needs. As George herself
admits,

'killing

I

or harming any animal

would suggest

is

an

95

evil .'

some Native Americans express toward having

that such feelings as

to

kill

animals are appropriate and not in themselves a problem for the excused classes. Rather, the

problem would be with
that

it is

must

they and only they

eat. This

who make

our

as our

among humans who

They would be mistaken

lives

own.

sisters,

talking about are (speaking as a

wives, daughters, and young sons, etc.

what they

are,

—people on whom we depend,

and whose health and happiness are of

A society the members

of

to suppose

are responsible for the deaths of the animals they

would be a mistake because the people we are

man) our mothers,

(men)

their feeling uniquely responsible.

as

much

interest to us

which are interdependent, or rather which know

they are interdependent, would take on the responsibility of necessary animal suffering
collectively.

95

George, p 407
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So, while line (1) might be true, the question

only?

If

is

would

it

animal liberation can be part of larger, communitarian

be true for the excused classes
then the answer

ethic,

is

no. This

leaves line (1) untouched, but gives us reason to deny (2), which George justifies only by saying
that 'we do not ordinarily

We

all

can

tell

know

the reason's for a stranger's actions.'

things they do. In addition, the
identifiable.

main excused

This

Which

individualism.

who

is

is

one that has

to say, there

George

classes that

far less of the

an overstatement.

talks

about are readily
is

perfectly compatible

element of suspicion than does Hobbesian

would be no reason

would quite

eat meat, in such a world one

is

strangers in a mall or at school say and do the

Furthermore, a communitarian ethic (and communitarianism

with animal liberation)

strangers

why

with some degree of confidence

96

to suppose that, rather than vilifying

naturally

assume that that person had

to

eat meat.

Line (4) raises the following question: given an ethical ideal, what are

some people,

fact that

to reach that ideal?

have gone

for reasons or causes for

Do

can in

ideal? Consider this analogy:

grades, etc. (a typical

A

the best student the one

student, say); or

is

(this

leisure time in

who

fail

same,

I

to

which to engage

think.

schools might

A person who
become a

in a

life

so situated.

courageous, as in a courageous burglar.

George, p 426.

they

reached the

who

does the most they can

be virtuous, needed to be

in felicitous

own

is

no praise

left

over for those

(no community, no leisure time).

We

feel the

rough inner-city neighborhood with poorly financed

criminal because of the lack of educational and vocational opportunities

and other misfortunes of a

96

in fact

if

does the best work, gets the best

and so on. There

fault of their

grows up

that ideal, or,

other people to be just to; one cannot be wise without

in philosophy;

be virtuous through no

do about the

could be a C student)?

Aristotle believed that a virtuous person, to

One cannot be just without

who

the best student the one

with the talents and opportunities they have

circumstances.

them from reaching

and causes, have they

light of those reasons

Is

to

which they are not responsible, might not be able

the reasons and causes excuse

as far as they

we

The

We

best he can be, in terms of virtue, might be

might excuse

his

behavior because he

is

not
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responsible for the condition of the school

district,

the local economy,

the virtue (say, lots of courage) he could in light of his circumstances,
step and praise

him

He seems

for being virtuous.

his upbringing, destined for a

for

in a vegetarian world.

facts of their physiology, destined for a

who (among

we would

not take the further

They would seem

kind of moral underclass.

women would be

As in the case of the inner-city youth,

class of the best.

not go so far as to say that they are

to be,

If

the

their other virtues) cause the least pain

and death to other animals (human and nonhuman), then

but

all

to be, because of the material circumstances of

women

best people in a vegetarian world are those

excluded from the

we do

having attained

kind of moral underclass.

George has the same concern
because of the material

etc., but,

among

systematically

we might

excuse them,

the best just because they do the best

they can.
If

George's concern

is

valid,

comprehensive vegetarian practice

it is

is

relevant even now,

closed to

all

virtuous option of a truly

but the upper middle class by virtue of the cost

of cruelty-free and organic products at the market.

list

when the

To

illustrate the difference

I

have included a

of prices from a large, mainstream grocery store chain and a smaller chain of stores

specializing in cruelty-free

groceries

and organic products

would show the burden of shopping

someone on a lower income. That
four such trips

and spending

is

is,

for

(table 1). This

at the latter to

still

list;

10%

a month's worth of

disproportionately greater for

of her income

difference

between

on shopping mainstream

shopping organic and cruelty-free. For someone making $3000 a month, the

difference as a percentage of income

is

only the difference between 2.6% and 5.3%. Furthermore,

the 'exclusivity' of the cruelty-free, organic

'culture' at

these shops can be discouraging.

percentage of employees at the local organic chainstore

over three years.

a small

someone making $800 a month, the

the difference between spending

20%

be

is

It is

no wonder that they

felt

are white approaches the

they had to pay

sign which read: ’Our stores are "inclusive." Everyone

foods are for everyone.'

who

is

lip service to diversity

welcome.

We

The

100% mark
by posting a

value diversity—whole
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Table

Prices of

1.

some

groceries

(

Jui y 30 1995). Where units

differ,

,

the figure in parentheses

used.

is

Organic or Cruelty-Free

Non-Organic, Non-Cruelty-Free

apples

1.49/lb.

1.29/lb.

lettuce

1.19 each

1.00/two (=.50 each)

tomatoes
cantaloupe
milk
hand soap

2.29/lb.

shaving lotion

4.99/8oz.

1.39/lloz. (=1.01/8oz.)

aftershave

6.99/9oz.

4.79/7oz. (=6.16/9oz.)

toothpaste

2.29/4oz.

mouthwash
shampoo

3.99/1 6oz.

1.49/5oz. (=1.19/4oz.)
3.29/32oz. (=1.65/16oz.)

4.75/18oz.

1.99/15oz. (=2.39/18oz.)

sandwich bread

2.49/24oz.

1.49/two 20oz. loaves

cheese

4.39/lb.

2.39/lb.

39.31

21.45

1.29/lb.

.98/lb. (est 1.5 lb.

=

1.47 each)

.80 each

1.99/.5 gallon

1.39/.5 gallon

.99/one 4-oz. bar

2.49/four 5 oz. Bars (= .50/one

4

(

TOTAL

slices

(1 unit

each item)

Here again, though,
their virtue

young

when we

are

all

I

oz. bar)

= .89/24oz.)

would simply challenge the legitimacy of ranking

involved in what each of us

is

doing.

We

individuals

cannot lord

it

by

over the

criminal; the system that allows us the luxury of considering an act of theft unthinkable

the same system that makes theft a viable choice for him.

cannot afford a
not having to

lifestyle

make hard

words, whatever
Arguably,

we

which

we

are no

is

choices

need of

all

I

;

it

over those

who

is

the same system that forces those choices on them. In other

is

predicated on their not being able to achieve the same.

virtuous than they; their deeds are our deeds, and vice versa.

Something along similar
achievable by individuals

cannot lord

cruelty- free, organic, etc.; the system that allows us the luxury of

attain in 'virtue'

more

We

is

if

lines has already

there

is

a biological

been said with respect

to diet.

need on the part of some people

The

ideal

for meat,

is

not

it is

of ours.

conclude that George has not successfully argued against ethical vegetarianism.

However, her arguments

militate against an individualistic interpretation of virtue

smug complacency on the

and against

part of individual vegetarians, especially those of priviliged classes.

a

CHAPTER

6

CLOSING RANKS

6.1 Animals in Utopia. Part

I

II

have argued that the issues of vegetarianism, environmentalism,
and

social justice are

interconnected, that irresponsible environmental practices,
immoral treatment of animals, and
unjust social systems prop each other up.

What have
I

yet to examine, though, are concrete

answers to the question of how our moral commitments

in all three of these areas

can be

coordinated (remember that social and deep ecology ignore the animals issue, and
ecofeminism
primarily a critical program).

It

would be

urn vers al vegetarianism now, when, as

I

irresponsible for philosophers like

have documented, that

me to

simply

is

demand

lifestyle is currently inaccessible to

so many.

On
have

at the

the other hand,

we

same can be

for,

let,

for example, indigenous peoples

whales and the seals just because these marine mammals constitute the best available

resource for these groups; at

issues are,

cannot just walk away and

least,

we

cannot do so without a

lot of

said about the destruction of the Brazilian rainforest.

on the one hand, the

rights or intrinsic value or

thought beforehand. The

The two most obvious concrete

autonomy

of,

as well as our

sympathy

the animals and plants in question, and on the other hand the similar rights, value, and

autonomy

of, as

well as our sympathy for, the

interests of nonlocals in local wildlife?

issue, as

when people

in the wild.

the world

outside of Asia

involved. But

how

shall

we weigh

the

Sometimes nonlocals are concerned over a preservation

become concerned about the impending

At other times the concern

when

humans

is

extinction of tigers

over cruelty. Witness the unhappiness of people around

they found out that fishermen are drowning thousands of dolphins in their tuna

nets every year.
Generally, environmentalists have downplayed issues of cruelty because they are not
interested in animal liberation.

They have downplayed

issues of social justice because they have
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diagnosed the root cause of environmental devastation as
anthropocentrism, thus indicting

humanity

collectively.

Nevertheless, at least two environmentalists have

made

at least

some

attempt to negotiate the competing claims of animals, humans, and
the environment. In
chapter,

I

examine and

criticize

those attempts. Then

I

this

look at the possibility of veganism and

its

Eastern foundations as a basis for a comprehensive ethic which takes
into account each of the
three issues. In the end

6.1.1 Callicott

It

it

be seen that

will

all

three of the attempts at a comprehensive ethic

on Midglev

would be most

fitting to

begin with

Callicott's

sketch of a unified animal liberationist-

environmentalist-social justice ethic, an ethic suggested to

and explained

in his

Callicott sees the

him

in part

by

his

reading of Midgley

paper 'Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again.’

way

out of the apparent conflicts between these three demands in

biosocial moral theory,’

from one

fail.

which grounds

ethics in the sentiments

and

in their

1

'the logic of

degree of variation

circle of relationships to another.

From

Midgley’s biosocial point of view, we are members of nested communities
each of which has a different structure and therefore different moral
requirements. At the center is the immediate family. I have a duty not only to
feed, clothe, and shelter my own children, I also have a duty to bestow affection
on them. But to bestow a similar affection on the neighbors' kids is not only not
my duty, it would be considered anything from odd to criminal were I to behave
2

so.

Callicott goes

on to observe that we have duties

other citizens, to citizens that
general that

we do

is

to

1

2

However,

gets

Callicott follows

so simple. His

first

example

is

most other humans; but since

Callicott, pp. 49-59.
Callicott, p. 55

not have to

human

we do

beings in general, and to

not have to

human

beings in

not have to animals in general.

The impression one
tree.

we do

to our neighbors that

up

to this point

in

of pets,

who

is

of a series of concentric circles, like rings in a

denying that the relationship between the relationships

Midgley

this

is

are animals to

on account

whom we owe

duties not

owed even

of their being 'surrogate family members,' the
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example seems

to actually

fit

the concentric-circles view.

A better example

is

that of

someone

depriving 'one's children of a trip to Disneyland or [giving]
them fewer toys at Christmas in order
to aid starving people

made

on another

for the benefit of

The

3

Here, a sacrifice of the interests of an inner circle

in a

participate in that

is

circle.

results for animals are as follows.

community but

pets, (2)

an outer

continent.’

Humans do

not live in a species-homogenous

mixed community of humans and animals. The extent

community depends,

for Callicott,

to

on whether the animals

which animals
in question are (1)

barnyard animals, or (3) wild animals:

Pets merit treatment not owed either to less intimately related animals, for
example to barnyard animals, or, for that matter, to less intimately related human
beings...

Barnyard animals... [may be

used] for work or even.. .for food so long as the
keeping and using of such animals was not in violation as factory farming clearly
is
of a kind of evolved and unspoken social contract between man and beast...

—

—

Wild animals

are,

by

therefore should not

lie

members of the mixed community and
on the same spectrum of graded moral standing as family
members, neighbors, fellow citizens, fellow human beings, pets, and other
domestic animals.
Callicott goes

definition, not

4

on to explain that

'wild animals, rather, are

community' and duties to them might therefore

—

nature

as our duties

-just

and obligations

5

of the biotic

derived from an ecological description of

members

to

from a description of the mixed community.'

lie

members

That

is,

of the

mixed community can be derived

duties to wild animals are dictated by the

Leopoldian land ethic (examined in the previous chapter) whereas duties to pets and barnyard
animals, like interhuman duties, are not.

There are a number of problems with
chapters: the

was

criticized in

3

Callicott, p.

58

Callicott, p. 56.

5

Callicott, p

scheme. Some

argument that exploitation of barnyard animals
Chapter

2,

and the idea that duties

a simple 'ecological description of nature'

4

Callicott's

57.

was

to the

criticized in

is

justified

I

addressed in previous

by virtue of their breeding

environment are magically revealed by
Chapter

3.

It is

worth adding here that
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Callicott's claim that the latter holds true
of

to

me

that this kind of naturalism

Callicott's

what the view he

is

ethics

is

in

need of support.

we do

also inadequate, since

not

owe

we owe

to

humans

duties to other

It is

attributing to Midgley adds

6
treatment of the issue of pets seems correct, particularly

duties to animals that

is

is

interhuman

less intimately situated.

humans,

up

not clear

to.

his point that

we owe

However, the treatment

in certain situations, over

and above

duties to our pets.

Callicott's

view of the place of barnyard animals

treatment of domestic animals in 'Animal Liberation:

signals a radical departure

A Triangular Affair

domestic animals equates them, Kant-like, with things

artifacts like tables

and

odd

little

earlier claim that liberation for

it

a meaningless concept. So

that Callicott has revised his view of barnyard animals in this respect.

view

in

given the

(at least,

—hence

is

Having a

chairs.

disparaging view of tables and chairs implicit in Callicott's earlier remarks)

farm animals

his

There, his view of

.'

—

even an unspoken one, with a table or chair seems a

social contract,

from

Callicott's

seems we may

He must have

infer

revised his

another respect, though. For while earlier he seems to be disgusted with the very

existence of such 'unnatural' artifacts, here a quite different attitude

context in which he says that

condemn human

'to

[wrongly]

—

slavery and penury

is

to

condemn the morality
condemn

is

of these roles

unspoken

Somehow I doubt

that the animals

—

as

we

rightly

the very being of these creatures."

This idea of an 'evolved and unspoken social contract between
explaining.

exhibited by virtue of the

would be pleased

to

man and

know

contract. Although food animals in ideal conditions (conditions

beast'

needs some

the conditions of this

which are

virtually

nonexistent at this time) might get some benefit from the association, the nature of the
relationship

Hardy,

is

less like a contract

who wrote

than an elaborate deception, a point made in poetic fashion by

of a (fictional) stuck pig's 'glazing eyes riveting themselves on Arabella with the

eloquently keen reproach of a creature recognizing at

6

Callicott,

pp

7

Callicott, p

1

5-38

56.

last

the treachery of those

who had seemed
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his only friends.

It

would indeed be an irony

some

that

who

of those animals

mixed community' get the benefit of the slaughterhouse.
But beyond being
is

wrong, and that Hardy does a better job than

'contract,' if there

contract that

we

is

one, between

ironic,

1

believe that

it

Callicott of characterizing the nature of
the

humans and food

animals.

If

a contract

sign for the very purpose of breaking. In other
words,

community has some kind

are part of the

of moral impact, then Callicott

is

is

present,

a

it is

the concept of a 'mixed

if

mistaken about what that impact

in

is

the case of barnyard animals: the 'mixed community'
concept does not justify the exploitation of

food animals. Rather,

it

condemns

that exploitation as a systematic betrayal of the trust
of

community members.

The wild animals

fare almost as poorly as the barnyard animals.

A

couple of

inconsistencies should be noted. First, Callicott claims that ’whatever moral
entitlements a being

may have

as a

member

of the biotic community, not

being should be respected and

harm

left

alone to pursue

among them
modus

its

to other beings, including other sentient beings.' 9

difference

between one theorys requirement

that

we

is

the right to

vivendi

First,

I

is

willing to saddle us with.

where the creature we are discussing
misstatement by

Callicott,

is

who

rightfully consider himself justified in doing so.

8

burden
is

What

surf.

The problem

is

Hardy, p 68f
Callicott, p. 57.

it is all

right for a

human

causes

which

being to not leave to

is

a moral

on us even

absurd. Surely, this

is

away

is

a

a great white

more important, he

attaches not just to animals

are a direct threat to us; some, including Callicott and myself, would say that,

of survival (at least)

9

this

not hesitate to blow

shark heading in the direction of some children playing in the

would

life,

ways, which

its life

a threat to other sentient beings

I

life

and another theorys requirement that we

Second, the claim that

who have no doubt would

of

do not see any appreciative

leave the creature alone (for the creature's sake, not ours) to pursue
Callicott

Rather, each

way

if its

respect a creature's right to

Callicott says does not exist in the case of wild animals,

burden

—even

life.

its

if it is

a matter

modus vivendi an animal he
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or she could

kill

and

eat.

Obviously,

community with the

biotic

some work needs

ethics of the

to be

done

in reconciling the ethics of the

mixed community.

These problems, while they point to deeper
too loosely. The more interesting objection

is

to

issues,

might simply

an asymmetry

in the lists of

on the one hand and the mixed human-animal communities on the

from speaking a

arise

human communities

What

other.

I

mean

the circles of nested communities go outward, they end, as far as humans go, with
in general.

of which

That

is,

in the

I

even

So,

am

they

more

a

lie

total strangers of the variety

member
'on the

Homo sapiens

same spectrum

of graded moral standing

intimate, domesticated circles.

On

other highly intelligent beings

of the

member

of the

(e.g.,

as the wild birds at

you are a member of the same mixed community

same
(i.e.,

as

biotic

community

either ignore

as the wild birds,

them or

kill

10
,

my bird

cattle

it is

Why am

are not

to consider

I

member

you are only a member of the
are, well to 'act naturally’

reiteration of the distinction

would not count

from the mixed community; nor does

the unilluminating

who

feeder? Callicott would say that yes,

claim that wild animals are 'by definition' excluded offer any insight.
definition he has in mind, unless

beings

good Samaritan).

rancher but not a

and your duties toward them

latter

As

although presumably humans and

as the rancher, but

and eat them). The

an explanation of the exclusion of the

Galapagos

this:

However, animals only appear

Martians) similarly situated would not.
as a

human

view, wild animals (animals

Callicott's

same mixed community

same mixed community

1

.

is

some moral community

(thus Midgley's justified admiration for the story of the

townies) drop out of the mixed community picture altogether

myself a

are part of

bit

'x is

wild

= x

It is

is

Callicott's

not apparent what

not a

member

of the

mixed community.'
It

might be worth noting

duty as dictated by 'ecological

that, if

ethics,’

people had always done what Callicott believes

then

we would

is

their

not have mixed communities of humans and

Midgley points out that, in Orwell's novel, the principle All Animals
suggest, and
are Equal' 'refers only to farm animals. In the first flush of revolution, these animals do
almost at once,
out
uncertainly agree, that rats are comrades. Attempts to act on this idea, however, peter
10

As they do

in

Animal Farm

as well.

deer, mice, voles,
and the only other outside candidates ever named are rabbits. Foxes, badgers, hedgehogs,
Midgley,
forgotten.'
simply
weasels etc And the whole tribe of wild birds, as well as everything smaller, are
p.

72.
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animals in the

first

place.

Such communities

natural niche and bringing

them

into the

Calhcott's attempt to resolve the

liberation (and social justice, but this
failure to

of the

arise out of

people taking animals out of their

human community

in

some way

competing claims of environmentalism and animal

not his focus) runs into two main problems
because of a

is

thoroughly integrate mixed community ethics and
ecological

two spheres

contractual ) mixed

is

untenable.

community

It is

or other.

as

though

ethics.

First,

the separation

can stick with (what Callicott takes to be

I

ethics within the city limits,

dog-eat-dog ) ecological ethics out in the country. As

and then (what

my criticism

pointed out in

I

Callicott takes to

be

of Rolston, there

are no such clear-cut boundaries between the cultural and the
natural. Second, Callicott

fails

to

incorporate the concentric circles of mixed community ethics into
ecological ethics; this failure
results in confusions such as the idea (supposing that

duties to the big shade tree in

my backyard

that

I

inclined can replace the shade tree example with

we

can have duties to trees) that

I

have no

do not have to shade trees everywhere (those so

some

local wild

animal whose presence they

have enjoyed or otherwise benefited from).
I

his

believe that there are

two other mistakes

treatment of animal liberation.

that have

First, his failure to

thrown

Callicott off consistently in

think of rights as requiring reference to the

particular persons involved (different people have different rights with respect to different people)
inspires the fear that animal liberation

'equal rights' does not

mean

must mean equal

a whole lot without

a dog dish out for the local coyotes; this

in particular.

Nor do the coyotes

These distinctions are only too
as

my children,

offer

I

in the

familiar;

is

some

rights for all animals. But the expression

clarification.

canyon have a

when

I

do not mean that they have a

logic of extending the prevailing

"Callicott, p 55

is

suggesting that

a right that the family dog in particular has against

right against

me

to rescue

them

I

set

me

in a flood.

say that immigrant children have the same rights
right to expect

me

to pick

up the red herring of 'equal moral consideration or equal moral

by the

No one

moral paradigms'”

them up from

school.

rights for animals, required

(Callicott's

emphases

signal the

To
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repugnant implication)

and

is

to subscribe to the

most uncharitable interpretations of those paradigms

to uncritically take philosophers like Singer

liberation practice

would look

bathrooms offered up

as a

like.

It is

that Callicott

why we have
local

what

post-

uncomfortably reminiscent of the paranoia of same-sex

makes over and over again

behavior to the satisfaction of physical needs

and family pets and

as representative of

reason to not support the Equal Rights Amendment.

The second mistake

the very reason

and Saponztis

like nutrition.

It

is

to reduce humans' natural

never seems to occur to him that

these problems with figuring out what to do with barnyard animals

wolves

is

that

humans

are naturally interested in the welfare of the

animals (and other species and natural objects) around them.

We are

the animal that most

intervenes in the fives of other animals, sometimes for the sake of the other animals themselves.

Furthermore,

this aspect of

our nature does not even

itself

other animals: Galapagos land iguanas signal to birds

make

when

us different in kind from the

they want the birds to pick mites off

of them; Galapagos seals tease marine iguanas by pulling repeatedly on their

swim away

(the seals

do not eat or maim the iguanas); the famous cuckoo leaves

birds to hatch; herder ants maintain a 'stockyard' of insects

even transport the insects themselves).

mean

to suggest that whatever

We

while they try to

its

eggs for other

which secrete a sweet nectar

(the ants

are simply the interventionists par excellence.

comes naturally to humans

ethicist like Callicott, this observation causes problems.

for both wild

tails

is

I

do not

good. However, for a naturalistic

Non-consumptive

and domestic animals seems to be universal among

interest in

and affection

cultures, including the kind of

cultures (his so-called 'savages') Callicott wants to look to for guidance in modeling a natural

So-called 'primitive' cultures domesticate animals today and in the past were responsible

lifestyle.

for domesticating not only food animals but also

parrots,

work animals and household

pets such as cats,

and monkeys.

When we
that only

see that

humans just

are naturally interested in the other animals,

an improbably narrow conception of what

underwrite

Callicott's earlier

will count as natural

dim view of domesticated animals and

his

human

we

see too

behavior can

unending prescription of
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an ecological ethic which would prevent

(via the 'shrinkage of the domestic sphere'

respect for other animals' 'modus vivendi') both the
domestication of any

other non-consumptive intervention into animals' (and
plants')

more

and the

species

and any

lives.

6.1.2 Taylor

Taylor does not treat animal liberation and environmentalism as separate,
competing
agendas.

human

He does

focus on wildlife rather than

culture in which

systematically exploit

humans

them

for

what he

calls

the 'bioculture'

—

'that

create and regulate the environment of living things and

human

benefit' (e.g., agribusiness, laboratories, pets), but unlike

the earlier Callicott he believes that such creatures, however internally modified,
of their

own and

aspect of any

still

have goods

inherent worth. His general view on the proper treatment of domestic animals

therefore does not differ in land from his view on the proper treatment of wildlife, in contrast to

both the earlier Callicott and the later, Midgley-influenced Callicott. Indeed, Callicott's tripartite
division of

human-animal relationships does not seem to have much purchase

and Taylor says that

'it

is

a truth of fact and not a value judgment that

all

in Taylor's system,

the living organisms

being used in any society’s bioculture are entities that have a good of their own. They can be
benefited or harmed. In this
ecosystems.'

12

Furthermore,

manner they

are exactly like wild animals and plants in natural

'the fact that the

animals and plants being dealt with in a society's

bioculture are valued instrumentally does not settle the ethical question of
11

treated.'

The requirements Taylor then

lightly

how

they should be

touches on are really just applications of

his

general principles of resolution between the competing interests of humans and wildlife, such as
the principle of

minimum wrong.

So, for Taylor, laboratories

and slaughterhouses (were they

necessary) are not arenas of human-animal contact with a set of rules different from that in

12

Taylor, Respect for Nature, p 55

11

Taylor, Respect for Nature p 57.
,
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nature. Rather, they are

subsumed under nature

as simply particular sites of such contact,

with

all

the rules of environmental ethics in place. 14
This view has a certain attraction by virtue of

its

comprehensiveness and simplicity with

respect to the animal liberationist-environmentalist debate,
but such simplicity comes at a cost.

The unity of the view
chapter.

is

The downside

enabled by Taylor’s

strict egalitarianism,

which

I

criticized in the previous

of this egalitarianism can be seen again in the context of Taylor’s

discussion of pets:
In the case of having

an animal as a pet, people do willingly accept certain
responsibilities for the animal's well-being. This is because they care about
it and
want to help it lead a healthy, happy Me. The pet owner's sense of responsibility
is

concomitant with her or Ms love for the pet.

Something subtle
something subtle

is

is

going on in these three sentences; or perhaps

not going on. Taylor

claims on us than do other animals.
that our willingness to

actually affect

do

is

should say that

not claiming here that pets actually exert stronger

merely pointing out a

by our pets

right

what our duty

He

is

I

is

fact

about

human

psychology,

helped by our love for them. Such feelings do not

is:

As was pointed out in connection with human etMcs, our duties toward other
persons do not depend on our feeling love or affection for them, but hold
regardless of such personal contingencies.

16

We may want to help certain species-populations because we like them or
because they are beneficial to us. But the Rule of Non-Interference requires that
we put aside our personal likes and our human interests with reference to how we
17
treat them.
Of special importance

for practical considerations,

we

are duty-bound not to
us... To
orgamsm, no matter

intervene in behalf of those creatures that happen to be beneficial to
respect nature

is

to be willing to take the standpoint of each

what its species, and view the world from the perspective of its good. None
18
makes a greater claim on our sympathy than another.

14

Given Taylor's Rule of Noninterference, our adopting

the continued existence of the bioculture

The

his ethical

rule says that

system would seem to

we have

call into

question

'two sorts of negative duties, one

requiring us to refrain from placing restrictions on the freedom of individual organisms, the other requiring a
general "hands off" policy with regard to whole ecosystems and biotic communities, as well as to individual

organisms'
15
16

—

Taylor, Respect for Nature p
,

Taylor, Respect for Nature ,

p. 55.

Taylor, Respect for Nature p 56.
,

17

Taylor, Respect for Nature p

1

77.

Taylor, Respect for Nature p

1

78f

,

18

,

173.

Callicott has the

same tension

in his

view (above)
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Taylor bases his case for vegetarianism not on sympathy for animals nor
on barnyard
social relations.

No animal

has any more of a claim against us than does any plant, according
to

Taylor's egalitarian biocentrism. Taylor believes that the only reasons
to eat vegetables rather

than animals are (1) that making animals into food might involve suffering on the
part of the
animal, an intrinsic evil not met with in the consumption of plants (presumably,
right to eat animals

plowed

if

no suffering were involved), and

land, thus allowing for

more room

it

would be

all

(2) that a vegetarian diet requires less

for other species to live.

19

Taylor would deny entirely

the moral legitimacy of Callicott's concept of nested communities based on sympathy. The shade
tree

problem which points out the weaknesses of

Callicott's

environmental ethics (above) points

out the weakness of Taylor's entire ethical system as well, unified though

too egalitarian to be tenable. The proposed indifference
conferred on

my family and

to, e.g.,

the proposed indifference to,

animal liberationist-environmental ethic that

is

e.g.,

it

may be:

the benefits

it is

simply

my shade tree

my affection for

it

make

for

has

an

both objectionable and impractical.

Taylor does spend an entire chapter on the problem of the competing claims of humans

and

wildlife,

but he incorporates a number of unfortunate assumptions.

based on the assumption of a just

social system,

70

First, his entire analysis is

thus precluding any meaningful discussion

about the effect of environmental policy on the possibility of social

justice.

This assumption

is

attached to another, namely that environmental justice can be divorced from social justice. Taylor
believes that

human

between them

lie in

ethics

is

separate from environmental ethics, and that 'the differences

the content of their respective systems of norms.’

not confuse 'the two domains of

22

ethics.'

At one point Taylor

is

21

explicit

He

is

concerned that

about the practical fallout

of this assumption:

Nor can we avoid the issue by arguing that in the long run the interests of humans
and the good of wild animals and plants coincide. Large numbers of organisms,
species-populations, and communities of life can be destroyed for the sake of

19

20

Taylor, Respect for Nature, p

295f

Taylor, Respect for Nature p 257
,

21

Taylor, Respect for Nature p 33

22

Taylor, Respect for Nature p 33

,

,

we
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benefiting humans, and

on Earth could

No

if

care and foresight are taken, the future of

be assured.

still

doubt, such destruction

straightforward proposition

is

23

earned out for the

is

human

humans, but

'benefit' of

burdened with a number of ambiguities.

First,

life

this

we can

seemingly
destroy the

environment for the sake of such benefits, but without actually bringing them about.
That

may be mistaken

about whether what

we

are doing

is

beneficial to us or not. Second, there

problem of identifying who the humans are that these practices are
of us alive

now may come

health to which attention

We must

constitutes a

good

is

usually called, as

life for

the whole

human

be met on a future Earth where humans

want of natural oxygen and ozone

does not

even

if

fulfill

even

I

discussed in the

if

layer.

it

being. Here

district will result in

first

made about what

what

is

know

usually neglected

it,

living

on a

the veridicality of our experiences

we

is

the

Homo

sapiens can

live their entire lives in climate-controlled buildings for

I

do not believe that

this

is

true. Indeed,

is

welfare-interests.

I

They would be

vibrant, exciting, diverse, life-filled planet.

la Star

Trek ) which would

make

it

would go so

is

important to

much

less interesting since

,

off,

Even having

I

argued in Chapter

own

experience.

by the 1940s farmers had

completely decimated with the simple shotgun the only parrot native to

Taylor, Respect for Nature p 259f

better

3,

us.

can extrapolate into the future on the basis of our

in the Eastern United States that

it still

possible to experience

holographic, representations of nature would not suffice since, as

Incidentally,

sort of life

those future people are acclimated to such a deprived existence,

experience machines (or 'holodecks' a

23

an increased

section of the previous

the implication that the interests of

their interests, for the issue here

they do not

realistic,

benefiting. Benefits for those

ambiguity are not just the obvious ones

not forget, though, that mistakes are also

psychological. Taylor's claim carries with

far as to say that

the

and unhealthy waters downstream. These are the obvious dangers to physical

rate of soil erosion

life

first

not knowing that such-and-such development of a riverside

chapter.

is

we

with costs to those living in the future.

Furthermore, the mistakes alluded to in the
like

is,

this continent, the

Isn't
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Carolina Conure, which used to occur abundantly in thick flocks
everywhere east of the
Mississippi? Arent our imaginations that

the moa, the largest bird of the

people to arrive in

first

are beautiful marine

New

much poorer on account

modem era,

all

mammals, but we

We

Bering Sea, killed off by 1768.

and the world's only

twelve species of which were wiped out by the

Zealand? The ten-foot long, half-ton manatees and dugongs extant
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been

deprived of the most magnificent Sirenian of

wolf,

of our not being able to witness

the twenty-foot, six-ton Stellar's Sea

all,

flightless

sparrow (we are lucky enough to have some short film
all

pygmy mammoths which

clips of

animals that humans have had a hand in killing

Natural extinctions also deprive us of experiences that would have

as of the

of the

have also missed out on the utterly alien dodo, the Tasmanian

the last Tasmanian wolf). Of course, these are
off.

Cow

survived on Pacific

Rim

made our

such

lives richer,

islands until as recently as about

3000

BCE.

I

that

hope that

in the previous chapter

would be enough

I

succeeded in arguing that

is

then
get

when we

spiritually healthy

environment.

destroy the environment

what they deserve.

If

a just state of

we

affairs

injustice to future generations

noted above,

we can imagine

If

entails depriving future generations of a

people deserve to

are making

then environmental destruction would be an

The

we

not compatible with environmental devastation for perhaps the

most obvious of reasons. Environmental devastation
and

are connected;

to counter Taylor's assumption that they are not. In addition, though,

can conclude that social justice

physically

all injustices

is

one

it

in

live in a healthy

environment,

the case that future generations do not

which everyone

gets

what they deserve,

injustice to future generations.

can also be put in nakedly

utilitarian language.

As

I

a future generation of humans living on a barren planet with

holographic substitutes for nature. Maybe the pleasure those humans would get from those
artificial trees

and birds would equal, quantity- wise, our own

that they do not

know what they

are missing (they

know

no acquaintance with the pleasure of experiencing the

(I

doubt

it),

perhaps due to the

fact

these things are not real, but they have

real

McCoy).

Still,

in the language of a
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utilitarian like Mill, the quality of the pleasure

real nature

is

inferior.

The pleasure

that,

inasmuch

as

environmental devastation

intensity of the pleasure

latter,

itself.

I

and that

believe Mill

denies future generations the intrinsically superior experience,

it

is

measured by the

wrong.

Taylor's errors arise from a fundamental mistake similar to

the

of experiencing

intrinsically superior to the pleasure of experiencing artificial nature,

superiority of quality cannot be

would say

would be

one of

Callicott's.

Taylor does not prescribe a 'shrinkage of the domestic sphere' and a

Now,

unlike

'return' to hunter-

—on the
he recognizes the value of continued technological
achievement—so
he cannot be charged with reducing human welfare-

gather cultures

contrary,

that

interests to physical

However,

interests like nutrition.

autonomy of other animals and

an

interest

is

the fact that

which

demand

that

we

give as wide a berth as possible to the

plants he does overlook one facet of a

which goes beyond both physical
culture.' This

in his

survival

humans

good human

and the achievements of what

we

might

life,

call

a facet

'interhuman

naturally take a non-consumptive interest in other animals,

exhibits itself in study, in aid (from bird feeders to helping beached pilot whales

back into the sea), and

in the desire for animal

companions. To divorce ourselves from animal

contact to the extent that Taylor's system seems to prescribe

is

to do the kind of injustice to

ourselves that Taylor wants us to avoid doing to other animals, an injustice attached to a kind of

unnatural interference in our

own

lifeways. Taylor

seems to regard every event

in

nonhuman

nature as good, even the (hypothetical) natural extinction of a highly developed species

and

mountain

gorilla,

and some

cultural values) as a

by natural

to regard

like the

any human intervention (aside from satisfaction of basic needs

prima

facie

extinction. This erroneous

wrong—even intervening

view

is

attached,

of emotion in ethics and his (related) liberal slant on

I

to save a species threatened

believe, to both his devaluing of the role

what

constitutes social justice.

Human

regard
emotional responses to other animals have no currency in Taylor's system. Some might
as a virtue of the system;

include the following:

I

have argued previously that

it is

this

a defect. His views on social justice
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People do not have a subsistence right to an income or employment beyond what
is required for the necessities of life. However, they do have a liberty right to
choose their own vocation and to earn an income beyond the subsistence level

under

The

which

social conditions in

everyone.

fair

equality of opportunity

is

extended to

24

right to subsistence

when

given assistance

a positive right insofar as

is

it

includes the right to be

need through no fault of one's own. A condition of
dire need is here understood to be one in which a person will not be able to do his
or her fair share in making available to those in dire need what is required to
sustain

I

in dire

25
life.

will not

spend a

lot

of time criticizing Taylor's views on

out two questions that the statements above

which

I

can exercise

my right to

the market, thereby making

choose

my right to

raise.

First,

my vocation?

fault of one's

own'? In the

Darwinian labor market

US

in

to animals

Is it

it is

for

Second, what constitutes

humans.

I

we

associate with

manner

that does not

do

of choices

among

right

his

human

by humans nor by

rights

communal

own

'dire

need through

inability to survive in the

conclude that Taylor's system

and plants and even, to some extent and despite

unified in a

will only point

defined by the jobs already available in

1995 many are saying that the very

formulated to exclude the kind of sentiment that
the animals and plants as

I

what defines the range

nobody’s fault but one's own. This view of

is

rights.

choose nothing but a right to choose from among equally

unsatisfying hourly-paid jobs in national chainstores?

no

human

is

ties.

is

deliberately

It is

as

bad

for

unified with respect

hesitations,

humans, but

their wild beneficiaries

it is

and

benefactors.

Veganism

6.1.3 Ahimsa. Jainism, and

Another more or
called veganism.

I

am

less unified ethic of

not sure

vegetarianism in inspiring

I

will rely primarily

Thorsons, 1985).

24
25

on

One

its

if

human, animal, and environmental justice

is

that

veganism has had greater success than animal liberationism or

followers with a single, shared vision; for purposes of this discussion

Victoria Moran's book. Compassion: The Ultimate Ethic (Wellingborough.

thing

is

certain, though,

Taylor, Respect for Nature, p 235
Taylor, Respect for Nature p 236.
,

and that

is

that

many vegans

strive for a unity in
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their treatment of animals, the environment,

of Jainism, from which

The most
most

ethical.

notes

It

view of wool.

distinguishing feature of veganism

precludes not only meat, but also

will present the rationale

many vegetarians and

Also like

indignities suffered

racing.

all

in

keeping with the tenets

the diet that vegans consider to be the

dairy products, eggs, and honey (Moran

not wear leather or

However, there
silk,

is

more

but vegans also take a dim

activists,

in laboratories, circuses,

vegans are opposed to the cruelties

and sports such

dog and horse

as

So, like vegetarians, vegans' ethics include a special concern for the welfare of

animals. However, what

makes veganism

not focused solely on sentient

to

behind these additional prohibitions momentarily.)

other animal rights

by animals

is

this last prohibition).

many vegetarians, vegans do
(I

is

derived, either directly or indirectly, their inspiration.

some disagreement among vegans on

veganism. Like

and

many vegans have

and other persons. This

nonhuman

of interest to us in the context of this chapter

is

that

it is

life:

The Golden rule applies not only to our conduct with fellow humans but to the
animal kingdom and, inasmuch as is possible, to the plant world and the earth
26

itself

.

Veganism

is

exploitation,

upon which we
[There

is]

called for

—

one thing and one thing only a way of living which avoids
whether it be of our fellow men, the animal population, or the
rely for our very existence.

soil

2'

the need to be certain that taking

life,

even that of a plant,

is

really

28
.

Although [vegans] live from plant products, they are opposed to wanton
destruction even of these and are sensitive to taking from the earth only as much
29
as they need and returning to it all they can
.

In connection with this last point,

plant

life

than

is

Moran

the diet of meat-eaters, since 'vegans... are not responsible for

consumed by animals they might otherwise have
final analysis

20
27
28
29
3<J

Moran, p

Eva

than do omnivores

13.

Batt, cited in

Moran, p 21.
Moran, p 49.

Moran,

p. 50.

points out that the vegan diet

Moran,

p.

19.

30
.'

eaten, and thus they

kill

far

is

also better for

all

the vegetation

fewer plants

in the
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Vegans also have concern

amount

of food an

acknowledgment

all- vegetable

of the

for social justice,

diet

makes

and an important case

available for

be solved by mass vegetarian conversions.' 31

special concern about the recurring

phenomenon

veganism

Some vegans

of war.

number

of vegan pacifists.

What

is

the

the

is

agricultural

There seems to be a
believe (and

to agree) that the indifference to the consumption of flesh cannot help but prop

mentality, whereas the moral abstention from meat

is

humans. At the same time, there

problem of 'unequal distribution of control over

resources... that can hardly

for

would have the opposite

I

would tend

up the war

effect.

Moran

cites a

32

common

philosophical foundation for

all

of these concerns?

It is

the principle

of ahimsa, or nonviolence. All the major Eastern religions include vows of nonviolence, but

probably the Jainist interpretation of ahimsa has had the most influence on vegans, through

Raychandbhai Mehta's influence on Gandhi and the

word

latter's

influence

on the West generally

’nonviolence’ does not appear in English until the historical emergence of Gandhi

translation of ahimsa necessary). Indeed, the founder of the American

Dinshah, explains veganism by
Jainism

itself

way

includes five

Vegan

for

monks and nuns

(the

vows are

made

a

Society, H. Jay

of six principles he calls 'Pillars of Ahimsa.'

vows

(the

33

less strict for

laypersons):

The monks and nuns take the
from

(1) injuring

life,

five 'great

vows' (mahavratas) pledging to abstain

what

not given, (4)
sixth vrata ('vow') consists of abstaining

(2) false speech, (3) taking

is

unchastity, and (5) appropriation. A
from taking food and drink at night: it is evidently aimed at avoiding injury to
insects, which might go unnoticed in the darkness, and thus is a consequence of
34
the first mahavrata
.

The

vratas are not directed specifically at either

human

or animal

life;

Jainism thus offers

a unified human-animal morality (continued in the popularity of pacifism in vegan circles). Also,

ahimsa s target
'

31

32

33

Sussman, cited

Moran, p
Moran, p

30.

Caillat, p.

509.

34

51

is

in

not just the avoidance of killing, but of any injury of any kind, even insult. Thus,

Moran, p 45.
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veganism

is

dairy, egg,

a stand against any activity which results in any undue harm, and vegans believe that

honey and wool production email such harm. That

protest of the particularly cruel

methods of factory farming

as

their complaints go

is,

it

happens to currently be practiced

(although of course they join in protests against such conditions).
that of mainstream vegetarians and animal liberationists?
will

round out

this brief explication of

The vegan
fertilized

egg

is

veganism;

it

will

Some

How does

their

consume

a chicken before

be followed with some

it is

view

answers to

specific

case against eggs can be summarized in three main claims.

in effect to

beyond the

differ

this

from

question

criticism.

First, 'to

eat a

bom.' Second, 'unfertilized eggs, the

products of a bird's sexual cycle, can hardly be regarded as natural food’ for people. Third, no one

hens past their prime,' nor

will 'support

will

anyone support the surplus of male chicks (when eggs

are hatched to produce another generation of layers ).

The vegan case
from

against dairy products

is

35

based on the inhumanity of separating mother

calf prematurely, the artificial induction of maturity in

young females, and the same

problems facing the egg industry of supporting surplus males and

The

two of these problems might not be

first

and (attempted)

inevitable, but the second

cruelty-free farming alike. Also, there

production are more efficient uses of land than
the production of grains for direct

The complaint
which
bees'

15

37

38

is

the point that although milk and egg

meat production, they

human consumption

honey seems

is

are

still

not as efficient as

3
.

to be specifically against commercial harvesting,

and death to bees due to rough handling and

do not seem to be inevitable

Moran,

p. 43.

Moran,

p.

40f

Moran,

p.

47.

Moran,

p.

76,

n.

10.

in

beekeeping.

38

36
.

two plague factory-farming

also in substitution of the

honey with com syrup (commercial harvesters do not just take the excess honey). These

factors

36

results in injury

against

older, non-productive animals
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The

objections to

wool are

also specifically against the

wool

industry. Right

now, wool

is

mostly a by-product of mutton, and those animals which are not killed for meat must
nevertheless
suffer

rough handling (including spillage of blood) and the danger of death from
It

would seem

and the reason

that,

under the

meat products (Frey

is

a meat-eater)

—

i.e.,

rather than against the intrinsic nature of the product.

three problems egg production has in

common

when one

like Frey's

reasons for

as a protest against the current practice

The only

serious objections to eggs are the

with milk: the surpluses of males and older,

unproductive females, and the relatively inefficient use of land. But
are only problems

39

honey and wool would be acceptable,

from these products now would be much

for refraining

refraining from

right circumstances,

cold.

I

think that these problems

has bought into a certain approach to production, namely the

centralized, profit-driven approach.

A

corporation in America certainly does not want to take on

the profitless task of maintaining even one unneeded male chick. However, that should not
influence

how we

imagine a practice closer to the

that the cost of the feed for a

than outweighed by
clutch.

I

would

do not know
it is

if

all

few roosters

bom

ideal.

For

my own part, would
I

like to

think

from the occasional hatched clutch would be more

the consumable eggs produced over the years by the hens from the same

like to think that the

same can be

said of the

upkeep of the occasional male

the employment of goats instead of cows would

worth investigating). The point

is,

when Moran

make

this less or

asks the question 'who

more

calf

costly,

would pay

(I

but

for the

upkeep' of such animals, she seems to assume that the 'who' has to be the same kind of 'who'

running things now. The possibility of

local, subsistence-oriented

production challenges that

assumption.

The

issue of the efficient use of land

is

the strongest objection to egg and dairy

production. However, the strength of the objection varies with the significance of eggs and dairy

products in the

diet.

The more nearly primary

a place in the diet such products are to occupy, the

cannot
greater the strain on the land. This can be mitigated by agreeing that such animal products

39

Moran,

p.

58
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by themselves replace what

is

currently

consumed

as

meat

(as

is

feared). Also, consumption (in

connection with production) should vary from region to region, depending on whether local
conditions permit such use of the land and whether the animals can live outdoors comfortably.
If

that

we

my objections

are

left

about animals

to the

vegan view on the use of food animals have merit, then

with the vegan charge that while

is

'the desire of

this

hope. ..in the pipe dream category.’

There are a number of things to say about

this charge.

in-the-air attitude of resignation to the current state of affairs

Moran's example of Harold and Jenny Bland,

who

generally' with their nearly self-sufficient lifestyle.

raising

who

for a return to traditional agricultural methods,... population

urban/suburban centralization put

were

non-vegans

two children on two and

it

seems

are concerned

numbers and

40

First of all, this

hands-thrown-up-

seems to render rather pointless

are 'proving the point of vegan economics
41

At the time of Moran's writing the Blands

a half acres with the help of fruit trees, a garden, a

wood-

burning stove, a solar oven, and a windmill. This return to small-scale living (along with the

examples of many other people) gives the

The resignation

lie

to the pipe-dream charge.

growth and urbanization contradicts

to current trends in population

Moran's interpretation of ahimsa as the principle of 'purposefully living to do the most good as
well as the least

harm

possible.'

current practice of capitalism

To shrug

may go on

growth and urbanization

off population

while

I

do

my vegan thing.'

is

to say 'the

Yet both overpopulation and

urbanization are underwritten by capitalist ethics, which vegans must oppose. After
goals of vegans

is

to

remove, at least to a large extent, two of nature's

animals. Secondly, as already noted, the argument that

allows

more people

commitment

to be fed with the available arable land

to changing the

A willingness
because,

40
41

Moran,

if

p.

to put

way

31.

one of the

to capital: land

and

should adopt a vegan diet because

is

it

meaningless without an attached

resources are allocated.

up with

social injustices

a seductive possibility for veganism

is

Moran's presentation of the vegan position

Moran, p 48

we

'gifts'

all,

is

representative, veganism has, just like the
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environmentalist ethics of Calhcott and Taylor, overlooked the question of what
constitutes a good
life

for a person. Again like Callicott

or do without.

and Taylor, the emphasis

Hence Schweitzer's mistaken

distance on pavement rather than walk in a
accidentally stepping on insects

he might cause to
as primarily a

insects,

burden

42

This

.

is

belief that

field, since

it

is

on what humans can put up with

would be better

for

him

to

walk a

the former entails a smaller chance of

a mistake because, in fretting

overmuch on the damage

Schweitzer forgets the injury he does to himself by conceiving of himself

to the lifeforms

around him. So, he cheats himself out of a pleasant and

stimulating walk on the earth, with the feel of blades of grass around his ankles and the sights of

swaying plants and grasshoppers leaping out of
concrete instead, the perfect vision of a person

The same tendency

his

way.

who

to forget one's duties to oneself might be informing vegan pacifism.

subscribe to Taylor's claim that

'in

against another in defense of our
,4

(

.

This too

opts for the dreary walk on the

has forgotten his duty to himself.

Based on Moran's report of vegan feelings about war,

the situation

He

the domain of

life

only

I

suspect that vegan pacifists would

human

ethics,

when we cannot

we

are permitted to use force

avoid the other's attack or escape from

an error and a forgetting of the consideration

is

while a pacifist position with respect to a given war might certainly be
that

human

situation'

beings are morally obligated to

—when someone

Indians' response to

right

now.

I

else forcibly invades their

am reminded

you accept your second-class status
of waitresses and waiters
Will you mix their martinis
Will you stand still for it
44
Or will you take to the hills ?

A nation

Moran,

p.

21.

Taylor, Respect for Nature p 268
,

44

Waters, Roger

homeland.

of the song 'Home,' by Roger Waters,

Will

42

i.e.,

I

justified,

I

ourselves. For

do not believe

to 'escape from the

am thinking

European invasion and the desire of Bosnian Muslims

When they overrun the defences
A minor invasion put down to expenses
Will you go down to the airport lounge

42

—

become refugees

we owe

who

of the Plains

to defend themselves

usually writes against war:
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cannot believe that people have a duty to put up with such an existence. Certainly, the

I

best thing
that

is

means

and

to be creative

find the least violent

means

not so peaceful as Gandhi's campaign of

is

civil

of effective defense, but sometimes

disobedience. Again

am thinking

I

of

the Bosnian Muslims. They deserve to be able to defend themselves.
This idea of 'doing without' as the primary virtue of veganism reaches

Jainism with the notions (amenable to Abaris) that the only acceptable food

drunk

daytime) and the best death

in the

neglect of the good

human

life,

the duties

is

that

by

we owe

starvation.

extreme

its

is

water

Vegans do not go

in

and

(filtered

but their

this far

to ourselves, enables also their refraining from

tackling head-on the issues of social justice.

It

seems to

me

that the positive ideals in ahimsa

attending to the ideal of the good

life

and veganism are best served by

for all people, not just to the least violent life for

former entail the condemnation of wool because of the suffering of animals, they

condemnation of cotton because of the suffering of people
from Indonesia to Los Angeles. Vegans must
insidious suffering of those

who

toil in

without health benefits. The truth
only because

amount

shoes

may be

cut

is

me.

If

the

entail also the

sweatshops of the Pacific Rim,

also take a stand against the less dramatic but also

forty-hour

monotony

that at this time

wages below the poverty

at

no vegan

is

a

'fully

by a machine that has a leather

of animal gelatin in photographic film,'

consume

wage

'vinyl

is

in the

my

45

etc.

level

accomplished' vegan, not

belt

on

it;

there

is

a minute

but also because almost every product

mediated by the exploitation and suffering of that most

and

we

ill-used of us animals, the

laborer.

6.2 Conclusion

I

and how

have examined the views of

we

can find a

fit

Callicott, Taylor,

and the vegans on the question of whether

between environmentalism, animal

have shown that each view

is

liberationism,

flawed. Indeed, they share at least one

a good
neglect to consider adequately the question of what counts as

45

Moran,

p. 72.

and

common
life

social justice.

flaw.

I

They each

for a person.

185

Callicott

and Taylor

fail

to appreciate the role that animals play in the psychological

welfare of humans. This in turn leads them to disparage or neglect the value of non-consumptive

human-animal
as, at best, a

relationships.

necessary

Vegans

like

Moran

characterize

human impact on

This also disparages the value of non-consumptive human-animal

evil.

relationships. All three regard, with varying degrees of explicitness, social

and environmental

ills

and animal suffering on the other

assumption to that

effect,

by

on the one hand

ills

as distinct problems. At best, each

regards at least two of these problems as being separately resolvable. This
explicit

the environment

is

camp

witnessed by Taylor's

complete neglect of social problems, and by

Callicott's

Moran's view that the goals of veganism can be met without addressing urbanization and
population growth.
Yet, as

I

have argued throughout

resolution of each of these problems

is,

we

when we

get

down

is

this dissertation,

but especially in Chapter

5,

the

not merely compatible with the resolution of the others;

to the practical level, a necessary

component.

It is

difficult to

imagine

are going to save the environment without giving up the international trade in beef.

difficult to

imagine

how

cruelty to animals will

to live a cruelty-free lifestyle.

It is

difficult to

if

we

It is

imagine

how

social justice will

have been done

live.

could achieve any one of these goals independently and at the expense of the

other two, there are

still

reasons

why we

dissertation, doing the right thing in

thing in the other two.

It is

should not. As

one of these cases

clear, then, that resolving

for perpetuating the other two. At the

justice offer

how

end without everyone having the economic power

without everyone having a healthy environment in which to

Even

it

is

I

have argued throughout

this

not incompatible with doing the right

one of these problems

will offer

no excuses

minimum, vegetarianism, environmentalism, and

complimentary, not competing, agendas.

social
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